Silverman's Game : A Special Class of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 424) (1995. x, 283 S. X, 283 p. 235 mm)

Silverman's Game : A Special Class of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 424) (1995. x, 283 S. X, 283 p. 235 mm)

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  • 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版/ページ数 283 p.
  • 商品コード 9783540592327

Full Description

The structure of a Silverman game can be explained very quickly: Each of two players independently selects a number out of a prede­ termined set, not necessarily the same one for both of them. The higher number wins unless it is at least k times as high as the other one; if this is the case the lower number wins. The game ends in a draw if both numbers are equal. k is a constant greater than 1. The simplicity of the rules stimulates the curiosity of the the­ orist. Admittedly, Silverman games do not seem to have a direct applied significance, but nevertheless much can be learnt from their study. This book succeeds to give an almost complete overview over the structure of optimal strategies and it reveals a surprising wealth of interesting detail. A field like game theory does not only need research on broad questions and fundamental issues, but also specialized work on re­ stricted topics. Even if not many readers are interested in the subject matter, those who are will appreciate this monograph.

Contents

1. Introduction.- Survey of prior work.- The payoff function and expected payoffs.- The sequences {pk} and {vk}.- The sequences {Vk} and {Uk}.- Equivalent variations.- 2. Silverman's game on intervals: preliminaries.- The key mixed strategies.- 3. Intervals with equal left endpoints or equal right endpoints.- The regions LAn, and equal right endpoints.- Case 1. [(1, B)] x [(1, B)].- Case 2. [(1, B)] x [(1, D)],1 < B < D.- Case 3. [(1, B)] x [(A, B)], 1 < A < B.- 4. Intervals with no common endpoints.- Case 4. [(1, B)] x [(A, D)], 1 < A < B < D.- Case 5. [(1, D)] x [(A, B)], 1 < A < B < D.- Case 6. [(1, B)] x [(A, D)], 1 < B ? A < D.- Appendix. Multisimilar distributions.- 5. Reduction by dominance.- Type A dominance.- Type B dominance.- Type C dominance.- Type D dominance.- Semi-reduced games.- 6. The further reduction of semi-reduced games.- Games with |M| = 1. (Reduction to 2 x 2.).- Games with M = 0 which reduce to odd order.- Games with M = 0 which reduce to even order.- 7. The symmetric discrete game.- The symmetric game with v ? 1.- The symmetric game with v < v(n).- 8. The disjoint discrete game.- The disjoint game with v ? 1.- The disjoint game with v < 1.- 9. Irreducibility and solutions of the odd-order reduced games.- The reduced game matrix A and the associated matrix B.- The polynomial sequences.- The odd-order game of type (i).- The odd-order game of type (ii).- The odd-order game of type (iii).- The odd-order game of type (iv).- 10. Irreducibility and solutions of the even-order reduced games.- The reduced game matrix A and the associated matrix B.- Further polynomial identities.- The even-order game of type (i).- The even-order games of types (ii) and (iii).- The even-order game of type (iv).- 11. Explicit solutions.- The game onintervals.- The symmetric discrete game.- The disjoint discrete game.- The reduced discrete game.- Semi-reduced balanced discrete games with no changes of sign on the diagonal.- Maximally eccentric games.- References.