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Kumārila on How to Denounce Buddhism as a Heresy in Terms of the Sources of Dharma


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Integrated Area Studies on South Asia at Ryukoku University (RINDAS): Fundamental Changes in Thought and Values in South Asia



In many studies, it has been pointed out that Indian society has undergone radical changes since the 1990s. This is seen in the political sphere in the spread and the deepening of democracy. In terms of the economy, changes are remarkable in the development of the market economy, improvements in living conditions and widening of economic gaps, which is one of the negative impacts of such economic growth. Societally, this has been expressed through the appearance and rise of various social movements. Culturally and religiously, it has been expressed through a parallel rise in assertion of identities by diverse communities. These changes can be seen as the results of embryonic fundamental changes in thought and values of people in India and South Asia.

The unified theme of this project is “Fundamental Changes in Thought and Values in South Asia.” One perspective being used to approach this theme is genealogical research along the long timeline of philosophy and thought in South Asian societies, using Ryukoku University’s extensive accumulation of research. Another is analysis of fundamental changes in values based on fieldwork research of actual conditions. These perspectives are combined in comprehensive research, with the aim of identifying the sources of changes in the foundations of contemporary Indian and South Asian societies, and the driving power behind them. Special attention is paid to the rise of the Dalits, other lower strata people, and religious minorities, a phenomenon that represents dynamic changes in contemporary Indian and South Asian societies. The project examines the background and theory behind this, with relation to the history of philosophy and thought, and investigates and analyzes changes in peoples’ living conditions, consciousness, and sense of values, based on fieldwork research.

The "South Asian Area Studies" Project (FY 2016 to 2021) is being operated and conducted by expanding upon the National Institutes for the Humanities’ “Contemporary India Area Studies” Project (Phase 1: FY 2010 to 2014, Phase 2: FY 2015). Ryukoku University is one of six institutions working together, conducting joint networked research. It is joined by Kyoto University (the central research hub), the National Museum of Ethnology (the secondary research hub), the University of Tokyo, Hiroshima University, and the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

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as a Heresy in Terms of the Sources of *Dharma*

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Kiyotaka Yoshimizu



Self-immolating Kumārila
from the movie
Adi Shankaracharya

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Introduction

Since the founding of Buddhism in India, many monks from Brahmin families have contributed to the development of Buddhist doctrine. Nevertheless, Buddhist theorists have always opposed the Brahmin philosophical schools. During the Gupta dynasty, the Yogācāra and Sāṃkhya schools debated with each other, and the Buddhist logicians of the Dharmakīrti lineage debated with the Nyāya school,

which had become a school of Śaiva theology. The content of their debate was limited to philosophical theories. It could be said that the Brahmin philosophers mostly ignored Buddhism as a religion and, in particular, Mahāyāna Buddhism as a social movement. Nevertheless, the Mīmāṃsā school—the most conservative among Brahmin schools—was an exception, and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (c. 560–620¹)

* The present monograph is an English translation of Yoshimizu 2015a, an expanded Japanese version of Yoshimizu 2015b. In the bibliography, I add a few studies that I could not refer to in Yoshimizu 2015a, such as Francavilla 2006 and Olivelle 2017. I thank Prof. Shōryū Katsura for granting me the opportunity to present the original version at the RINDAS Seminar on Traditional Thought (December 19, 2014).

¹ Unless there is an individual basis, I have followed Frauwallner's principle (1961:129), which sets the lifespan of philosophers at approximately sixty years, and I further adopt the chronological dates of Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660) computed by Frauwallner (1961:137–139). On this basis, I have assumed that Dharmakīrti used the ontological term *niyama* as the foundation for inference in the first chapter and the self-commentary of his *Pramāṇa-vārttika* (PV), which is regarded as his first work, by adapting the concept of *niyama* advocated in the inference theory of the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (BṬ), Kumārila's work in his later years. Thus I have supposed that Kumārila's death occurred around 620. Frauwallner's (1962) theory, which holds that the *niyama* in the inference theory in BṬ was influenced by Dharmakīrti, is difficult to accept. In regard to this, see Yoshimizu 2007c, 2011b, and 2020a, particularly its appendix. Recently, Franco (2015–2018:134–135) found out Dharmakīrti's use of a BṬ verse in PV, chapter 1.

In his criticism of the omniscient person (*sarvajña*), Kumārila criticizes the Jainas who assert the existence of a soul (*jīva*) who knows minute (*sūkṣma*) or past (*atīta*) objects by super-sensual perception (*indriyādyanapekṣin*) for committing the fault of interdependence between the authority of the omniscient person and that of scripture (*āgama*) (*Ślokavārttika* [ŚV], Codanādhikaraṇa, vv. 141–142). Fujinaga (2001:168–172) argues that with this criticism Kumārila refers to Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* (ĀM), vv. 5–6 (cf. Balcerowicz 2016:461–462). ĀM v.5: “Minute, disappeared, and distant objects are perceptible to someone because they can be known through inference, like the fire [on a mountain]. In this way, the existence of an omniscient person is established.” *sūkṣmāntaritatadūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā / anumeyatvato 'gnyādir iti sarvajñasamsthitiḥ //*; v.6: “Moreover, such a person is you (i.e., Mahāvīra) alone, faultless and whose speech is incompatible with neither reasoning nor scripture. [Your speech has] no incompatibility because what you maintain is not rejected by what is generally accepted.” *sa tvam evāsi nirdoṣo yuktiśāstrāvirodhivāk / avirodho yad iṣṭam te prasiddhena na bādhyate //* In his “simplest conclusion, and most innocuous one,” which is different from his hypothesis that assumes two or three Samantabhadras, Balcerowicz (2016:469) conjectures Samantabhadra's dates as 530–590 and the ĀM to be written around 580. If Fujinaga's interpretation is accepted and the ĀM was written around 580, it may be natural to suppose that Kumārila was born around 560.

As I mentioned in Yoshimizu 2015b, footnote 1, in ŚV, Nirāmbanavāda, vv.14–15, Kumārila holds the bifurcation of Mahāyāna philosophers that was most probably created by Bhāviveka (c. 490–570) (see Saito 2007:155), namely, *yogācārāḥ* and *mādhyamikavādināḥ*, to have already been well established. Moreover, in v. 15, “Of these, [namely, the cognition lacking an external object (v.14a) and the non-existence of the cognition (v.14c)], first, the former is common to both positions. [Moreover, according to

was its leading advocate.

The antagonistic relationship between Kumāriḷa and Buddhism is the subject of legends from the sides of both Buddhism and Hinduism. From the Buddhist perspective, Bu-ston (14 c.) writes that Kumāriḷa was the uncle of Dharmakīrti,² who stole Kumāriḷa’s robes and was banished when he was young.³ Moreover, Tāranātha (16–17 c.) states that the claim that Kumāriḷa was Dharmakīrti’s uncle is unreliable, and reports in detail that Dharmakīrti lived in Kumāriḷa’s house disguised as a servant, became his disciple, and fled after learning all the teachings of the Brahmins. After defeating one Brahmin thinker after another, Dharmakīrti challenged Kumāriḷa to a debate and won. He then succeeded in converting all of Kumāriḷa’s disciples to Buddhism.⁴ However, Kumāriḷa’s writings and fragments of his lost writing do not reveal anything that

the *mādhyamikavādins*,] after denying that (i.e., the reality of the object), one comes to conventionally (*saṃvṛti*) assume the cognition in the same way that [one has conventionally assumed the object]” (*tatra bāhyārthaśūnyatvaṃ tulyaṃ tāvad dvayor api / nivṛtṭyāsya tato jñāne tadvat saṃvṛtikalpanā //*), Kumāriḷa tells us that his contemporary Mādhyamikavādins advocate a transition from the provisional perspective of the Yogācāra to the ultimate perspective of the Madhyamaka applying the method of a “sliding scale.” Kumāriḷa also explains that Mādhyamikavādins hold the cognition’s object’s non-externality to be the basis (*mūla*) of the non-existence of the cognition (v. 16b). Because Bhāviveka, who is later called “Sautrāntika-mādhyamika,” does not, even provisionally, accept the Yogācāra view that cognition has no external object, Kumāriḷa’s contemporary Mādhyamikavādins must belong to the next generation of Bhāviveka.

² Bu-ston places Dharmakīrti’s birth in Cūḍāmaṇi (Obermiller 1932:152). Vidyabhusana (1978:303, n. 4) claims that this is Coḍa or Chola, a country in eastern Deccan, and that *yul lho chyogs* (the southern country), which is supposed to be the place of his birth in the colophon of the Tibetan translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* (Peking ed., vol. 130, 250a5), is also Deccan (1978:307, n. 4). “Eastern Deccan,” in this case, is probably the southeastern part of the Deccan Plateau. During the flourishing of the Pallava dynasty, before the new Chola dynasty arose in the ninth century with Tanjore as its capital, southern Deccan and Andhra Pradesh were occupied by several tribes that claimed to be connected to the lineage of the Karikan kings of ancient Chola and that are collectively called the Telgu Chola (from Takakuwa 1974:218–222 and <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chola-dynasty>). Furthermore, Tāranātha holds that Dharmakīrti was born in Trimalaya, which was formerly known as Cūḍāmaṇi (Schiefner 1963:175). Trimalaya is identified by Stcherbatsky (1964:34) with Tirumalla, and by L. Joshi (1986:146) with Tirumalai. Both are probably Tirumala (in Andhra Pradesh), a sacred site for Viṣṇu worship. Note that Xuanzang reports in the *Da Tang Xiyu Ji* (The Great Tang Records on the Western Regions) that the country “Cholya” lies between Dhanakaṭaka, a country at the mouth of the Kṛṣṇā River, and Kāñcīpura, the capital of the country Draviḍa (Pallava dynasty) (see Mizutani 2000:333–335). Takakuwa (1974:196–200) regards Xuanzang’s Cholya as the region ruled by the head of the Telgu Chola, whom the Pallava and others subjugated, and he identifies Cholya with present-day Nellore.

³ See Obermiller 1932:152.

⁴ See Schiefner 1963:177–179.

could be considered influenced by Dharmakīrti.⁵ Kumārila's later years may have overlapped with Dharmakīrti's younger years, but Kumārila's life ended before Dharmakīrti became known outside the Buddhist orders. It is unlikely that they faced each other directly, including in written exchanges like those in the Heian era of ancient Japan when Saichō and Tokuitsu argued about superiority between the theory of one vehicle (*ekayāna*) and the theory of three vehicles (*yānatraya*) for liberation.

The most famous legend on the Hindu side is told in the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* (ŚDV), a biography of Śaṅkara, the founder of the school of the Advaita Vedānta.⁶ Mādhava Vidyāraṇya, who is ascribed to be the author, reinforced the financial foundation of the Sringeri monastery, the base of the Advaita Vedānta school, through public worship of the goddess Śārādā under the protection of the Vijayanagar dynasty in the fourteenth century and wrote the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* (Compendium of the schools of philosophies). According to the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*, after Śaṅkara completed the commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on the *Brahmasūtra*, he wished Kumārila—the most highly regarded scholar of his time—to write a sub-commentary on his work and make it known worldwide. He then found Kumārila on the shores of the sacred site Prayāga (present-day Allahabad), where the Gaṅga and Yamunā rivers meet. However, Kumārila was surrounded by his disciples and buried in a mountain of chaff with only his head showing. Furthermore, the chaff had been set alight and was smoking vigorously, at which the disciples were crying.

When Śaṅkara asked what was happening, Kumārila recalled: Previously, I was enraged that Buddhism flourished with the support of influential people in the vulgar world and the Vedic tradition was being ignored, and I engaged in debate with a Buddhist monk but was defeated. Therefore, I falsely entered a Buddhist order to learn about the esoteric teachings of Buddhism. Once, I heard a wise Buddhist monk sharply criticizing the authority of the Vedas; despite myself, I shed tears out of frustration. My tears were seen by those around me, who realized my true nature. Consequently, the Buddhist monks pushed me off the tower roof; I lost an eye but remained alive. After leaving the Buddhist order, I attempted a debate with the master, which I won. I then banished the Buddhist order from the land and

⁵ Kataoka (2011a) seeks to support Frauwallner's theory about the relation between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, but it errs. See Appendix herein.

⁶ The Sanskrit-language movie *Adi Shankaracharya* was released in 1983 (director: G. V. Iyer; film advisor: T. M. P. Mahadevan) and can currently be viewed on YouTube. This movie also contains the meeting between Śaṅkara and Kumārila and the scene of the recollection by Kumārila. According to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adi_Shankaracharya_%28film%29, the role of Kumārila is played by Sreepathy Ballal.

restored the Vedic tradition. Now that I have completed what I ought to have done, I have decided upon suicide to absolve myself of the fault of “terrifying a master,” albeit a Buddhist monk, and thus, I am carrying it out.⁷

Śaṅkara is believed to have flourished around the end of the seventh century at the earliest,⁸ so he could not have met Kumārila, who lived around 600. Accordingly, this legend is fiction. Moreover, Mādhava himself did not write the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* in the fourteenth century. Instead, it is thought to have been written in his name in the eighteenth century.⁹ This work, however, is written as a compendium of previously compiled Śaṅkara biographies. The literary genre of Śaṅkara biographies was probably established in or after the fourteenth century, and several biographies continued to be written.¹⁰ Notably, they all include the scene where Śaṅkara meets Kumārila and a similar recollection by Kumārila.¹¹ It is a fact that throughout the Middle Ages, Kumārila was regarded as the standard-bearer of Buddhist criticism on the side of Brahmanism.

Documents showing that Kumārila was actively involved in the anti-Buddhist movement by Brahmin forces in real society remain from earlier—precisely the same era as Kumārila. In the *Vāsavadattā Kathā*, a literary work by Subandhu, there is a scene of competition for the heroine Vāsavadattā’s hand in marriage. Among the depiction of princes of different countries vying for her hand in marriage is this passage:

“Certain ones were like the adherent of the philosophy of Jaimini, who expelled [the philosophy of] the Tathāgata.”¹²

⁷ ŚDV 7.75: “And so he, seeking to absolve himself of the serious fault he bore due to having terrified a master, entered the chaff fire, as he knew the entire meaning of the Vedas and was orthodox, this sage.” *so ’yam guror unmathanaprasaktaṃ mahattaraṃ doṣaṃ apākariṣṇuḥ / aśeṣavedārthavid āstikatvāt tuṣānalaṃ prāviśad eṣa dhīraḥ // Manusmṛti (Mn 11.89) orders the same atonement as for killing a Brahmin to those who defy (prati-rabh) a guru.*

⁸ W. Slaje (2007: n. 1) sets Śaṅkara’s era around 670–700 due to his relationships with other thinkers. K. Harimoto (2006:106) places the period when Śaṅkara wrote the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* between 756 and 772 due to relationships with epigraphic materials.

⁹ See Sawai 1992:18–21; Bader 2000:53–62.

¹⁰ According to Bader (2000:23–25), ŚDV is based directly and indirectly upon four of the seven preceding Śaṅkara biographies that he consulted.

¹¹ According to Bader (2000:74 & 86, n. 26), all the *Śaṅkara* biographies before the ŚDV have a meeting with Kumārila, who is going to commit suicide, or at least with Bhaṭṭa/Bhaṭṭācārya/Bhaṭṭapāda. See AŚV 173,5–174,6 (173,11: The debate opponent is Jainaguru); VŚV 5.9–37.

¹² VK 24, 7–8: *kecit jaiminimataśrāviṇa iva tathāgata[mata]dhvaṃsinaḥ*. Kimura (1999:212) has already interpreted this as a mention of Kumārila, albeit without study.

This work is estimated to have been created around 600.¹³ The tale is primarily set in the region from the Vindhya Range to the Gulf of Cambay. Subandhu may have lived in the Avanti region (present-day Malwa region), centered on Ujjain, from the work's geographical range and customs.¹⁴ Then, judging from the geography seen in Kumārila's writings,¹⁵ the Vedic schools,¹⁶ and the descriptions of social

Jaimini is said to be the founder of the Mīmāṃsā school, but this is debated. See Yoshimizu 2021: 506–516.

¹³ The depiction of the competition for Vāsavadattā's hand in marriage contains a description that Uddyotakara is “the authority of Nyāya” (see VK 38, 13–19: *nyāyasthitim ivoddyotakarasvarūpām ... vāsavadattām dadarśa*; Kimura 1999: 211). Because Uddyotaka is the person who criticized the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the final work of Dignāga (around 500), in detail, his views probably became an authority representing the Nyāya school no earlier than the first half of the sixth century. Moreover, because VK has expressions that rhetorically lament the dog-eat-dog political chaos (VK 2,9–10), it seems that this work was written before Harṣavardhana, who assumed the throne in 606, achieved victory in the struggle with his political rivals and established his power (Hoernle 1909:138–139). In addition, Singh (1993:7) notes that *Vāsavadattā* and *Taraṅgavatī* are mentioned together in the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* by the Jainist Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa, and that a colophon of the Jaisalmer manuscript states that Jinabhadra wrote his own commentaries to this work at Valabhī in the year 531 by the Śaka calendar (608–609 in the Gregorian Calendar). Accordingly, VK was written around 600 and promptly became popular.

¹⁴ See Warder 1977:234; Singh 1993:14–15.

¹⁵ Kumārila explains that wherever a word is spoken, it expresses the same meaning: “whether the word ‘*agnihotra*’ (the name of a simple sacrifice) or the like is spoken in Valabhī or in Pāṭaliputra, it cannot cause the understanding of a different meaning.” (TV 613,19: *valabhyam pāṭaliputre vāgnihotrādīśabda uccāryamāṇo nārthāntaram prati-pādayati*). Kumārila must have given two places that were realistically the most distant from each other, which means that Valabhī (now Vallabhipura) is the westernmost and Pāṭaliputra (now Patna) is the easternmost representative city as seen from Kumārila's place of residence. In addition, Kumārila mentions twice the language of Lāṭa, a town facing the Gulf of Cambay, as an example of a regional language (TV 260,2 & 952,12; Kane 1978:172). Regarding Lāṭa, see Shastri 2000:105. Furthermore, the section on the language of barbarians (*mleccha*) (MmS 1.3.10) points out, albeit in the statements by the opponent, a few characteristics of the languages of *āndhra* and *draviḍa* in the south (but IO: *ānd[sic]radraviḍādi*; Ān: *draviḍādi*) and distinguishes them from the languages of western tribes like the Persians (IO: *pārasīka*; Ān: *pārasī*), the Greeks (*yavana*), the Romans (*raumaka*), and western barbarians (*barbara* = *barbaroi*?), among others, while including *āndhra* and *draviḍa* in the languages of *mleccha* (TV 226,8–10). In addition, Śabara mentions the *holākā* in the east, the *āhnīnaibuka* in the south, and the *udvṛṣabhayajña* in the north as regional festivals, together with directions (ŚBh 243,5–244,2), but he does not mention a festival in the west, nor does Kumārila. As they have probably divided the directions by comparison to their own places of residence, we can infer that they both lived in midwestern India.

¹⁶ The Yajurveda is broadly divided into the Black Yajurveda, which has both a Mantra section and a Brāhmaṇa prose section (precepts and commentary on rites) in the main collection (Saṃhitā), and the White Yajurveda, which has only *mantras* in the main

customs,¹⁷ the present author suspects that Kumārila may have lived somewhere in

collection, and each of these Yajurvedas branch out even further. For a broad outline of the Yajurveda, see Tsuji 1970:3–5; Gonda 1975:323–337. Many of the Mīmāṃsā subjects are interpretations of extracts from the Black Yajurveda corpora. In section MmS 3.4.30–31, Kumārila argued that the example text in the *Taittirīyasamhitā* should be understood literally, whereas an interpretation according to the corresponding passage in the *Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā* should be avoided. TV 969, 17–18: “That the giver [of horses] is entitled to the offering has already been established by means of the passage quoted from the Taittirīya *śākhā*. That would not be disproved by any other reasoning nor by any passages of other (*śākhās*).” *yathodāhṛtena tāvat taittirīyaśākhāvākyena dātur iṣṭiḥ siddhā. sā na nyāyāntareṇāpanīyate na vacanāntareṇa*. For details, see Yoshimizu 2016, section 6. Accordingly, Kumārila was active in a region where the Yajurveda division is occupied by the Taittirīya school (but he was not necessarily born in a family of the Taittirīya branch). Alternatively, he appears to have been in the Taittirīya sphere of influence through the process of elimination (see footnotes 78 and 106 herein).

According to Pāṇini, who was in northwestern India, “*taittirīya*” is a word derived from the personal name Tittiri (see A 4.3.102; Witzel 1982/83:185), and the *Bhāradvāja-gr̥hyasūtra* (BhGS) 1.21 (21,14), a Taittirīya text, contains the name of the Yamunā River, and the *Śrautasūtras* of several Taittirīya schools contain many quotes from the Maitrāyaṇīya and Vājasaneyin schools, which were founded in northern India (see Kashikar 1968:162–163). Therefore, the Taittirīya school of the Black Yajurveda is inferred to have been born in northern India, but it seems to have quickly expanded southward, and the compilation of the *kalpasūtra*, including the Dharmasūtras, seems to have been completed in southern India (Bühler 1879:xxxvi–xxxvii; Bühler 1882:xli–xlii; Witzel 1985: n. 13). A minimal number of donation inscriptions addressed to Taittirīya Brahmins have been excavated in northern India after the Gupta dynasty (Datta 1989:153–158). Moreover, the writer Bhavabhūti was born in a Taittirīya Brahmin lineage in the Vidarbha region (northeastern Maharashtra) (Warder 1983:271–273). For the distribution of the Yajurveda schools in Indian subcontinent, see footnote 67 herein.

¹⁷ The opponent criticizes that Arjuna’s marriage to Kṛṣṇa’s younger sister Subhadrā contravenes the marriage provisions that forbid marriage to a daughter of one’s mother’s brothers (*mātr̥bhrātṛtanayā*), since Arjuna’s mother and Kṛṣṇa’s father were siblings (see Mn 11.172; BDhS 1.2.3), amid the defense of the *Mahābhārata* heroes’ behavior, which appears at first glance to depart from *dharma*. In response to the criticism, Kumārila says that Subhadrā is not Kṛṣṇa’s real sister, but the daughter of Kṛṣṇa’s mother’s sister (*mātr̥svasrīyā*) or the daughter of a daughter of Kṛṣṇa’s mother’s father’s sister (*mātr̥pitṛ-svasrīyāduhitṛ*) (see TV 210,16-19; Yoshimizu 2016, n. 76), and he explains that Subhadrā is a maternal relative in the same generation as Arjuna but not the daughter of his uncle. In addition to his comment on differences in customs between northern and southern India, as in, “Southerners are satisfied with marrying the daughter of their own maternal uncle, but other people do not do that, out of hatred for it” (TV 204,26–27: *svamātulasutām prāpya dākṣiṇātyas tu tuṣyati // anye tu savyalīkena manasā tan na kurvate /*), the defense of Arjuna’s marriage suggests that Kumārila himself lived in a region that avoided matrilineal cross-cousin marriage, which was normal in southern India (see Rivers 1907).

Furthermore, MmS, volume 2, chapter 3, section 2 contains a debate in the interpretation of a certain ritual provision in the Rājasūya sacrifice, between an opponent who holds that “the person with ruling power is recognized as the king, regardless of their social class of origin” and a proponent who holds that “the king is limited to those from the *Kṣatriya* class” (see Yoshimizu 2020c). Śabara states, as a parlance supporting the

the midwestern region of India, in present-day southwestern Madhya Pradesh, eastern Gujarat, or northwestern Maharashtra. Therefore, Subandhu and Kumārila lived in the same period and were relatively close geographically. If that is the case, then by the end of the sixth century, Kumārila should have released his first work, *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV), and solidified his position as a Mīmāṃsā scholar. Moreover, he should have been writing his subsequent work, *Tantravārttika* (TV), while publicly criticizing Buddhism on various occasions, as presented in this paper. Therefore, Subandhu should have been aware of Kumārila’s social influence and used him metaphorically as a confident suitor.

The Mīmāṃsā school was born from speculative consideration of the structure of and relationships between Vedic sacrifices, initially having no relation to Buddhism. The later-formed parts of the *Śrautasūtra*, which describes in detail the sacrifices in each Vedic school, display considerations that are similar to parts of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (MmS), the fundamental compendium of the Mīmāṃsā school. However, once Buddhist orders gained social power, one chapter was added at the beginning of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* to combat it. To counter Buddhism, which held that the teachings of their founder, the Buddha, were the true *dharma*, volume (*adhyāya*) 1, chapter (*pāda*) 1 begins with the first *sūtra*, which proclaims the start of “an exploration of *dharma*” (*dharmajijñāsā*). This chapter argues that the only basis for recognizing *dharma* is the Vedas, and *dharma* cannot be recognized with experiential observations that rely on the senses.¹⁸

After the formation of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, the oldest surviving Mīmāṃsā literature is Śabarasvāmin’s commentary on the MmS, dating to around 500. Śabara

proponent, “The people of the Āndhra region call people ‘king’ if they are Kṣatriya, even if they do not make their livelihood by administration.” (ŚBh 580,6–581,1: *janapadapura-parirakṣaṇavṛttim anupajīvaty api kṣatriye rājaśabdān āndhrāḥ prayuñjante*). This is probably a custom among local people who revere the royalty who have the proper historical lineage but have had their power usurped, and who do not accept the legitimacy of Kalabhra control, in the period when the Kalabhra tribe, who patronized Buddhism and Jainism, controlled the Āndhra and Tamil regions (Karashima 2014:60, 85–86). Kumārila asserts that this custom is from the Āndhra and Draviḍa regions and then finds that this southern custom is a basis for supporting the proponent’s position (TV 585,27–28), based on the interpretive rule (MmS 1.3.10) that “word usage by foreigners (*mleccha*) will also be a basis to the extent that it relates to experiential things.” (TV 586,26–27) This statement by Kumārila was made from his confidence of being a resident of the land where Aryans live gregariously—the *āryāvarta*—north of the Āndhra region, like Śabara. See III.1 herein.

¹⁸ Here, I do not translate “*dharma*” or translate it simply as “law” in its wider application Olivelle (2000: 1) notes: “The term *dharma* may be translated as “Law” if we do not limit ourselves to its narrow modern definition as civil and criminal statutes but take it to include all the rules of behavior, including moral and religious behavior, that a community recognizes as binding on its members.”

quotes an entire section of the commentary *Vṛtti* that preceded him. It formulates the Mīmāṃsā school’s definitions of means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*),¹⁹ including discussions criticizing consciousness-only epistemology and the selflessness doctrine of Buddhism. From the Buddhist perspective, after presenting the basic precepts of the Mīmāṃsā teachings in chapter 9 of his *Madhyamakahrdaya* (Heart of the Middle Way), Bhāviveka conveyed the Mīmāṃsā authors’ criticism of “the Buddha being a *sarvajña* (omniscient person)” (vv. 15–17).²⁰ The *sarvajña* criticism is part of religious thought, but it is based on theological theory. By contrast, Kumārila directed his criticism toward the idea that the Buddha is a *sarvajña*, but also toward Buddhist missionary activities in society. As presented below, Kumārila’s denunciation of Buddhism is more vivid and harsh than previous anti-Buddhist criticisms by Brahmin scholars.

All of Kumārila’s writings are sub-commentaries on the Śabara’s commentary on the entire *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*.²¹ In volume 1, chapter 3 of *Tantravārttika*, Kumārila develops his criticism of “Buddhism as a religion.” Relying on the framework of legal source theory in the *Manusmṛti* (Mn), the first and the most voluminous Hindu code (Dharmaśāstra), he debates about the authority of various scriptures called “Smṛti” (originally meaning “memory” or “recollection”) that was formed by human beings. Kumārila quotes over twenty verses from nearly all chapters of the *Manusmṛti*²² and regards it highly. At the beginning of chapter 2, the *Manusmṛti* lists four sources of law (*dharmamūla*) as the basis for recognizing *dharma*. The criteria for determining good and evil are the revealed scripture (*śruti*, Veda), the recollected scripture (*smṛti*, written law), the customs of good people (*sadācāra*, customary law), and self-satisfaction (*ātmatuṣṭi*).²³ Buddhists devoutly believe in the Ratnatraya (triple gems), namely, the Buddha, Buddha’s words, and Buddhist orders. The Buddha is the object of belief. Buddha’s words that have been

¹⁹ Frauwallner 1968:24–60.

²⁰ See Kawasaki 1992:377 and 411.

²¹ The *Ślokavārttika* is a full-verse sub-commentary on MmS volume 1, chapter 1, consisting of sections on philosophical problems. The *Tantravārttika* is a sub-commentary from volume 1, chapter 2 through volume 3, and it discusses in detail the interpretive principles for discussion in the MmS. His commentary on volume 4 and following survive in the *Tuṣṭikā*, a collection of fragments. The *Bṛhatṭikā*, a work from his later years, is an expanded version of some debates in the *Ślokavārttika*, and it may have been uncompleted or dispersed and lost except for some fragments.

²² See Kane 1925:99, n. 26.

²³ Mn 2.6: *vedo ’khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidāṃ* / ācāraś caiva sādḥūnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca //*; 2.12ab: *vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyam ātmanah / *Gautamadharmasūtra (GDhS) 1.1-2: vedo dharmamūlam; tadvidāṃ ca smṛtiśīle; see Olivelle 2005:244.*

transmitted as precepts (*sūtras*) and rules (*vinayas*) are guidelines for thinking and living. The behaviors of Buddhist monks with high morals are life models. Moreover, people are required to determine things, constantly relying on their intellect and the *dharma* taught by the Buddha, and to “abide with yourselves as the island (i.e., refuge)”²⁴ (relying on oneself as a lamplight, 自燈明) due to the Buddha’s dying wish. However, Kumārila believed that all of these should be rejected because they are inconsistent with the four sources of law taught by the *Manusmṛti*.²⁵

I. Revealed scripture (*śruti*)²⁶

The Mīmāṃsā school asserts that “the Vedas are scriptures that were revealed” and regards their authority as absolute. The final section in volume 1, chapter 1 of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* examines the authority of Vedic corpus with names that appear to be of its author. This examination is held to prove that the Vedic tradition has no beginning, and people from every generation in the past have learned the Vedas that their masters learned from their preceding generations because the Vedas are not something created by human hands (*apauruṣeya*).²⁷

²⁴ *Mahāparinibbānasuttanta* (Dīghanikāya 16, ed. Rys Davids and E. Carpenter, PTS, 1903), 2.26: *attadīpā viharatha*.

²⁵ The *Manusmṛti* does not name Buddhism or any other specific religious groups. Instead, it refers to heretics who do not believe in the Vedas as *pāṣaṇḍa* and prohibits revering *pāṣaṇḍa* (Mn 4.30), living in a country controlled by *pāṣaṇḍa* (4.61), and offering water to a woman who aids *pāṣaṇḍa* if she should die (5.90), and requires the king to expel people affiliated with *pāṣaṇḍa* from the capital (9.225). Eltschinger (2014:36, n. 3) summarizes examples of usages and the etymology of “*pāṣaṇḍa*,” going back to inscriptions of King Aśoka.

²⁶ Old usage examples of *śruti* can be seen in *Mānavagṛhyasūtra* (MGS) 1.9.22 and GDhS 9.72. Both are from EINO CARD.

²⁷ For example, Śābara explains that the title of the text, *Kāṭhakaśaṃhitā*, begins with the personal name Kaṭha merely letting one know that Kaṭha is the expert of that text. *Śābarabhāṣya* (ŚBh) 102,6–10: “Even if the recitation [of the *Kāṭhakaśaṃhitā*, etc.] by Kaṭha, etc. were performed eminently and in a way comparable to no other, people would name [those after their names]. Moreover, it is passed down that Vaiśampāyana studied the entire [Yajur] Veda corpora, but Kaṭha studied on this Vedic corpus alone.* Whereas some people studied many Vedic corpora, he studied only one Vedic corpus, and because he is an expert on that (the Vedic corpus that he studied), the determiner [*Kāṭhaka*], which is not shared by the others, is applied [to that Vedic corpus].” *prakarṣeṇa vacanam ananyasādhāraṇam kaṭhādibhir anuṣṭhitam syāt tathāpi hi samākhyātāro bhavanti. smaryate ca vaiśampāyanaḥ sarvaśākhādhyāyī, kaṭhaḥ punar imāṃ kevalāṃ śākhām adhyāpayāṃ babhūveti. sa bahuśākhādhyāyināṃ saṃnidhāv ekaśākhādhyāyī anyāṃ śākhām anadhīyānaḥ tasyāṃ prakṛṣṭatvād asādhāraṇam upapadyate viśeṣaṇam.*

However, going beyond resolving individual doubts, Kumāriḷa founded the non-artificiality of the Vedas upon the basis of principles in his own way. If the non-artificiality of the Vedas could be proved by human intellect through experience or logical reasoning, the human intellect would become superior to the Vedas and damage their absolute authority, he says. Kumāriḷa argues in volume 1, chapter 3 of the *Tantravārttika* that the Śrautasūtra is a ritual scripture but not *śruti* (revealed scripture). In the discussion about why the Vedas can be *śruti* though being a ritual scripture like the Śrautasūtra, he admits that the Vedas cannot be actively proven not to be artificial. However, he states that those who recited the Vedic *mantras* could not believe them to be created by human skill.

Concerning the Vedas, the fallacy that they “are a created thing” arose from spurious reasoning, such as “because their essence is the collection of words and sentences,” as long as one has not perceived the form of the Vedas because of being outside [Vedic culture] (*bahiravasthāna*). However, having perceived the form of [*mantras*] themselves, such as a *ṛc* and a *sāman*, one ceases this fallacy. Listening even to the opening of the [three] Vedas, a person of intellect cannot deem at all that they are artificial.²⁸

Then he quotes the first part from the *mantra* collections of the Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, and Sāmaveda. He praises them as texts written in a transcendently excellent language that definitely could not have come from human intellect, as they are far removed from worldly literary works,²⁹ and draws the following conclusion:

As shown above, every time students, teachers, or bystanders observe the forms of the Veda words and sentences and their meanings, they are sure to

* In Indian legends, the Vedas, which were originally one, were split into four divisions (*vy-as*) by Vyāsa, the creator of the *Mahābhārata* (MBh), and one division was passed down to each of four disciples (MBh 1.57.73–75; 12.314.23–24). One of these, Vaiśampāyana, received the Yajurveda (*Viṣṇupurāṇa* [ViPu] 3.4.8), and Kaṭha was one of Vaiśampāyana’s disciples (*Mahābhāṣya* [VMBh] vol. 2, 316,4–5: *vaiśampāyanāntevāsī kaṭhaḥ*; see Tsuji 1970:36).

²⁸ *Tantravārttika* (TV) 237,11–15: *vedeṣu hi tāvad eva padavākyasaṃghātātmakatvādi-hetvābhāsaiḥ kṛtakatvabhāntir bhavati. yāvad (IO; Ān: yā tad) bahiravasthānād vedarūpaṃ na drśyate / ṛksāmādisvarūpe tu drṣṭe bhāntir nivartate // ādimātram api śrutvā vedānāṃ pauruṣyatā / na śakyādhyavasātum hi manāg api sacetanaiḥ //*

²⁹ See Harikai 1994:157–158; Yoshimizu 2008a:65–66.

ascertain that [their forms] are recognized by themselves (*svasaṃvedya*) as being non-artificial.³⁰

Apologetics like this is a rejection of responses to the criticism that Buddhists have frequently made since the *Tevijjasutta* (The Threefold Knowledge) (Dīghanikāya 13), that the authority of the Vedas cannot be rationally proved. To avoid attempts at proof because they are beyond the bounds of rationality might be seen as an outburst of defiance, but Kumārila took a most rational approach from his viewpoint. Anyone who recites the Vedic *mantras* might naturally be convinced that the Vedas are not artificial, without further examination or proof. Here Kumārila does not mention Buddhism by name. However, he turned to his advantage the term “self-consciousness” (*svasaṃvedana*) used in the doctrine that cognition has “form” (*sākāra*), which became the mainstream in Buddhist epistemology from Dignāga onward, and implicitly reproached the Buddhists, saying that they vainly seek to prove the artificiality of the Vedas on various grounds because they have not learned the Vedas.

Kumārila set up a defense of Veda’s supreme authority by refusing to prove that the Vedas are not artificial on any grounds. However, he raises criticisms of the Buddha’s supreme authority as a *sarvajña* (omniscient person) to attack Buddhism in his early work, the *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV), and the surviving fragments of his later work,³¹ the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (BṬ), which was quoted in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* by Buddhist Śāntarakṣita. The argument in the ŚV is concise, while that in the BṬ is detailed, but the *sarvajña* criticisms in both texts follow the same path. The criticism was developed from two points.³² First, no human can become a *sarvajña*

³⁰ TV 238,23–24: *evaṃ ca yadā* (IO; Ān: *yadā* omitted) *yadādhyetāro adhyāpayitāraḥ pārśvasthā vā vedapadavākyatadartharūpāṇy ālocayanti tadā* (IO; Ān: *tadā* omitted) *tadā svasaṃvedyam evāpauruṣeyatvam adhyavasyanti*. In Mīmāṃsā, the existence of the self (*ātman*) is known by *svasaṃvedya*. See ŚBh 67,14.

³¹ On the chronological order of Kumārila’s works, see Yoshimizu 2007a:213–219; Yoshimizu 2020a, n. 4.

³² ŚV, Codanāsūtra, vv. 110cd–155; TSg vv. 3127–3245. Even Manu, the compiler of the *Manusmṛti*, could not directly recognize *dharma* by his own power, and he should have been able to recognize *dharma* only after being taught the Vedas by others (see footnote 73 herein). Kumārila states that the *sarvajña* criticism in the Codanāsūtra section of ŚV applies to Manu as well. TV 163,27–28: “In addition, it is probably imagined that Manu, etc. has capabilities different to all present-day humanity, but this was dismissed in the argument on *sarvajña*.” *punaś cedānīmtanasarvapuruṣajātiviparītasāmarthyakalpanā manvādeḥ tac caitat sarvajñavāde nirākṛtam*. See Harikai 1975:63; McCrea 2009: n. 21. On the statement, “because that consists of the knowledge of all things” (*sarvajñānamayo hi saḥ*) in Mn 2.7 relating to the Vedas and not Manu, see Wezler 1982.

because nobody can obtain awareness of their life after death. Second, even if there were a *sarvajña*, we would have no means of recognizing who it is.³³

However, Kumārila does not believe that “every person is equally unaware of matters relating to their lives after death.” He writes that people can know from the statements in the Vedas what they should do in their present life in order to be born in their next life under certain circumstances. Considering that Vedic statements are included in “teaching by words” (*śabda*), one of the six means of knowledge, humans can become *sarvajña* in a certain sense.³⁴ He then believes that the “erudite” (*śiṣṭa*),³⁵ namely, the person who has learned the Vedas and the sciences based upon them through education, stands in a better position than ordinary people who have not done so.³⁶ The grammarian Patañjali had already defined *śiṣṭa*:

³³ Some of these BṚ verses quoted in the TSg are also quoted in Ratnakīrti’s *Sarvajñasiddhi* (see Frauwallner 1962; Bühnemann 1980:174). As this *sarvajña* criticism has already been extensively studied (see Harikai 1985:50-61; Kawasaki 1992:262-326; McClintock 2010; Moriyama 2012:231–234), this monograph will not discuss its contents further except for one topic in the Appendix.

³⁴ ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 111cd: “If a person becoming a *sarvajña* were to occur through the six means of knowledge, what could this be prevented by?” *yadi ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ syāt sarvajñāḥ kena vāryate*; TSg v. 3134: “Moreover, who would not agree that a person who has discerned the objects of the six kinds of knowledge by the six means of knowledge is, in summary, a person who knows all?” *tathā ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇair yaḥ ṣaṭprameyavivekavān / so ’pi saṃkṣiptasarvajñāḥ kasya nāma na sammataḥ //*

³⁵ *Śiṣṭa* is the past participle of the verb *śās*, meaning “teach,” and once a disciple (*śiṣya*) has finished acquiring all of the master’s teaching, they become a *śiṣṭa*. Because Mīmāṃsā requires studying by being taught by another, this monograph translates it as “erudite.”

³⁶ In the Mīmāṃsā before Kumārila, Śabarāsvāmin had already observed that the word meaning of scriptures is ascertained by *śiṣṭa*. ŚBh 217,5–518,1: “[What is accepted] by people who are grounded upon scripture is the meaning of words. Who are the people who are grounded upon scripture? They are erudite. They have uninterrupted memories concerning multifarious words and Vedas. For this reason, erudites are the basis when ascertaining [the meaning of the words of] the revealed scriptures and the recollected scriptures.” *ya śāstrasthānāṃ sa śabdārthaḥ. ke śāstrasthāḥ. śiṣṭāḥ. teṣāṃ avicchinnā smṛtiḥ śabdeṣu vedeṣu ca. tena śiṣṭā nimittaṃ śrutismṛtyavadhāraṇe*. See Taber 2012:141. Attacking this point, Dharmakīrti points out, “The actual words of the Vedas do not speak directly to people” (PV 1.312), and raises an objection to the Mīmāṃsā view that understanding of Vedic texts requires commentary by erudites, giving the criticism, “If someone says that they correctly know and can give commentary on the meaning of the words in the Vedas, it would become impossible to deny that there could be some people who know extrasensory matters without relying on the Vedas” (PV 1.313). See Wakahara 1990 and Taber 2012. On the interdependence of the scriptures’ authority and the erudites’ authority, see also footnote 214 herein.

“The Brahmins who are in the fixed dwelling place of the Aryans,³⁷ have enough cereal to fill a jar, are not greedy, have no [vulgar] motives, and have pursued learning of some kind without requiring any special [effort] are erudite.”³⁸

According to this definition, Kumārila considered having extensive knowledge of the Vedas essential for an erudite. He taught that regardless of which law source is used as a basis for justifying a norm, the norm must be recognized by erudite people. *Śiṣṭa* in the grammar tradition is limited to educated people up to Patañjali’s era who could use Sanskrit correctly as their everyday language.³⁹ However, the Mīmāṃsā interpreted it expansively to include intellectuals of the same era, when a new Hinduism was being organized.⁴⁰

II. Recollected scripture (*smṛti*)

1. Heresy due to contradictions with the Vedas⁴¹

³⁷ On “the place where Aryans live gregariously” (*āryāvarta*), see III.1 herein.

³⁸ VMBh, vol. 3, 174,8-10: *etasmīn āryanivāse ye brāhmaṇāḥ kumbhīdhānyā alolupā agr̥hyamāṇakāraṇāḥ kiṃcidantareṇa kasyāścid vidyāyāḥ pāragās tatrābhavantāḥ śiṣṭāḥ*. Cf. BDhS 1.1.5: *śiṣṭāḥ khalu vigatamatsarā nirahaṅkāraḥ kumbhīdhānyā alolupā dambhadarpalobhamohakrodhavarjitāḥ* (≅ above VMBh); VDhS 1.6: *śiṣṭas punar akāmātmā*. See Kane 1968-1977, II, 2:971-972; III:825-826; Pollock 1985:505; Cardona 1997:552.

³⁹ See Thieme 1957:60–62; Deshpande 1993.

⁴⁰ See footnote 212 herein. Śabara included intellectuals of his time as *śiṣṭa* as well and said: The elective sacrifice (*kāmyakarman*, which grants benefits in the present life) does not need to be held regularly as an obligation, unlike fixed sacrifices (*nityakarman*), but once it has commenced, an obligation to perform it right to the end arises (MmS 6.2.13: *prakramāt tu niyamyeta* ...). However, those who break down and end the elective sacrifice partway will “be rebuked by the erudite” in the community. ŚBh 1397,20–1398,1: “In fact, to those who begin something like this (the elective sacrifice) and then complete it, the erudites do not rebuke them saying, ‘This person only starts [sacrifices], and we should not interact with him.’ Furthermore, receiving a rebuke from erudites is a fault.” *yo hy ārabdham evaṃjātīyakaṃ samāpayati, na taṃ śiṣṭā vigarhante, prākramiko ’yaṃ asaṃvyavahārya iti śiṣṭavigarhaṇā ca doṣaḥ*; ŚBh 1259,15–17: “Even if you lose [your wish], there is a restriction [that you must complete the elective sacrifice] for that (MmS 4.3.24). ... so that you do not receive a rebuke from erudites for not completing [the elective sacrifice] although you began it. Erudites would immediately rebuke such a person, saying, ‘This person is a wretched fellow who only begins [sacrifices].’” *vīte niyamas tadartham ... śiṣṭāvigarhaṇāya. upakramyāparisamāpayataḥ, tadanantaram evainaṃ śiṣṭā vigarhayeyuḥ, prākramiko ’yaṃ kāpuruṣa iti vadantaḥ*. Śabara’s *śiṣṭavigarhaṇa* (ŚBh 1398,14) appears to be an expression imitating “to be rebuked by good people” (*sadbhir vigarhita-*) (see MBh 1.92.5; 5.9.26; 5.128.35; 5.133.7; 11.14.13).

⁴¹ This monograph considers only Kumārila’s perspective when calling Buddhism a

Smṛti is a text written by ancient sages and passed down as scriptures. The official view of the Mīmāṃsā school⁴² is that the authors of these works previously heard and memorized the Vedas from other sources and later recollected them and compiled them into the text, which is why they are called “recollected scripture” (*smṛti*).⁴³ From a historical point of view, however, the Vedas are the oldest ritual texts, and the Smṛti texts all originated several centuries after the Vedic era, not to mention the case of the *Manusmṛti*. Moreover, looking at their contents, the main topics of the law codes are norms for life in secular society and do not include Vedic sacrifices. Therefore, common sense suggests that the individual provisions of the Smṛti are unlikely to be supported by precepts in the Vedas. Given this, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* assumes an opponent who rejects all scripture other than the Vedas, and argues in response to this opponent: If people who follow a Smṛti are accustomed to conducting sacrifices precisely as stipulated in the Vedas, the Smṛti

“heresy.” As historically Buddhism was not born out of the Vedic religion upheld by the Brahmins and separated from the Brahmin orthodoxy, it cannot be called heretical in the same sense as in Christianity. Nor is it clear whether Kumāṛila’s orthodoxy was supported by royal power as the Christian orthodoxy was since the Edict of Thessalonica by Theodosius I (380 CE.). However, in the quotation in footnote 80 herein, Kumāṛila notes that Buddhism proclaims the same goals as the Vedas and, then, he evaluates it as preaching the wrong path to reach them.

⁴² TV 165,12–14: “Moreover, [the law codes of Manu, etc.] themselves were handed over [to the readers] after being compiled by the people (i.e., the law code compilers) who remembered [the corresponding provisions in the Vedas] thinking, ‘The Veda as a whole is the source of *dharmā*,’ and ‘The entirety [of *dharmā*] is taught in the Veda.’* Accordingly, this (i.e., the fact that the provisions of the law codes have their sources in the Veda) should have [factually] been confirmed for certainty by the people acting at the time [of the compilation of law codes], because they act discreetly. For this reason, the validity [of the law codes] is established through the Veda.” *api ca vedo akhilo dharmamūlaṃ sarvo abhīhito veda iti ca svayam eva smṛtibhir ātmā badhvā samarpitas* (Ān; IO: *samarpitam*) *tac caitan niyogatas tatkalaiḥ karṭṭbhir buddhikāritvād upalabdham ataḥ siddham veda-dvāraṃ prāmāṇyam*.

* In response to the opponent who raises the criticism that Mn 2.6a “*vedo ’khilo dharmamūlaṃ*” and Mn 2.7c “*sa sarvo ’bhīhito vede*” lack foundation (TV 163,16–17; cf. NSu 121,15–16), Kumāṛila probably would have regarded these two passages as a meta-rule that control the *Manusmṛti* as a whole.

⁴³ The early Dharmasūtras explicitly stated, “Finding a religious foundation in the gods, etc. for the norms in life in society is useless, and acts praised by Aryans are *dharmā*, while acts criticized by them are the opposite (*adharmā*)” (ĀpDhS 1.20.6–8; Ikari & Watase 2002:344–345; Wezler 2004:629), and the word “*smṛti*” was used in the sense of “recollection of unwritten traditional customs.” (GDhS 1.2; Wezler 2004:635–637) However, opposing the rise of the religion of renunciates, “*smṛti*” gradually came to be used in the sense of “recollection of words in the Vedas that serve as a source,” and it became a source of law subservient to *śruti*. On the transition in the significance of “*smṛti*” in the various Dharmasūtras, see Brick 2006.

can be recognized as correct.⁴⁴ For example, Mn 4.150cd states:

“On the days of *aṣṭakā*, and the following day, one should always worship the ancestor spirits.”⁴⁵

This provision requires a special ancestor ceremony on the *aṣṭakā* days, that is, the eighth day of the black part (*kṛṣṇa pakṣa*, the last half of a month) of the three (or four) months of winter from the latter half of November in the closing stages of the year.⁴⁶ While the Vedas did not mention a special ancestor ceremony by the name of *Aṣṭakā*, Mīmāṃsā believed that *Atharvaveda* (AV) 3.10, a *mantra* that praises the goddess *Aṣṭakā* at the end of each year, was the mark (*liṅga*) that suggests the *Aṣṭakā* ancestor ceremony.⁴⁷ The equivalence with the Vedas required to justify a *Smṛti* has lax standards. As long as it can be associated with the Vedas with a mark of some kind, it is justified because the erudite who has inherited Vedic culture has approved and performed it. However, to force that the Veda supports the correctness of the *Smṛti*, the Mīmāṃsā school openly supposes, in a way that is forbidden to modern-day scholars of philology, that there should be a corresponding injunction of the Vedas (*vidhi*), once a supporting mark is found in a surviving Vedic *mantra* (the formula chanted during a ritual) or explanatory passage (*arthavāda*, commentary on the significance of a ritual).

Before Kumārila, Śabara had already reported the debate on how to think about this supposition.⁴⁸ First, Śabara had the opponent say that the *Smṛti* precepts not supported by the existing Vedas cannot be means of knowledge because no one had heard and confirmed the Vedic text that would be their source no matter how many generations one may trace back in an unbroken chain.⁴⁹ Kumārila assumes a

⁴⁴ MmS 1.3.2: “No, [the recollected scripture, *smṛti*,] should be a means of knowledge as that whose [sources] are inferred to be [in the Vedas], due to the commonality of the agent of action.” *api vā karṣṣāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānaṃ syāt.*

⁴⁵ Mn 4.150cd: *pitṛṃś caivāṣṭakāsv arcen nityam anvaṣṭakāsu ca//*

⁴⁶ The three months of Mārgaśīrṣa, Pauṣa, and Māga, and the month of Phālguna. For the details of the *Aṣṭakā* ceremony in *Gṛhyasūtras*, see Gonda 1980:450–456.

⁴⁷ Śabara quotes AV 3.10.2a, “(the goddess that) people welcome with joy” (*yāṃ janāḥ pratinandanti*) in ŚBh 165,9 (on alternative readings, see Yoshimizu 2012a: n. 33). AV 3.10.5 and 8 pray for the safety and long life of “descendants” (*prajā*), which is deeply related to the ancestor spirits.

⁴⁸ The three theories described below have already been summarized in Kane 1968–1977, III:829–831 and Harikāi 1974:65–68; thus, there is no need to cover them again. This monograph discusses why Kumārila proclaimed the theory of the scattered sources, which is a point not discussed by Kane or Harikāi.

⁴⁹ ŚBh 162,3–4: “Because the texts [of the Vedas] can be perceived (heard) directly, it is

provisional position for rebutting this opponent and calls it the theory of “constantly inferring” (*nityānumeya*) that the Vedic passages that are their source do exist somewhere every time the *Smṛti* is passed down, leading to the present-day.⁵⁰ But that position is not correct. Basing them on the Veda that no one has ever learned is like telling what colors things are by a group of people born without eyesight. The metaphor of blind people fumbling around to form a line, with the person in front leading the person behind, appears in the *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*.⁵¹ Buddhism referred to it in the *Tevijjasutta* (Dīghanikāya 13) and the *Caṅkīsutta* (Majjhimanikāya 95) as a metaphor for the Brahmins passing down the Vedas from generation to generation, even though they cannot prove that the Vedas are correct.⁵² By the time of Śabara before Kumāriḷa, the Mīmāṃsā rebutted what Kumāriḷa calls “constant inference theory” by changing this metaphor into a visual information transmission scene.⁵³

not impossible to have recognized [the texts] earlier than [recognizing their meaning]. However, in the case of *Aṣṭakā* and others, for which the effects cannot be confirmed through experience, there is no cause for assuming that [the original Vedic text] was recognized in advance [of recognizing *Aṣṭakā*], so that [*Aṣṭakā* and others] are known to be no more than an imaginary recollection.” *pratyakṣeṇopalabdhatvād granthasya, nānupapannaṃ pūrvavijñānam. aṣṭakādiṣu tv adṛṣṭārtheṣu pūrvavijñānakāraṇābhāvād vyāmoha-smṛtir eva gamyate.*

⁵⁰ TV 164,8: “They (the Vedic precepts that act as sources) have constantly been inferred and certainly have never been recited.” *nityānumeyās tā na kadācid uccāryate.* In Śabara’s commentary, this theory is only presented by the opponent and rejected, and it is not clear whether the Mīmāṃsaka who asserted this as his own theory factually existed before Śabara. Śālikanātha from the Prabhākara school espouses this theory (PrkP 249,8–250,4), but Prabhākara himself was faithful to Śabara and wrote that the Vedic precepts that act as sources were forgotten (Bṛh 80,2: *vismaraṇopapatteś ca pratipattuḥ*). Śālikanātha probably relied on this outdated theory out of antipathy against the Kumāriḷa’s school, rather than upon Prabhākara’s works.

⁵¹ *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* 2.5d: “like a group of blind men, led by a man who is himself blind.” (Transl. by Olivelle 2005) *andhenaiva nīyamānā yathāndhāḥ.*

⁵² DN vol. I, 239,19–21 = MN vol. II, 170,15–17: “Just as a file of blind men go on, clinging to each other, and the first one sees nothing, the middle one sees nothing, the last one sees nothing.” (Transl. by Walse 1987: 189) *seyathāpi, ... andhaveṇi paramparā-saṃsattā purimo pi na passati majjhimo pi na passati pacchimo pi na passati.*

⁵³ ŚBh 162,4–6: “For example, it is like this: Let us say a person born without sight says, ‘I remember this specific color.’ When asked, ‘Where did you gain recognition [of the color] in advance [of recollecting it]?,’ he points to another person born without sight. [When asked,] ‘Where did he [gain recognition of the color in advance of recollecting it]?,’ [he responds,] ‘From another person born without sight.’” *tad yathā kaścij jātyandho vadet. smarāmy aham asya rūpaviśeṣasyeti. kutas te pūrvavijñānam iti ca paryanuyukto jātyandham evāparaṃ vinirdiśeta. tasya kutaḥ. jātyandhāntarāt;* TV 164,11–12: “But that is not correct, because of the principle of transmission between people without sight. Because a decree that had not been recited at any time had not been presented to any person’s perception or the like, it is extremely difficult to say that it exists.” *tat tv ayuktam. andhaparamparānyāyād eva. yā hi codanā na kadācid uccāryate tasyāḥ sarvapuruṣa-*

Regarding the Vedic precepts that formed the source for the Aṣṭakā ceremony and the like, Śabara himself opines that they have fallen out of heredity, and have been forgotten (*vismaraṇa*).⁵⁴ However, from Kumārila’s perspective, invoking lost inheritance under the “lost (*pralīna*) sources theory” is like summoning a dead person to witness in a trial.⁵⁵ Believers of heretical religions could also justify their theories because their scriptures are based on the lost Vedas, if their existence is not disproved.⁵⁶ Having rebutted the “lost sources theory,” which had been an accepted theory until then, Kumārila proposes his “scattered (*viprakīrṇa*) sources theory,” which states that “sources that cannot be found in the Vedas of one’s school should exist somewhere in the Vedas currently passed down by other schools.”

In fact, the various Vedic passages that are scattered among the separate Vedic corpora and should be perceptible to separate people [who inherit them] ... are put together in their recollection.⁵⁷

Some circumstances explain why the Vedic sources of Smṛti, although passed on to other schools, cannot be found. Many schools that passed down their unique Vedic corpora are scattered all over India. Moreover, the Vedas do not have chapters collecting the norms for everyday life, so the sources of individual Smṛti provisions are interwoven into chapters on various Vedic sacrifices. For this reason, people do not have the perseverance to find the sources for all the daily life norms in the Vedic corpora.

The diverse Vedic corpora are scattered [throughout the land], humans are lazy, and the sources of Smṛti lie in various chapters [of sacrifices], which is why they cannot be found.⁵⁸

pratyakṣādiprasarābhāvād durlabhataram astitvam.

⁵⁴ ŚBh 165,6: *vismaraṇam apy upapadyata iti.*

⁵⁵ TV 161,12: *mṛtasākṣikavyavahāravat pralīnaśākhāmūlatvakalpanāyām.*

⁵⁶ TV 163,8–9: “However, if one were to accept that [the provisions of the recollected scripture] are based on the lost Vedic corpus [even if they do not exist in the surviving Vedas], the recollected scriptures of the Buddha and others would all be means of knowledge by this method.” *yadi tu pralīnaśākhāmūlatā kalpyeta tataḥ sarvāsām buddhādismṛtīnām api taddvāraṇ prāmāṇyaṇ prasajyate.* See Harikai 1974:57.

⁵⁷ TV 187,16-18: *śākhāntaraviprakīrṇāni hi puruṣāntarapratyakṣāṇy eva vedavākyāni... piṇḍīkr̥tya smaryante.* Cf. Olivelle 2017:97.

⁵⁸ TV 164,18-19: *śākhānām viprakīrṇatvāt puruṣāṇām pramādataḥ / nānāprakaraṇasthatvāt smṛter mūlaṇ na dr̥śyate //.*

However, whether it is claimed that “the source Vedas have been lost” or that “a Vedic school somewhere else currently passes them down,” the outcome is the same in that it is not possible to show the Vedic location of the supposed precepts. Kumārila asserted the theory of the scattered sources because he claimed that Brahmins should be tolerant of other Vedic schools to adopt their own lifestyle. Among Brahmins, the Vedas are imagined as a single giant tree, the “Veda tree” (*vedavr̥kṣa*), growing from a single root, even though each school passes down different Vedic corpus. The tree’s trunk has four parts corresponding to the four divisions of the Vedas, with each dividing further into smaller branches. The Vedic corpora for each school, which include the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads, centered on the Saṃhitās, which collect the sacred *mantras*, are likened to single branches (*śākhās*) that extend out from the four trunks.⁵⁹ In the same way that a gardener’s job is to maintain and cultivate the branches of trees,⁶⁰ the Brahmins are obligated to correctly learn from the preceding generation and correctly pass on to the following generation the Vedic corpus of the schools to which their households belong. Kumārila places the relationship between the individual and the universal at the base of his ontology. Every individual of the same species, for example, every cow of different nature, is endowed with the same universal property, cow-ness,

⁵⁹ Renou (1947:29) finds an example of “*śākhāntara*” in ĀpDhS 1.12.4 as an older source. Witzel (1982/83:193) shows an illustration of a *vedavr̥kṣa* depicted by a modern Brahmin (see Witzel 1981: n. 3 for the source). Śābara states that the partial disagreement in terms of content between two Vedic corpora does not constitute proof that the sacrifices differed between them, but is rather a point of similarity between two branches extending from the same tree. ŚBh 639,6–8 (on MmS 2.4.18): “It is not true that each branch is perfectly provided with a full set of flowers and fruit. This case is also similar to [the fact] that each (Vedic corpus) is not perfectly provided with a full set of chapters of subservient rites. Accordingly, given that [all] matters are not necessarily perfectly provided [in the Vedic corpus for each school], they can be called ‘branches.’” *na caikaikasyāṃ kṛtsnaṃ puṣpaṃ phalaṃ sannihitam, evam ihāpi, naikaikasyāṃ kṛtsnaṃ guṇakāṇḍaṃ sannihitam ity arthasamnidheḥ śākhāśabdopapattiḥ*. Kumārila also uses the word *vedavr̥kṣa* while likening the Vedic corpus of each school to the branches of the same tree. TV 639,18–19: “Because [the Vedic corpora] are an authority for [gaining] the result of some sort of sacrifice [for each school], it is well known that all are branches from the same ‘tree of the Vedas.’ It is like a single tree having many branches.” *ekasya vedavr̥kṣasya kiṃcitkarmaphalāśrayāt / evam śākhāḥ prasidhyanti bahuśākhāikavr̥kṣavat //*

⁶⁰ Śābara used this simile as a foundation for the *apūrva* theory predating Kumārila, i.e., the theory that deems *apūrva* to be the ritual pattern unique to each sacrifice that was traditionally established in advance of individual persons. On this basis, he likens the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) to a “designer of garden forestry” (*ārāmapoṣaka*) who enters an existing garden and cultivates the trees. See ŚBh 1641,3–6; Yoshimizu 1996:33.

whole and equal, without lacking anything in the slightest.⁶¹ He says that this relationship also holds between the *śākhās* as individual Vedic corpora and the essence of the Vedas (*svādhyāyatva*⁶²).

In completely the same way that the universal form (*ākṛti*, or *sāmānya*) inheres in each individual, the essence of the Vedas inheres in each Vedic corpus (*śākhā*).⁶³

This statement in *Tantravārttika*, volume 2, chapter 4, section 2 appears amid an argument that sacrifices stipulated in each *śākhā* are the same as long as their titles are the same, notwithstanding any differences in details between them.⁶⁴ However, it appears that in the Brahmin society of the period and region where Kumārila was active, some people believed that it was sufficient for a Vedic

⁶¹ See ŚV, Ākṛtivāda, v. 17; Vanavāda, vv. 30–31, 35–36, 46; Yoshimizu 2011a: 579–581.

⁶² The *sva* in *svādhyāya* is not “one’s own individually,” but “ours” in the sense of “belonging to one’s household for generations.” *Svādhyāya* means the daily repeated recitation of a Vedic corpus. Moreover, as the object of the verb in the injunction “*svādhyāyam adhīte*” or the learning precept “*svādhyāyo ’dhyetavyaḥ*” (*Aitareyāranyaka* 2.15.7; for Kumārila’s interpretation of this *vidhi*, see Harikai 1990:118–119), it can also mean the actual Vedic corpus of a specific school to which one’s family belongs (Malamoud 1977:45–46). Kumārila himself identifies *svādhyāya* as one’s own Vedic corpus as follows. TV 635,21–22: “In the first place, learning a different *śākhā* is completely not permitted for a single person, because the word *svādhyāya* is understood to mean one *śākhā*.” *śākhāntarādhyayanam tāvad ekasya puṃso naiveṣyate. kiṃ kāraṇam. svādhyāyagrahaṇenaikā śākhā hi pariḡṛhyate /*; TV 635,24–26: “For that reason, because [in the injunction] ‘*svādhyāya* should be learned,’ [*svādhyāya*] is the subject introduced in response to [the listener] seeking to know [what] the acts [one should perform are], it is intended that the singular number is used [in ‘*svādhyāyaḥ*’]. Therefore, [only] one *śākhā* is to be learned.” *ataś ca “svādhyāyo ’dhyetavya” iti karmāvabodhanaṃ praty upādīyamānavād vivakṣitaikasamkhyaikā śākhādhyetavyā*. If a word in an injunction represents the object that that injunction should regulate, the grammatical number of the word is intentional (see Yoshimizu 2006).

⁶³ TV 635,24: *yathavivakṣitīḥ prativyakti samavāiti tathāiva svādhyāyatvam ekaikasyāṃ śākhāyām*. Kumārila again argues about the “intention” (*vivakṣā*) contained in Vedic injunctions that the same “supreme self” (*paramātman*) resides within each of the individual Vedas as its body (see TV 702,4–703,17; Yoshimizu 2007a:220–229). This can also be construed as representing the thinking that all Vedic schools are equal.

⁶⁴ Kumārila says that every Brahmin should learn the *śākhā* of the school which their household has belonged to for generations and must not concurrently learn another *śākhā* in the same Vedic division and flaunt their knowledge. TV 636,14–15: “Moreover, for this reason, simply because he is too intelligent, a person who would also learn different Vedic corpora belonging to the same division of the Veda may, when he becomes rich, mix barley and rice [to make an oblation] when holding a sacrifice (resulting in spoiling the sacrifice).” *ataś ca yo nāmātimedhāvitvād ekavedaḡatāni śākhāntarāṇy apy adhīyīta* (IO; Ān: *adhīte*) *sa samṛddhaḥ san vrīḥiyavair api miśrair yajeta* (IO; Ān: *yajet*).

division to have one major Vedic school. It is of no consequence even if minor Vedic schools die out.

As one Vedic corpus alone could obtain all people's acceptance [regarding sacrifices], shouldn't the other Vedic corpora be nothing but meaningless?⁶⁵

The *Mahārṇava* is a lost summary of law codes (Nibandha) compiled in or before the 11th c.⁶⁶ Still, its fragment that describes the geographical distribution of the Vedic schools is quoted in an extant text.⁶⁷ The Yajurveda division, which is

⁶⁵ TV 638,24: *nanu caikayāpi śākhayā samastapurusaṣpratipādane sati, anarthakam eva śākhāntaram.*

⁶⁶ The *Mahārṇava* is also called *Prakāśa*, *Mahārṇavaprakāśa*, or *Smṛtimahārṇava*. See Kane 1968–1977, I, 2: 652–655; Witzel 1981: 126.

⁶⁷ According to the *Mahārṇava* fragment quoted by Mahidāsa, the author of the commentary *Bhāṣya* (CVBh) on the medieval work *Caraṇavyūha* (CV), which shows the branches of the four divisions of the Vedas, firstly, the four divisions of the Vedas are composed of separate schools north and south of the Narmadā River. CVBh 33,16–22: Siegling 1906:36,8–13: “This is also [explained as follows] in the *Mahārṇava*: ‘The Narmadā River is said to be a central band in the land. Different *śākhā* are related in the regions to the north and south [of the river]. In the region south of the Narmadā River, the Āpastamba school [in particular in the Taittirīya school of the Black Yajurveda], the Āśvalāyana school [of the Ṛgveda], the Rāṇāyanīya school [of the Sāmaveda], and the Paippalāda school [of the Atharvaveda] share sacrifices and daughters among themselves. Alternatively, in the region north of the Narmadā River, the Mādhyandina school [of the White Yajurveda (Vājasaneyin school)], the Śāṅkhāyana school [of the Ṛgveda], the Kauthuma school [of the Sāmaveda], and the Śaunaka school [of the Atharvaveda] share sacrifices and daughters among themselves.’” *tac ca mahārṇave—pṛthivyā madhyarekhā ca narmadā parikṛtitā / dakṣiṇottarayor bhāge śākhābhedaś* (Siegling; CVBh: *śākhā vedāś*) *ca ucyate (sic) // narmadādakṣiṇe bhāge āpastamby āśvalāyanī / rāṇāyanī pippalā ca yajnakanyāvibhāginah // mādhyandinī śāṅkhāyanī kauthumī śaunakī tathā / narmadottarabhāge ca yajñakanyāvibhāginah //* The quoted *Mahārṇava* fragment gives the names of the *śākhā* of the *Ṛgveda* and the names of the *śākhā* of the *Yajurveda* in the eastern and western parts of southern and northern India, respectively, in a further seven verses, and at the end, it states that the Kāṇva school of the White Yajurveda (Vājasaneyin school) “had been spread to all regions” (*sarvadeśeṣu viśtrīṭā*) by the sage Yājñavalkya. See Deshpande 2010:46–49; Deshpande 2012:351–353. For the distribution of Vedic *śākhās* in modern India, see Witzel 2016.

According to this *Mahārṇava* fragment, each region formed marriage relationships among Brahmins by exchanging women (“share out daughters [to each other]” *kanyāvibhāgin*) between families belonging to specific *śākhā* in the four Vedic divisions. Therefore, we may say that the Vedic restrictions influentially remained within the traditional Brahmin societies in the middle ages, when Hindu rites had developed in general society, and Vedic sacrifices (*yajñas*) were seldom conducted jointly between divisions. This is because the *śākhā* handed down over generations in one's family influenced one's marriage, in addition to determining what one should learn. In addition, it would influence one's social status. For example, the title *cāturvidyasāmānya* appears on the inscriptions of

most closely related to Mīmāṃsā, birthed the Vājasaneyin school (White Yajurveda) in the east after the establishment of the Black Yajurveda schools in ancient northern India. From this fragment of the *Mahārṇava*, we can see that the Vājasaneyin school gradually spread its influence toward the west. After the fall of the Gupta dynasty, it threatened the Maitrāyaṇīya school, which had spread to midwestern India, among the Black Yajurveda. In Kumārila’s era, the Vājasaneyin school was probably seeking to expand into southern India, where the Taittirīya school had previously moved to claim as its area of influence.⁶⁸ Kumārila directly opposes a contemporary opinion that sought to promote the globalization of Vedic schools in the Indian subcontinent. In his view, no matter how many people belong

the Maitraka dynasty after the fall of the Gupta dynasty. Njammasch (2001:304) construes this as “a Brahmin community concentrating on religious activities,” while Shastri (2000:204) construes it as “a member of the local council of experts (*pariṣad*)” (see Mn 12.112). People in lineages with weak *sākhā* that are not incorporated into local *sākhā* associations could only be placed at a disadvantage in the local community.

⁶⁸ M. Willis focuses on an inscription excavated at Eran made at the time of Budhagupta (ca. 477–488) (Fleet 1888:89, No. 19). According to that, the grandfather Indraviṣṇu of the Gupta dynasty retainer Mātrviṣṇu, who had this inscription carved, completed the study of the Vedas (*adhītasvādhyāya*), executed sacrifices (*kratuyājīn*), was a Brahmin saint (*vīprarṣi*), and was called the “bull of the Maitrāyaṇīya school” (*maitrāyaṇīyavrṣabha*). In addition, Willis interpreted King Samudragupta, famous for the performance of the *Aśvamedha* (horse sacrifice), as being praised as “equal to Kubera, Varuṇa, Indra, and Yama” by the Allahabad inscription carved on the Aśoka pillar (Fleet 1888:8, No. 1, line 26: *dhanadavaruṇendrāntakasama*), and pointed out that unlike the Yajurveda corpora of other schools, the *Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā* (MS 2.6.11[70,10]) lists *dyumna*, *tejas*, *indriya*, and *kratu* as the four godly powers received by a king who undergoes libation (*abhiṣeka*) in the Rājasūya sacrifice, interpreting these four deities as corresponding in order to the four powers (he construes *dyumna* as meaning wealth). On this basis, Willis infers that because Mātrviṣṇu’s grandfather Indraviṣṇu was from the same period as Candragupta II, the Maitrāyaṇīya school were involved in the court ceremonies of the Gupta dynasty (Willis 2009:189–192). The flourishing of the Maitrāyaṇīya school until around shortly after the year 500 towards the end of the Gupta dynasty can also be inferred from the fact that Śabara (see Garge 1952:19–22) and Bhartr̥hari (see Rau 1980) appear to have been particularly deeply related to this school, from the quotations of Vedic texts in their works.

However, according to Njammasch (2001:313), inscriptions in the Maitraka dynasty (from 502), which flourished after the fall of the Gupta dynasty, contain twenty-eight offerings to the Vājasaneyin school but only eight offerings to the Maitrāyaṇīya school. Moreover, Mazumdar (1974:81) investigated fifty-seven northern Indian inscriptions dating from 1030 to 1225, concluding that not a single inscription was offered to Black Yajurveda schools. Accordingly, the influence of the Maitrāyaṇīya school in western India must have declined significantly after the fall of the Gupta dynasty. In addition, Mahidāsa writes that those from the Maitrāyaṇīya school study White Yajurveda (CVBh 33,1–2: Siegling 1906, 35,11: *maitrāyaṇīyas tu vājasaneyavedādhyāyī*). In Mahidāsa’s time, the Maitrāyaṇīya school followed the *Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā* when they performed ceremonies among themselves, but to survive within the local Brahmin community, they were forced to study the White Yajurveda as well.

to a particular school, every Vedic corpus is perfectly endowed with the essence of the Vedas, and in this respect, they are all equal.⁶⁹

The Vedic corpora (*śākhās*) inherited in other schools have significance to them as long as certain people teach them, and therefore it is not possible [to say] to other people, “that has no significance.” The prospect [probably held by those in dominant schools] that “the people belonging to those [minor] schools would also understand [that the Vedic corpus of their school lacks significance] if they would only learn it (the Vedic corpus of the dominant school)” does not hold true, because the Vedas are eternal and [in any school] there is no beginning to the connection between learning it (the Vedic corpus unique to the school) [from the master] and having [the disciple] learn it. In addition, it is not correct to move away from the Vedic corpus transmitted directly [from one’s master] (*sampradāya*) and exert the same efforts to learn the Vedic corpora of other schools because that corpus is the cause of one’s fame.⁷⁰

Similarly, in a debate on the authority of recollected scriptures (*Smṛti*) in volume 1, chapter 3, he describes respect for the Vedas of other schools as the basis for advocating the “theory of scattered sources” rather than the “theory of lost sources” of the *Smṛti*:

In fact, this Veda is precisely the same, whether it is recited [as *Śruti*] or recollected [as *Smṛti*], in that it is made known to people [through being transmitted⁷¹]. Therefore, they are equally distributed [to people who transmit the Veda by either method]. While not being pronounced, the [recited] Veda

⁶⁹ However, as a Mīmāṃsaka, Kumārila gives the Yajurveda highest precedence over the four divisions of the Vedas. See Yoshimizu 2013b.

⁷⁰ TV 638,25-29: *na ca puruṣāntaragatam śākhāntaram* (IO; Ān: *śākhāntaram* omitted) *tatpratipādanenārthavad anyān praty anarthakam bhavati. yas tu te 'pi kila śākhinas tām evādhītya pratipatsyanta ity abhiprāyaḥ sa nityatvād vedasya tadadhyayanādhyāpana-saṃbandhānādītvād anupapannaḥ. kiṃ ca. sampradāyāgatam muktivā sva*(IO; Ān: *svām*) *samākhyānibandhinīm / śākhām śākhāntaram yuktam nādhyetum sadṛṣe śrame //* See Yoshimizu 2016, section 3.

⁷¹ NSu 159,19–20: “[Here, Kumārila] says: although the forms of the phonemes [in the surviving Vedic text that serves as *Śruti*] can be directly perceived [unlike the phonemes of the Vedic text that has been imagined as sources for *Smṛti*, both Vedic texts] are equal because their inheritance by transmission without beginning relies on people.” *varṇa-svarūpasya pratyakṣatve 'py anādisampradāyāgatavasya puruṣādhīnatvāt tulyatām āha.*

remains within the learners solely by their disposition (*saṃskāra*) or by the memory created thereby. For this reason, when those (Smṛti compilers) expound the meaning of the Veda [in their Smṛti], the Veda expounded as the recollected meaning is equivalent to the [Veda] being recited [in one's own school], so what rationale could be given for excluding it?⁷²

The Vedas must not be put into written form, but must be passed on orally from master to disciple, which means that even the existing Vedic texts handed down in one's school are merely preserved in one's memory unless they are chanted orally. Therefore, if a Smṛti compiler partially learned the Vedas of other schools and recalled them while enacting some provisions based on the wording therein,⁷³ the other schools' Vedas that served as sources will have equal authority as their own Vedas, in that they are retained in people's memories from ancient times without beginning. Thus, since it is necessary to respect the Vedas of other schools, we cannot immediately deny the authority of the Smṛti provisions just because we do not find them in the same form in our own Vedas.

Moreover, if after rejecting some recollected scripture, [you], who have a thorough theoretical knowledge, soon hear a revealed scripture that is passed down in another school [and forms the source for that], how would your countenance appear, being so proud of yourself as a theorist?⁷⁴

Here, Kumārila advocates tolerance, warning that if one discovers wording that serves as a source in the Vedas of another school after rejecting a certain Smṛti because it cannot be found in one's own Vedas, “you will completely lose face.” However, Kumārila's tolerance toward other Vedic schools is inseparably

⁷² TV 187,22-27: *vedo hīdṛṣā evāyaṃ puruṣair yaḥ prakāśyate / sa paṭhadbhiḥ prakāśyeta smaradbhir veti tulyabhāk // anuccāraṇakāle ca saṃskārair eva kevalaiḥ / tatḥkṛtasmarāṇair vāyam vedo 'dhyeṣu tiṣṭhati // tenārthaṃ kathayadbhir yā smṛtārthā kathyate śrutiḥ / paṭhitābhiḥ samānāsau kena nyāyena bādhyate //* See Pollock 1997:411-412; Olivelle 2017:97.

⁷³ Kumārila infers that Manu compiled the law codes in precisely this way. TV 164,27–28: “Manu and others did not necessarily study the Vedic corpora of all schools, because they probably strove to hear the Vedic corpora of other schools from people who studied them and wrote down just the meaning in their own words so that they did not forget them.” *na cāvaśyaṃ manvādayaḥ sarvaśākhādhyāyinaḥ. te hi prayatnena śākhāntarādhyāyibhyaḥ śrutvārthamātram svavākyair avismaraṇārthaṃ nibadhnīyuh.*

⁷⁴ TV 188,5-7: *bādhitā ca smṛtir bhūtvā kācin nyāyavidā yadā / śrūyate nacirād eva śākhāntaragatā śrutiḥ // tadā kā te mukhacchāyā syān naiyāyikamāninaḥ /* Cf. Olivelle 2017:98.

connected to the intolerance toward those who do not believe in the Vedas. In *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.3, it was explicitly stated that Smṛti should be immediately excluded if it contradicts (*virodha*) the Vedas.⁷⁵ In this respect, Buddhist orders defy Vedic traditions in their founder, followers, and mission methods.

[Founder:] As someone who is a Kṣatriya deviates from their obligations and gets the occupation of missionary work and receiving [charity], how could such a person be trusted to “explain *dharma* without confusion”?⁷⁶

[Followers:] Because [the words of the Buddha] have mostly been entrusted to the unenlightened people in the fourth class (Śūdra) and the untouchables outside the three Vedas, it is unthinkable that the Vedas are their source of law.⁷⁷

[Mission methods:] The [provisions of] various recollected scriptures [that do not have their source in our revealed scriptures], such as initiation ceremonies, agree with revealed scriptures seen in other schools,⁷⁸ but things

⁷⁵ MmS 1.3.3: “However, in the event of contradictions [with the extant Vedas], [the recollected scripture] should not be reflected upon, because [the source in the Vedas] is inferred when there is no [contradiction with the surviving Vedas].” *virodhe tv anapekṣam syād asati hy anumānam*.

⁷⁶ TV 195,9-10: *svadharmātikrameṇa ca yena kṣatriyeṇa satā pravakṛtvapratigrahaḥ pratipannau sa dharmam aviḥkṛtam upadekṣyatīti kaḥ samāśvāsaḥ*. Cf. Olivelle 2017:103. In Hindu law codes, teaching *dharma* and receiving sacrificial fees as a charity are the privilege of the Brahmins. See Mn 1.88; 10.75 & 77.

⁷⁷ TV 195,8-9: [*śākyādivacanāni tu ...*] *trayībāhyebhyaś ca caturthavarṇaniravasita-prāyebhyo vyāmūḍhebhyaḥ samarpitāṅṅīti na vedamūlatvena sambhāvyaṅṅte*. See Eltschinger 2014:68, n. 146; Olivelle 2017:103.

⁷⁸ TV 188,1-4: “When all the various words of Smṛti [that have no source in our Vedas] concerning initiation ceremonies, etc. are regarded as being based on Vedic texts recited in the Kāṭha or the Maitrāyaṅṅīya, etc., if any of the texts among them was an erroneous recollection [of the Vedic text], our tongues would not say [that that entire Smṛti] arose based on something other [than the Vedas].” *kāṭhamaitrāyaṅṅīyādīpaḥḥitaśrutimūlikāḥ / dṛśyaṅṅte smṛtayaḥ sarvā yadā (IO; Ān: bhadra-) upanayanādiṣu // tadā tanmadhyapāty ekam vākyam kiṅcid apasmṛtiḥ / mūlāntarodbhavaṅṅ vaktuṅṅ jihvā no na pravarttate // Cf. Olivelle 2017:98. This statement shows that Kumārila deemed the Kāṭha and Maitrāyaṅṅīya schools to be external schools. The initiation ceremony received by Aryan disciples when they begin their studies is a personal rite of passage (*saṅṅskāra*), so it is not a usual topic in the Vedas. However, as an exception, the Upanayana-Brāhmaṅṅa about the initiation ceremony exists as a Brāhmaṅṅa fragment from the Kāṭha school (see Sūryakānta 1981:47–52; Kajihara 2003:2–3). Moreover, *Śatapathabrāhmaṅṅa* (ŚB) 11.5.4 also follows the order of a similar initiation ceremony to the Kāṭha school (see Kajihara 2003:2–3), so the Yajurveda school that Kumārila is related to must not be the Vājasaneyin school, either. Accordingly, the Taittirīya school remains through the process of elimination.*

like building shrines, worshipping them, and alms for receipt by Śūdra certainly do not agree [with any revealed scripture].⁷⁹

Although the Buddha was born into the Kṣatriya class, he abandoned the Kṣatriya obligation to protect the people by military force and preached and received charity as a religious leader like the Brahmins. Moreover, many followers of Buddhism came from lower classes outside the Aryan cultural sphere, such as Śūdra and untouchables. In addition, Buddhist orders erect shrines (*caitya*), announce that they contain the Buddha's bones, and encourage the unenlightened populace to make their offertory donation to fetishize the bones. They also give alms to the lower classes to increase their social support in numbers. These prove that heresy cannot be reconciled with Vedic religions, and Kumārila warns that ignoring this kind of religion is likely to make people forsake the Vedic tradition (TV 194,17–18).

In addition, Buddhism, although superficially denying the authority of the Vedas on the surface, tacitly relies on Vedic teachings within. Amid discussions about the authority of various textbooks other than the Vedas, Kumārila writes about Buddhist doctrine:

Such theories as *vijñapti-mātratā* (consciousness-only), *kṣaṇabhaṅga* (momentariness), and *nairātmya* (non-self) have their origins in the Upaniṣads and the explanatory passages (*arthavādas*) and are intended to suppress extreme greed on their various objects.⁸⁰

Kumārila feels convinced that Buddhist doctrines such as consciousness-only (everything exists as a representation of consciousness), momentariness (everything that exists in time exists only for a moment), and non-self (no permanent essence can be found in any phenomenon) are refuted in the *Ślokavārttika*.⁸¹ From his observations, Buddhists preach these doctrines to prevent people from wallowing in desire, affixing to objects in the external world, and

⁷⁹ TV 195,25-26: *na hi yathopanayanādismṛtīnām śākhāntaradr̥ṣṭāsrutisaṃvādaḥ, evaṃ caityakaraṇa-tadvandana-śūdrasaṃpradānakadānādīnām saṃvādaḥ saṃbhavati*. Cf. Olivelle 2017:104.

⁸⁰ TV 168,19-20: *vijñānamātra-kṣaṇabhaṅga-nairātmyādivādānām apy upaniṣadarthavādaprabhavatvaṃ viṣayeṣv ātyantikam rāgaṃ nivartayitum*.

⁸¹ In ŚV, the Nirāmbanavāda section and the Śūnyavāda section criticize *vijñapti-mātratā* (consciousness only), the Śabdānityatā section criticizes *kṣaṇabhaṅga* (momentariness), and the Ātmavāda section criticizes *nairātmya* (non-self).

becoming overly self-conscious. However, the Upaniṣads, which have liberation from transmigration as their main subject, and the explanatory passages in the Brāhmaṇas, which explain the significance of rites and sacrifices, preach the need to suppress desires. Thus, the state that Buddhists consider ideal has already been expounded by the Vedas. Furthermore, Buddhists are indeed aware that although they strive for liberation and happiness, they have failed to establish a unique worldview to achieve it. They are embarrassed to admit this, and Kumārila compares their denial of the authority of the Vedas to a delinquent son who hates his parents and takes to delinquency out of spite because nothing he does will reach his parents' level, even though he would not exist without them.

However, because [the Buddha's teachings] cannot be a source of law equivalent [to the Vedas],⁸² and from humiliation, they do not seek to admit that the Vedas are their source of law, like a son who despises his parents and has become delinquent (*duṣṭaputra*).⁸³

In another aspect, Buddhism has even imitated the Vedic religion. Since the founder Buddha died long ago, he cannot be a missionary today. Moreover, in the present Buddhist orders, no one has reached a state of enlightenment as perfect as the Buddha's. Since the Brahmin preaches that "the Vedas originate from a timeless antiquity and will never be destroyed," the Buddhists fear that their mission will be less convincing if they do not take countermeasures. Since they could be at a disadvantage, they say that the Buddha's teaching predates the founder Buddha and are eternally indestructible,⁸⁴ in imitation of the idea of "the eternal Vedas," even though the Buddha's words should also be impermanent, given the Buddha's teaching, "Everything is evanescent in this world."⁸⁵ Kumārila quotes verbatim the cliché:

⁸² I correct my previous translation, "in spite of noticing that the source of the Buddha's teaching is equal to the Veda," in Yoshimizu 2015b:48,8–9.

⁸³ TV 195,5-6: *vedamūlatvaṃ punas te tulyakakṣamūlatvākṣamayā eva lajjayā ca mātāpitṛ-dveṣidūṣṭaputravan nābhypagacchanti*. Cf. Olivelle 2017:102.

⁸⁴ TV 235,22–23: "For example, this is something like Buddhists and those from the Vaiśeṣika school being in awe of the Mīmāṃsaka, voiding their intellect, and saying, 'Our scripture is permanent.'" *yathā mīmāṃsakatrastāḥ śākyavaiśeṣikādayaḥ / nitya evā-gamo 'smākam ity āhuḥ śūnyacetanam* // Kumārila criticizes the guarantee of the eternality of Buddhist law through "the Buddhas of the past" in the BṬ fragment quoted in TSg vv. 3175–3183. See Kawasaki 1992:295–298.

⁸⁵ TV 237,1: "For this reason, the scriptures cannot be permanent for those authors who hold that language is not permanent" *tenānityaśabdavādinām āgamanityatvānupapatter*.

“Whether Tathāgatas (i.e., Buddhas) appear [in the world] or not, it is certain that *dharma* is eternal.”⁸⁶

This cliché is repeatedly quoted in various Buddhist scriptures and Buddhist treatises, based on the *Nidānasaṃyutta* (Saṃyuttanikāya 12). He then ridicules it as a foolish suitor asked by a girl’s father about his *gotra* (Brahmin kin),⁸⁷ that is, which ancient sage (*ṛṣi*) his paternal family is descended from, and the suitor then replies, “The same as your *gotra*.”

[Suppose that] a foolish suitor had come to take a girl in marriage; asked [by her father] about his *gotra*, he replied, “Mine is the same as your *gotra*.” In the same way, [Buddhists also] say that their scripture is eternal, in imitation of their opponent’s scripture.⁸⁸

The Brahmin society seeks to avoid religious uncleanness in all aspects of life. They have a strict system of exogamy to prevent marriage between close relations, and marriage partners were required to be descended from different paternal *gotra*.⁸⁹ This simile sarcastically suggests that Buddhism should behave

⁸⁶ TV 230,14–15: *utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā sthitaiveyaṃ dharmanityatā*. Cf. Saṃyuttanikāya (Nidānavagga, ed. L. Feer, PTS 1888), 12.20, Paccayo, pp.25–26: *uppādā vā tathāgatānam anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ thitā vā sā dhātu dhammatthitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā*; LS 143,11–13; *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (ed. E. Waldschmidt, 1950–51), 9.18. Saito (2011:10–11) points out that among the Buddhist orders, the Mahīśāsaka and the Vibhājyavāda advance the theory that dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) itself is an unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) factor, based on this *sūtra* of *paccaya* (dependence), and the Sarvāstivāda and the Southern Sthaviravāda criticize that theory.

⁸⁷ The eight sages Bṛghu (Jamadagni), Gautama, Bharadvāja, Atri, Viśvāmitra, Kaśyapa, Vasiṣṭa, and Agastya are supposed to be the founders of their respective *gotra*. *Pravarasūtra* 54 in the Baudhāyana school *Śrautasūtra* defines *gotra* as “the descendants of the above seven sages, with Agastya as the eighth, are *gotra*” (BŚS, vol. III, 467,7: *teṣāṃ saptarṣiṇām agastyāṣṭamānām yad apatyam tad gotram*). See Brough 1953:4 and 9. In the Purāṇa literature, the above seven founders, excluding Agastya, are said to be the seven sages in the era of Manu Vaivasvata, which includes the present day (see Mitchiner 1982:56). On the *gotra* recorded in inscriptions, see Gupta 1983:98–121.

⁸⁸ TV 236,4-6: *kanyāvaraṇārthāgatamūrkhavaragotrāpraśnottaravat. yad eva bhavatām gotram tad asmākam apītivat / āhuḥ svāgamanityatvaṃ parāgamānukāriṇaḥ //*

⁸⁹ Mn 3.5: “A girl who belongs to an ancestry* different from his mother’s and to a lineage different from his father’s, and who is unrelated to him by marriage, is recommended for marriage by a twice-born man**.” (Transl. by Olivelle 2005) *asapiṇḍā ca yā mātur asagoatrā ca yā pituḥ / sā praśastā dvijātīnām dārakarmaṇy amaithunī //* See GDhS 4.2

like other heretical religions, rather than imitating Brahmanism in half-measures and contradicting itself.

Now, what is the most basic doctrinal conflict between the Vedic religions and Buddhism? Generally, it is believed to be an ontological disagreement over the existence of the permanent self or essence (*ātman*) as an entity. However, Kumārila regards Buddhism, Jainism, and other heretical religions as having a common fundamental conflict with Vedic religions in their theory of norms: They overgeneralize avoidance of taking life (*ahiṃsā*) and other ethical precepts by applying them to the sphere of the Vedic sacrifice.

For this reason, avoidance of taking life, etc. [as preached by Buddhism and other heretical religions] are conceived under the intention of being that (*dharma*) by the similarity of the acts [between animal sacrifices and taking life in the secular world] (*anurūpya*), or [inference] based on common observations (*sāmānyatodrṣṭa*), or logical requirements (*arthāpatti*), and they fall within [heresy] that is similar but not identical to *dharma*. Even if [these virtues] are the foundation of a good person (*sanmūla*), they are useless and unreliable, like the milk poured into a water bag made of dog skin, and can be obtained only from that (heretical scriptures).⁹⁰

In Kumārila’s view, the duties of individuals laid down in the Vedas and the codes of law are segregated according to class, gender, age group, and the circumstance to which they belong. It is impossible to establish duties that everyone should follow uniformly in all situations. For example, Vedic sacrifices create

(*asamānapravara*); BDhS 2.2.37 (*sagotrā* bar); VDhS 8.1 (*asamānārṣīyā*); *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (YS) 1.53.

* The extent of the paternal *sapiṇḍa* is said to be up to the seventh generation in the *Manusmṛti* (Mn 5.60), but on the extent of the maternal *sapiṇḍa*, the commentator Medhātithi notes the existence of a third-generation theory and a fifth-generation theory, but holds that it is correctly up to the fifth generation, mentioning GDhS 4.5 “*mātrbandhubhyaḥ pañcamāt*” (MnBh, vol. 1, 207,25–28).

** Of the four classes in Aryan society, the upper three classes, whose youth are qualified to be initiated into the study of the Vedas, are said to be “twice-born” (see Mn 2.49; 10.4). Undergoing an initiation ceremony (*upanayana*) is considered their second birth.

⁹⁰ TV 203,13–14: *tena karmānurūpya-sāmānyatodrṣṭa-arthāpattibalāt tadabhiprāya-kalpitadharmābhāsamadhyapatitaṃ sanmūlam apy ahiṃsādi śvadṛtinikṣiptakṣīravād anupayogy aviśrambhaṇīyaṃ ca tanmātropalabdhaṃ bhavati*. For the religious impurity of dogs, see Mn 4.115 and 126; Bühler 1982:550.

sacred times and spaces⁹¹ where the vulgar norm prohibiting killing does not work.⁹² Nevertheless, Buddhism and other heretical religions take the universal criterion for the good or evil of an action, whether it causes pleasure or suffering to the other person.⁹³ This criterion applies uniformly, even to Vedic sacrifices. Since this is an overgeneralization, by exceeding the limit of the human intellect, avoiding a sacrifice despite its precious virtue becomes something like “pouring milk into a water bag made of dog skin” because dogs have been seen as impure animals. There are limits to the human capacity for rational reasoning. Even though worldly ethics cannot justify the sacrificial process prescribed by the Vedas, in Kumārila's view, people should abide by the Vedas.

2. Heresy due to secular motivations

In addition to contradictions with the Vedas, Mīmāṃsā has another ground for rejecting scriptures of a particular religion as heretical. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4 “further, because motivation (*hetu*) is seen”⁹⁴ means that if it is discovered that the compilation of a Smṛti was due to secular motivations, that Smṛti is to be excluded. Kumārila lists three motivations for creating false scriptures: misapprehension that contradicts the facts, indulgence in greed, and useless scrutiny that diverges from reality.

⁹¹ MmS, volume 3, chapter 4, section 4 is called the section on *karṭṛ*, and Kumārila develops a lengthy debate concerning the expression of *bhāvanā* (the motion form of an intentional act in general) by verb suffixes. However, the original theme of this section is to examine whether the vow (*vrata*) by the sacrificer “He must not speak untruth” (TS 2.5.5.6: *nānṛtaṃ vadet*) prescribes part of the process of the sacrifice, or is separate from the context of the sacrifice and prescribes a statement of truth (*satyavacana*) as an obligation on individual people. The Mīmāṃsā position is that falsehood in the middle of a sacrifice would damage the sacrifice more than the person telling a lie, so the scope of application of this vow goes no further than the context of the sacrifice. For this reason, a person who tells a lie during a sacrifice should perform the atonement prescribed in the Yajurveda (*yājurvedikaṃ prāyaścittam*), rather than the atonement prescribed in the law codes that are the precepts for everyday life (*smārtaṃ prāyaścittam*) (ŚBh 941,7–943,2). See Yoshimizu 2007d; Yoshimizu 2012b:555–560.

⁹² The taking of lives in a sacrifice is an exception to the general prohibition on taking lives, and Brahmins believe that exceptions take precedence over general provisions. See Halbfass 1991:93, n. 26.

⁹³ ŚV, Autpattikasūtra, v. 2a-c: “After all, it is well known that those who benefit [others] are good people, while those who cause pain are bad people.” *dhārmikādhārmikatvābhyām pīḍānugrahakāriṇau / prasiddhau hi*. On the ideological conflicts about how to distinguish good and bad actions between Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism, see Halbfass 1991: Chapter 4 “Vedic Apologetics, Ritual Killing, and the Foundations of Ethics.”

⁹⁴ MmS 1.3.4: *hetudarśanāc ca*.

Delusions in some cases, greed in some cases, and theoretical scrutiny in some cases cannot be denied as the basis for inventing [the Smṛti in question].⁹⁵

He then lists various heresies, including Buddhism, and criticizes them for assuming the “armor of dharma” (*dharmakañcuka*)⁹⁶ by using empty threats aimed at being worshiped and obtaining benefits from the community. In other words, for preaching hypocritical doctrine for appearance’s sake.

In Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra (a Vaiṣṇava sect), Pāśupata (a Śaiva sect), Buddhism, and Jainism, there are writings on lawfulness (*dharma*) and unlawfulness. To cast the shadow of “the armor of *dharma*,” their authors mixed them with that (what the Vedas preach) partially, aiming to be accepted in the community and gain benefits, worship, and fame. That contradicts or is irrelevant to the three Vedas but gives a gaudy appearance because of the extravagant use of the theories of perception, inference, analogy, and logical requirement.⁹⁷

Moreover, he says that although they have extracted some virtues from the Vedas and mixed them into their writings in order to preach them convincingly, they have a hidden face: They perform incantations using spells and drags to satisfy the perverse desires of worldly people:

They have been given the faint scent of the revealed and recollected scriptures, such as avoidance of taking of life, truthful words, restraint, charity, and compassion, but [in fact] they use many spells (*mantras*) and drags with effects including detoxification, control, extermination, and inspiring frenzy. Sometimes, they proclaim that [the objective] has been achieved and teach

⁹⁵ TV 186,12-13: *kvacid bhrāntiḥ kvacil lobhaḥ kvacid yuktivikalpanam / pratibhākāraṇa-tvena nirākartuṃ na śakyate //* See Eltschinger 2014:70, n. 148.

⁹⁶ *Mahābhārata* (MBh) 7.118.42: ... *adharmiṣṭhā dharmakañcukam āsthitaḥ* “People enrobe themselves in *dharma* to depart from *dharma*” (Kamimura 2003:411); MBh 7.170.5: ... *dharmakañcukam āsthitaḥ ... kuntīputro yudhiṣṭhiraḥ* “Kuntī’s son Yudhiṣṭhira, enrobed in *dharma*” (Kamimura 2003:654).

⁹⁷ TV 194,8-11: *kiṃcittanmiśradharmakañcukacchāyāpatitāni lokopasaṃgrahalābhapūjā-khyātiprayojanaparāṇi trayīviparītāsaṃbaddhadṛṣṭaśobhādīpratyakṣānumānopamānārthā-pattiprāyayuktimūlopanibaddhān sāmkhya-yoga-pāñcarātra-pāśupata-śākya-nirgrantha-* (IO; Ān: *grantha*)-*parighṛtadharmādharmanibandhanāni*. Cf. Olivelle 2017:101. In commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 4.2.21 (20 in Bāskara’s commentary), Śaṅkara and Bāskara regard Sāṃkhya and Yoga as being preached in *smṛti* but not in *śruti*.

other things [than the prescriptions of lawfulness and the prohibition of unlawful] solely to obtain sustenance of their livelihoods.⁹⁸

In Kumārila’s view, these heretical religions are now reaching the peak of their popularity in general society because we have already entered a period of darkness (*kaliyuga*).

Because of gaudiness, facility, logical proof, and the Kali period, people will stumble into the delusion of abolishing “the taking of the lives of livestock,” and other matters taught [in the Vedas] concerning sacrifices.⁹⁹

In the Kali period, the foolish people will be confused by the “gaudiness” (*śobhā*) of ceremonies produced by heretical religions, the “facility” (*saukarya*) of not being required to make efforts to be saved, and the “logical proof” (*hetūkti*) that mystifies the people. In particular, Kumārila discusses the issue of “facility,” quoting a half-verse that allows followers to be saved by the Buddha even if they do not make any effort of their own:

“The various evil acts committed among people due to the corruption in the dark age (*kali*) shall enter me. In exchange, the world shall be liberated.”¹⁰⁰

He evaluates this as having been created by the Buddha with the rhetorical awareness (*alaṅkārabuddhi*) of employing rhetoric to gain people’s interest.¹⁰¹ It is already known that by the time of Kumārila, Buddhism incorporated Hindu eschatology and called the dark age “Kaliyuga” from passages in the *Laṅkā-*

⁹⁸ TV 194,11-13: *viṣacikitsāvaśīkaraṇocchātanonmādanādisamarthakatipayamantrauṣadhi-kādācikasiddhinidarśanabalenāhiṃsāsatyavacanadamādādayādīśrutismṛtisaṃvādi-stokārthagandhavāsitaḥjīvikāprāyārthāntaropadeśīni*. Cf. Olivelle 2017:101.

⁹⁹ TV 194,19-20: *śobhā-saukarya-hetūkti-kalikālavaśena vā / yajñoktapaśuhiṃsādityāgabhrāntim avāpnuyuḥ* // Cf. Olivelle 2017:101. On early esoteric Buddhism around 600, see Takahashi et al. 2013.

¹⁰⁰ TV 195,14-15: *kalikaluṣakṛtāṇi yāni loke mayi nipatantu vimucyatām tu lokah /*

¹⁰¹ TV 195,13: “Nevertheless, for the Buddha and the others, such deviations alone are established in the rhetorical awareness.” *buddhādeḥ punar ayam eva vyatikramo ’laṅkārabuddhau sthitaḥ*. Cf. Olivelle 2017:103. The commentator Someśvara states, “[The Buddha] deviates from his own *dharma* by boasting about rhetoric and is known to be excessively foolish,” (NSu 172,8–9: *svadharmātikrama evālaṅkārabhimānād atyantamūḍhatvaṃ pratīyate*), so *alaṅkārabuddhi* is probably not the title of a text that serves as the source of this verse.

vatārasūtra and *Kāraṇḍavyūha*.¹⁰² Going beyond the reference to Kaliyuga, this half-verse demonstrates a spirit of Mahāyāna Buddhism, using a technique of Sanskrit poetry: the meter is *Puṣpitāgrā*, which combines the twelve-syllable *Jagatī* and the thirteen-syllable *Atijagatī*. Rājaśekhara, a poet in the tenth century, quotes this entire verse in his work on poetic theory, *Kāvyaṁmāṁsā*, as a technically accomplished poem composed by a Buddhist.¹⁰³ The second half—

“In truth, because of my good deeds, all living creatures shall go to paradise (*sukhāvātī*) accompanied by the greatest pleasures.”

—is also in the same *Puṣpitāgrā* meter as the first half. This verse sings of the oath (*praṇidhāna*) sworn by a Bodhisattva aiming to become a Buddha in the dark age by letting people pass on to paradise (*sukhāvātī*) by “transferring” (*pariṇāmanā*) his or her virtuous deeds to others. Therefore, Kumārila mentioned the altruistic spirit of Mahāyāna Buddhism while quoting fragments of some Buddhist work, which is highly unusual for a Brahmin thinker. From Kumārila’s perspective, Buddhist missionaries proselytize people from Hinduism without regard for their social class with the subtle catchphrase “relief through altruism” and barely cast a sidelong glance at the Brahmins. The latter hesitate for fear of infringing a taboo and becoming unclean when they associate with lower-class people.

To give benefit to people, he (the Buddha) deviated from the *dharma* of Kṣatriya, engaged in the work of preaching (*pravakṛtva*), which is the livelihood (*vṛtti*) of the Brahmin. They say that he is praised [by lower-class people] for the virtue of “aiding others (*parānugraha*) knowing that preaching [*dharma* to them] would infringe upon (*pīḍā*) his [own] *dharma*, because Brahmins, who cannot break the prohibitions, refrained from preaching *dharma* to those people outside [Aryan society].”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² See *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (LS), *sagāthakam*, vv. 786–804; Eltschinger 2014:81–82. On the myth of the exorcism of Maheśvara (Śiva) by Avalokiteśvara as seen in the *Kāraṇḍavyūhasūtra*, see Eltschinger 2014:83–85 and 136–149.

¹⁰³ *kalikṛtakaluṣāṇi yāni loke mayi nipatantu vimucyatām sa lokaḥ / mama hi sucaritena sarvasattvāḥ paramasukhena sukhāvātīm prayāntu //* (KM 38,14-17). See Ramaswami Sastri, KM, p.182.

¹⁰⁴ TV 195,16–18: *sa kila lokahitārthaṁ kṣatriyadharmam atikramya brāhmaṇavṛttiṁ* (IO; Ān: *brāhmaṇavṛttaṁ*) *pravakṛtvaṁ pratipadya pratiśedhātikramāsamarthair brāhmaṇair ananuśiṣṭaṁ dharmam bāhyaajanān anusāsaddharmapīḍām apy ātmano ’ngīkṛtya parānugrahaṁ kṛtavān ity evaṁvidhair eva guṇaiḥ stūyate*. Cf. Olivelle 2017:103.

From Kumārila’s perspective, the Buddhist scriptures are born out of populist motives that employ sophistry for material gain and fame to cater to the masses. They are primarily among the evil scriptures that should be excluded. However, Kumārila acknowledges the existence of corrupt Brahmins who often recommend rituals to worldly people out of impure motives to make money through charities, and fabricate Smṛti as support for these.

In fact, Vedic priests know, concerning the sacrificer who is in the middle of holding [a sacrifice], that “[he] is [relying on us as priests] in slavery to [the idea that] a sacrifice that has been commenced must be completed at any cost. However, after [the sacrifice] is completed, he will be free [of us priests],” and while they are involved in a sacrifice that [the sacrificer] should perform, they think up some sorts of thing that they should receive [as charity]. Then each time, they demand [them from the sacrificer] after preaching an explanation [of efficacy] that will inspire belief (*śraddhā*), just like the servants occupied with getting their share of the grain on a threshing floor. The sacrificer, in his turn, has been confused, being shown that other charities are determined in the revealed scriptures that have actually been perceived. Still, because he is deeply faithful, he understands that [what the Vedic priests have made up on their own] is correct, and he presents them [with what they have demanded]. Thus, when one feels concerned that “people like this probably created this recollected scripture,” one [should] not infer that the Vedas are the foundation [for that]. Rather, once one concludes that only the supposition “that is based on greed” stands like in former cases, one’s concern is brought to an end.¹⁰⁵

Some Brahmins who serve as Vedic priests are blinded by desire, like “the servants who are busy getting their share of the grain on a threshing floor.” And if the sacrificer lacks judgment, he will do as he is bidden by the priests and pay a large amount in charity. However, if we observe their everyday behavior, we can check their avarice; therefore, the Smṛti that such Brahmins fabricate as a basis can

¹⁰⁵ TV 187,5–10: *rtvijo hi prayogamadyapatitaṃ yajamānaṃ prakrāntakarmāvaśya-samāpanīyatvanibaddhaṃ* (IO; Ān: -ddha-) *samāptyuttarakālabhāvisvācchandyaṃ ca viditvā kāryavattāvelāyām eva khalagatadhānya*(IO; Ān: -prādhānya)*vibhāgavyāpṛta*(IO; Ān: -vyāvṛtta)*bhṛtakavat svayam utpādyotpādyā tāni tāny ādeyakāni śraddhājananā*(IO; Ān: -janakā)*rthavādapurāḥsaraṃ yācante. pratyakṣaśrutivihitadeyāntaranidarśana-vyāmohitaś ca yajamānaḥ śraddadhānatayā tathaiva pratipadya tebhyaḥ prayacchatīti tair eṣā smṛtiḥ pravartitā syād ity āśaṅkāyāṃ vedamūlatvaṃ nānumīyate. pūrvavac ca lobhapūrvakatvakalpanam evopapannam iti nirṇayāt samdehanivṛttiḥ.*

be ignored as false imitations of the scripture. Since the Vedas are revealed scriptures not created by men, they are not corrupted by the characteristics of those who transmit them. Kumārila defended them by saying that certain Brahmins merely misuse them.

3. Differences in religious authority between Manu and Buddha

Suppose that a religious leader had the same potential to deceive laypeople for his benefit, whether he is a renounced ascetic or a Brahmin in secular society. Then, how can we say that Manu, the compiler of the *Manusmṛti*, is a good person and the Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, is a perverse person, even though both are humans?

In Kumārila's time and the area where he was active, the *Manusmṛti* was the only law code recognized by all Brahmins, extending beyond the framework of the Vedic schools. Kumārila states that besides the *Manusmṛti*, there were only the law codes for each Vedic school (actually the Dharmasūtras), giving the names of the texts:

Unlike the Purāṇas, the *Manusmṛti*, and legends [like the *Mahābhārata*], the various law codes compiled by Gautama, Vasiṣṭha, Śaṅkhalikhita, Hārīta, Āpastamba, Baudhāyana, and so on, and the various works of domestic rites (*gṛhya*) should be selected for reading differently for each subschool (*carana*), as phonetics for each Vedic corpus (*prātiśākhya*).¹⁰⁶

However, Kumārila does not believe that the correctness of the *Manusmṛti* relies on the fact that the various Vedic schools accept it. He does not trust the inductive method because the validity of an inference based on experience is probable and relative and always retains the potential for being overturned by a counterexample.¹⁰⁷ For this reason, Kumārila seeks a proper foundation in the

¹⁰⁶ TV 243,26–244,4: *purāṇamānavetihāsavyatirikta-gautama-vasiṣṭha-śaṅkhalikhita-hārītāpastamba-baudhāyanādīpraṇītadharmasāstrāṇāṃ gṛhyagranthānāṃ ca prātiśākhya-lakṣaṇavat praticaraṇaṃ pāṭhavyavasthopalabhyate*. Kumārila goes on to describe which *śākhā* each Dharmasūtra belongs to (TV 244,5–6). In the middle ages, the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* was valued as a law code as authoritative as the *Manusmṛti*. Yājñavalkya, who is attributed with its authorship, is a legendary intellectual of the White Yajurveda compiled in northern India. The original form of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* was established around the early fifth century (Olivelle 2019:xxix), but Kumārila does not quote from the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*. This could be considered to prove that Kumārila was active outside the White Yajurveda's sphere of influence at the time.

¹⁰⁷ Kumārila notices this possibility, and he points out that Buddhists assert that Buddhism

Vedas themselves, which are the absolute authority. Manu appears in many Vedic myths as the idealized image of a faithful Aryan householder.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the Veda itself gives Manu’s character reference as a trustworthy person concerning teaching. Kumārila focused on this and quoted the following passage from the *Pañcaviṃśabrāhmaṇa* (PB), a Sāmaveda scripture:

And alternatively,¹⁰⁹ in the supplement to the injunction, “Manu’s verses become *sāmidhenī*,” (PB 23.16.6), it is declared, “In truth, anything Manu relates is a medicine, for curing.” (PB 23.16.7) The word of his teachings is the medicine for evil diseases like an atonement (*prāyaścitta*).¹¹⁰

The passage quoted here is in the section on the *Sattra* sacrifice for twenty-one days.¹¹¹ This injunction prescribes that “Manu’s verses” should be included in the *R̥gveda* verses (*ṛcs*) that are recited as the *sāmidhenī*¹¹² when adding firewood (*samidh*) to the fire for offering (*āhavanīya*) before offering the oblations into it. Then, following that injunction, the explanatory passage (*arthavāda*) recognizes that Manu’s statements are all true, stating, “Anything Manu relates is a medicine for correcting errors.”¹¹³ “Manu’s verses” as mentioned here probably refers to

has been widely accepted in society in terms of time or of space. TV 194,27–28: “They preach that their own view has been accepted by the socially powerful class (*mahājana*), that their ancestors have obeyed it for generations, and that other continents* [than India] should be considered.” *mahājanagr̥hītatvaṃ pitr̥ādyanuḡamādi ca / te ’pi dvīpāntarāpekṣaṃ vadanty eva svadarśane* // See Halbfass 1983:16; Halbfass 1991:63; Yoshimizu 2015b: n. 73.

*In TV 228,8, Kumārila admits that woven silk (*patrorṇa*) is a product made only in a barbarian (*mleccha*) country, which may mean China. We may suppose that he held Buddhism to be prosperous in China, knowing that many Buddhist monks visited India from China.

¹⁰⁸ On Manu in Vedic myth, see Bühler 1982:lvii–lxx; Lévi 1966:115–121.

¹⁰⁹ This is an additional remark on the fact that even if someone deliberately defined words as the *prāyaścitta*, they would not be admitted as *dharma* (TV 202,1–2).

¹¹⁰ TV 202,7–9: *tathā ca “manor ṛcaḥ sāmidhenyo bhavanti”* (PB 23.16.6) *ity asya vidher vākyaśeṣe śrūyate “manur vai yat kiṃcid avadat tad bheṣajam bheṣajatāyai”* (PB 23.16.7) *iti prāyaścittādyupadeśavacanaṃ pāpavyādher bheṣajam*. See Yoshimizu 2012a, 2.3.

¹¹¹ *Sattra* is the *soma* sacrifice lasting twelve or more days. The Vedic priest (*ṛtvij*) also acts as the sacrificer (*yajamāna*), so only Brahmins can participate.

¹¹² Eleven *ṛcs* are recited, but the first and last *ṛc* are repeated three times; thus, the recitation totals fifteen verses. See Caland 1921:64 (on *Āpastambaśrautasūtra* 2.12.2). For each *ṛc* the Hotṛ priest chants, the Adhvaryu priest adds one piece of firewood to the *Āhavanīya* fire.

¹¹³ “Anything Manu relates is a medicine” is a cliché in Vedic literature, and Lévi (1966:121, n. 1) quotes examples in TS 2.2.10.2; MS 2.1.5 (7,7–8); *Kāthakasaṃhitā* 11.5 (ed. Schroeder, 150,1–2).

Ṛgveda (RV) 8.31.14–18 (amended in part) from the total of eleven *mantras*¹¹⁴ quoted in the *Brāhmaṇa* section of the *Yajurveda* as the *sāmidhenī* in the twenty-one-day Sattrā sacrifice. According to the *Sarvānukramaṇī*, which lists the names of the authors of each hymn (*sūkta*) in the *Ṛgvedasaṃhitā*, *sūkta* 27 to 31 in chapter 8 of the *Ṛgveda* were authored by Manu Vaivasvata,¹¹⁵ and RV 8.31.14–18, which are quoted in this *Brāhmaṇa* section, are included in these *sūktas* of Manu Vaivasvata. From the Mīmāṃsā perspective, which holds that the Vedas are not made by humans, the author of a *sūkta* would have been the person who was inspired with the eternal revelation and conveyed it to human society.

Thus, the foundation for “Manu being a trustworthy person” and “Manu’s teachings being trustworthy” for Kumārila is the word in the *Brāhmaṇa* of the existing Vedas (*śruti*), and “logical requirement” (*arthāpatti*) is not the foundation for this awareness.¹¹⁶ *Arthāpatti* is a type of reasoning among the “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*) independently accepted in Mīmāṃsā. Using proof by contradiction (*modus tollens*), it derives the positive of a proposition from the fact that the negative of the proposition inevitably produces a result that contradicts another proposition that has already been proved to be true.¹¹⁷ Kumārila separates *arthāpatti* into two—one based on one’s experiential observations (*dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*) and the other based on statements from others, including scripture (*śrutārthāpatti*)¹¹⁸—but both apply *modus tollens* to explicitly derive matters or

¹¹⁴ See MS 4.11.2 (pp. 164,11–166,1); TS 1.8.22.3–5; Caland 1982:597.

¹¹⁵ See Th. Aufrecht, “Verzeichnis der angeblichen Hymnendichter gemäß der Anukramaṇikā” (RV, pt. 2, p. 460); Macdonell 1866:29,11. Besides Vaivasvata, the authors Manu Sāṃvaraṇ (RV 9.101.10–12) and Manu Āpsava (RV 9.106.7–9) are also mentioned by name. On Manu Vaivasvata in Vedic literature, see Macdonell-Keith 1912, vol. II, 130, n. 6.

¹¹⁶ K. Kataoka asserts that Kumārila bases the trustworthiness of Manu’s teachings on *arthāpatti* or *anyathānupapatti* (Kataoka 2011:260; Kataoka 2013:244), but as discussed below, this assertion is in error.

¹¹⁷ When deriving a proposition by *arthāpatti*, examining similar and dissimilar examples is not necessary, unlike inference (*anumāna*) up to Kumārila’s time. See ŚV, *Arthāpattipariccheda*, v. 30; Yoshimizu 1999a; Yoshimizu 2007b. Shida (2011:517–518) compares *arthāpatti* with abduction (hypothetical inference) and points out that although they have the use of *reductio ad absurdum* in common, they also have differences, in that *arthāpatti* is supposed to be a type of *pramāṇa*, and the conclusion derived by that method must be true, but abduction, while based on experience, assumes the most probable hypothesis, which must be further verified. As to how *arthāpatti* differs from abductive reasoning, see Yoshimizu 2020b.

¹¹⁸ ŚV, *Arthāpattipariccheda*, v. 2: “‘Observed’ [in the *arthāpatti* definition by the commentator Vṛttikāra] means [recognized] by any of the five means of knowledge. *Arthāpatti*, which is formed from being heard, is said to be distinct from this, because the latter (*śrutārthāpatti*) has different characteristics from the former (*dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*) in that it

statements that are included, albeit not explicitly, in their basis. Deriving other statements contained in a particular scripture using *arthāpatti* as a means of knowledge is different from accepting the matter expressed directly in the scripture using it as a “means of knowledge by language” (*śabdapramāṇa*).

As we argued in section III. 1, Kumārila supposed a corresponding Vedic injunction of the *Aṣṭakā* ceremony. Before supposing this injunction, Kumārila listed four possibilities for the other circumstances under which Manu included provisions on the *Aṣṭakā* ceremony in the law codes and rejected them one by one.¹¹⁹ This elimination process (*pariśeṣa*) is an example of *arthāpatti*. Moreover, he admits that *anumāna* appearing in MmS 3.1.2 refers to “logical requirement” (*arthāpatti*).¹²⁰ However, what is required here is the existence of a specific Vedic decree (*codanā*) that corresponds to *Manusmṛti* 4.150cd, which orders a special ancestor ceremony to be held on the *Aṣṭakā* days, and not the descriptive statement “Manu is a trustworthy person.” In this *arthāpatti*, the point of departure (the words existing in law codes) and the point of arrival (the words imagined in the Vedas) are both injunctions (*vidhi*), and Kumārila himself admits that both are of the same essence as *vidhi* (*tādātmya*).¹²¹ In addition, Kumārila takes Manu’s trustworthiness for granted in the proof for supposing the decrees on the *Aṣṭakā* ceremony by an *arthāpatti*.¹²² If he nevertheless assumes that Manu’s trustworthiness is to be proved

grasps (see footnote 123 herein) the means of knowledge [of statement].” *dr̥ṣṭaḥ pañcabhir apy asmād bhedenoktā śrutodbhavā / pramāṇagrāhiṇītvēna yasmāt pūrvavilakṣaṇā //*

¹¹⁹ TV 163,21–22: “Because of being established in accordance with what is observed, only [the postulation of] a Vedic injunction is simpler (*laghīyas*) than (1) [the other postulations of Manu’s] mistake, (2) [Manu’s own] experience, (3) statements of someone [else], and (4) [Manu’s] deception.” *bhrānter anubhavād vāpi puṁvākyaḍ vipralambhanāt / dr̥ṣṭānugūṇyasādhyatvāc codanaiva laghīyasī //* Cf. Francavilla 2006:126; Yoshimizu 2022, section 3.

¹²⁰ TV 165,16–17: “For that reason, here [in MmS 1.3.2], none other than *arthāpatti* is said to be *anumāna*, because [calling it *anumāna*] does not deviate, because it is a simile, and because [both *anumāna* and *arthāpatti*] are means of knowledge mentioned after [perception].” *tasmād arthāpattir evātrāvyabhicārād upacārāt paścānmānād anumāna-tvenoktā.*

¹²¹ TV 164,30–165,11: “In that case, because the recollected scripture essentially consists in injunctions, when there is scope to infer that [the recollected scripture] shares the same essence with its original (i.e., the revealed scripture), there is no reason [for supposing that] it is based on an explanatory passage (*arthavāda*) [, not an injunction (*vidhi*)].” *tatra smṛter vidhyātmakatvāt prakṛititādātmyānumāne* (IO; Ān: -*anumāna*-) *labdhāspade ’rthavāda-pūrvakatvaṁ niṣpramāṇakam.*

¹²² Among the four possibilities listed above, Kumārila points out that (1) and (4) clash with Manu’s trustworthiness, which he takes into granted. According to him, possibility (1), Manu’s mistake, “would invalidate the assured truth [of the *Manusmṛti*] that has been approved by all people in the community” (TV 163,24–25: *sarvalokābhyupagataḍṛḍha-*

by another *arthāpatti*, he would commit the error of infinite regress. In brief, concerning Manu’s trustworthiness, it is sufficient to take his character reference given by the Veda itself, which are an absolute authority, at its face value, and there is no need for humans with their limited intellectual capacity to think about a proof of Manu’s trustworthiness using *arthāpatti*.¹²³

Moreover, foreseeing the counterargument, “Doesn’t the character reference to Manu the human given in the Veda contradict the Veda’s being eternal, beyond the mutability of society?” Kumārila brings out the global cycle theory of the “succession of Manus” (*manvantara*), one of the main topics in the Purāṇas.

For each [cycle of the] “succession of Manus,” a different recollected scripture is laid down. It is eternally determined that there are fourteen Manus for each *kalpa*.¹²⁴

In the Purāṇa theory of time, the ideal society of humankind gradually deteriorates and eventually reaches an extreme where social confusion prevails as it passes through the four *yugas* (periods) from the golden age of the Kṛta period to the dark age of the Kali period. However, if the surviving people under great distress sincerely repent at the end of the Kali period, the Kṛta period will come again, and one thousand repetitions of the *mahāyuga*, consisting of the four *yugas*, is the cycle of one *kalpa*. At the end of this *kalpa* cycle, natural disasters will

prāmāṇyabādhas ca), and possibility (4), Manu’s deception, “would negate the truth of assured trust [in Manu] that has already been established” (TV 163,30–164,1: *utpannasya ca dṛḍhasya pratyayasya prāmāṇyanirākaraṇāt*).

¹²³ Kumārila gives the supposition of a *śruti* using a *smṛti* as an example of *śrutārthāpatti* at the end of the *Arthāpatti* section in ŚV (v. 87ab: *smṛtyā śrutir yā parikalpyate*). In the second half of the *Arthāpatti* section (vv. 52–76), he argues in detail that *śrutārthāpatti* “has statements as its object” (*śabdagocarā*), rather than “having things as its object” (*arthagocarā*) concerning the objects that it derives (see Yoshimizu 1999b, section 3). Moreover, the four-and-a-half verses on *arthāpatti* that Śālikanātha quotes as a work by Vārttikakāra (Kumārila’s pseudonym) (*R̥juvimalāpañcikā* [RP] 116,12–20). These verses appear to have been quoted from BṬ because they cannot be found in ŚV. Their conclusion is: “Therefore, that (the recognition *dhī* obtained through ”*śrutārthāpatti*) always first has text as its object. After being recognized, the text will have its meaning understood.” (*tenaiṣā niyataṃ tāvat prathamam vākyagocarā // vākyam eva tu vākyārtham gatavād gamaiṣyati*) (see Yoshimizu 1999b, section 4). Kataoka’s theory, which holds that the trustworthiness of Manu’s teachings, a sort of matter, is derived by *śrutārthāpatti* from the provisions of law codes, thus ignores the distinction advanced by Kumārila between matters and statements as objects of the two kinds of *arthāpatti*.

¹²⁴ TV 202,12–13: *pratimanvantaram caiva smṛtir anyā vidhīyate / sthitāś ca manavo nityam kalpe kalpe caturdaśa // Matsyapurāṇa* (MtPu) 145.1b: *kalpe kalpe caturdaśa*; 58ab: *pratimanvantaram caiva śrutir(sic) anyā vidhīyate*; see Yoshimizu 2012a: n. 50.

continue at the end of the final Kali period, and the world will be destroyed, but at last, the world will be formed anew. During one *kalpa* period, fourteen Manus appear in order and rule the world. We live in the era ruled by the seventh of these, Manu Vaivasvata.¹²⁵ Kumārila says that the Brāhmaṇa passage concerning the *Ṛgveda* hymns authored by Manu Vaivasvata, “In truth, anything Manu relates is a medicine, for curing” (PB 23.16.7), guarantees the trustworthiness of the teacher Manu. However, because this passage is a cliché in Vedic literature,¹²⁶ Kumārila does not say that Manu Vaivasvata was the compiler of the *Manusmṛti*, but rather believes according to the mythological setting in Section 1 of the *Manusmṛti*¹²⁷ that the first of the fourteen Manus (Manu Svāyaṃbhūva) promulgated the *Manusmṛti*, which was passed down by the following generations of Manus. Then, because the existence of the Manus is eternal as they appear in each *kalpa* cycle, the Veda is eternal, even if it guarantees the character of the Manus.¹²⁸

On the other hand, the Buddha (unlike Manu) does not appear in the Vedic corpus. Kumārila quotes the beginning section from *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (ChU) 7.1.2, in which Nārada says to Sanatkumāra that he has learned the four Vedas and many secular fields of study (*vidyā*), and then lists the fields that he studied.

¹²⁵ On the formation of the *manvantara* theory in the Purāṇa literature, see Kane 1968–1977, V, 1: 686–693; Gail 1974; Mitchiner 1982:51–60.

¹²⁶ See footnote 113 herein.

¹²⁷ Manu, the narrator in chapter 1 of the *Manusmṛti*, relates the creation of the world carried out by “the one born of himself” (Svayambhū) as a Brahman (Mn 1.9), and then names himself as his child (Svāyaṃbhūva, see Mn 1.33) and gives the names of six Manus following him, with him as the first Manu and Vaivasvata as the last of the Manus (Mn 1.61–62). Then, the narrator changes from Manu to one of his disciples, Bhṛgu, in Mn 1.59–60.

¹²⁸ As Manu in the *manvantara* is the one holding power to rule the whole world, if this Manu were to be incorporated into the four-class system, he would be a Kṣatriya, who orders people to obey *dharma* by mandatory force. In fact, in the origin myth of royal authority in the *Mahābhārata*, Manu, who was entrusted with the power to bring about security by the people who suffered under a dog-eat-dog Hobbesian state of nature, is called “king” (*rājan*) (MBh 12.67.23–30).

However, if Manu the king is the compiler of the *Manusmṛti*, then given that Kumārila denounces Buddhism as heresy because “the Buddha was born as a Kṣatriya, not a Brahmin, so he has no right to preach *dharma*,” would he not have to conclude that Manu’s teaching is also heresy? In this regard, Someśvara, commentary to the TV, states, “[Kumārila’s] thinking is that supposing that Manu is the promoter (*pravartaka*, rather *pravakṛ* “missionary”?) [see footnotes 76, 104, 133 herein] [of *dharma*] despite being a Kṣatriya has no contradiction because the Vedas have approved, saying, ‘In truth, anything Manu relates is a medicine.’” (NSu 172,7–8: *manos tu kṣatriyasyāpi, pravartakatve “yad vai kiṃcin manur avadat tad bheṣajam” iti vedānujñātavād aviruddham ity āśayah*). He then asserts that Kumārila’s true feeling is that statements in the Vedas have authority that surpasses common knowledge of the class system based on *Smṛti*.

Kumārila states that the means for recognizing *dharma* (*pramāṇa*) are the fields of study created by legendary people, like Manu and the seven sages (*saptarṣi*). As the Vedas record their names, they are supposed to appear in this world repeatedly in the Purāṇa worldview. In contrast, because the Buddha and the founders of other heretical religions are omitted in the Veda, they could not be an authority on *dharma*.¹²⁹

In fact, the Upaniṣads explain as follows: “Oh, Sir, I have studied the Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Atharvaveda as the fourth Veda, the Itihāsa and Purāṇas as the fifth Vedas,” and so on (ChU 7.1.2). Human-made fields of study are named after the sages determined for each *kalpa*, Manus’ succession, and *yuga*. The creators of these human-made fields of study are recorded in *mantras* and explanatory passages in the Vedas. It is agreed that only the fields of study they founded are the means for recognizing *dharma*.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Kumārila argues that “the *vidyāsthāna* of *dharma* are limited to fourteen or eighteen (*parimita*)” and lists the titles of the fields of study, stating that Buddhism and Jainism are omitted (TV 201,23–25), but Kumārila did not create this limitation by numbers. I was informed by Prof. Tōru Funayama that Jizang’s *Bailun shu* (Commentary on the *Śataśāstra*) lists “eighteen divisions of *vidyāsthāna*” (Taishō, vol. 42, 251a16–b8) and that it appears that Jizang received information from Paramārtha (499–569). For details, see Ui 1927:462–468.

Incidentally, Kataoka (2013:260–262) argues that Dharmakīrti used Kumārila’s statement on *vidyāsthāna* in order to criticize the Vedas. In his criticism of the authority of the Vedas, Dharmakīrti states, “In addition, we have heard even from you that these (the Vedas) are passed down only by a limited (*parimita*) number of interpreters” (PVSV 169,13–15: *kiṃ ca parimitavyākhyātrpuruṣaparaṃparām eva cātra bhavatām api śṛṇumah*). According to Kataoka, this criticism refers to Kumārila’s remark in TV that the number of fields of study (*vidyāsthāna*) relating to *dharma* is limited to fourteen or eighteen.

However, the idea of limiting the number of fields of study to fourteen or eighteen had been established before Kumārila. Moreover, it is a hasty mistake to jump from the limitation on the number of fields of study to the limitation on the number of people involved in them. See Kataoka 2013, n. 51: “If it is claimed by a Mīmāṃsaka that the number of *śāstras* (brahmanical dharmic teachings) is limited, it implies that the number of *vyākhyāna* (such as *smṛti* literature) and *vyākhyātrpuruṣa* (such as Manu) is also limited.” When there are fewer options, the number of people involved in the individual options often increases. Market monopolization in economics is an example of this. Moreover, as a result of cultural globalization in modern and present times, many minor languages are on the brink of extinction, and the number of users of a few major languages, particularly English, is increasing. Accordingly, Dharmakīrti’s indication that “the Vedas are the scriptures of a small social minority” was irrelevant to Kumārila’s remark on the number of *vidyāsthāna* in TV, and Kataoka’s argument that Dharmakīrti exacted this remark as a promise for criticizing the Vedas fails completely.

¹³⁰ TV 202,23–26: *evaṃ hy upaniṣatsūktam. “ṛgvedaṃ bhagavo ’dhyemi yajurvedaṃ sāmavedaṃ atharvavedaṃ caturtham itihāsaṃ purāṇaṃ pañcamam” iti. tena pratikalpa-*

Looking at Indian history, the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* had been established before the appearance of Gautama Buddha. Therefore, it is entirely anachronistic to despise Buddhism because it is not on this list of subjects of study. Moreover, Kumārila uses the metaphor, “the Vedas, including the Upaniṣads, are the parent and the Buddhists are the delinquent son.” Since he is aware that Buddhism is a philosophy that developed after Brahmanism, this anachronism is deliberate. Based on this, Kumārila assumes that the entirety of the Vedas, including the Upaniṣads, is an eternal scripture that surpasses history. He staged it as though this was not anachronistic. The Purāṇa literature claimed from a comparatively early stage that Manu and the seven sages in each era of the “succession of Manus” preached the *dharma* of the Śruti and Smṛti to the people.¹³¹ Kumārila uses this while praising the *Manusmṛti* as a distinguished, authoritative law code on the one hand,¹³² but determines that Buddhist scriptures are heretical doctrine, on the other hand,¹³³ using the same criterion of whether the creator’s name is listed as a person who should preach *dharma* in the eternal Vedas and the Purāṇa scriptures based on them,

III. The customary practice of good people (*sadācāra*) and self-satisfaction (*ātmatuṣṭi*)

manvantarayuganīyatanīyārṣināmābhīdheyakṛtrimavidyāsthānakārā ye vede 'pi mantrārthavādeṣu śrūyante tatprañītāny eva vidyāsthānāni dharmajñānāṅgatvena sammatāni. ChU 7.1.2 lists secular fields of study, in addition to Vedic ones. See Yoshimizu 2012a, n. 117.

¹³¹ See MtPu 142.40; 144.97; Kane 1968–1977, V, 1:692. In *Vāyupurāṇa* (VāPu) 59.34 and *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* (BṇḍPu) 1.2.32.37–38, whose texts almost perfectly match, Manu and the seven sages are said to be *śiṣṭa* (past participle of the verb √ *śiṣ*) in the sense of having survived through the *manvantara*.

¹³² It is probably because of being in a position closer to the law court (*vyavahāra*) than the Mīmāṃsā scholars, that Medhātithi, a commentator on the *Manusmṛti*, admits that law codes with authority equal to the *Manusmṛti* may appear anew in the future, adopting a more liberal stance than Kumārila. MnBh, vol. 1, 67,27–28: “If a person provided with the many virtues above wrote law codes today only with this motivation, he would have authority like Manu among the people of later generations.” *adyatve ya evaṃvidhair guṇair yukta īdrśenaiva ca hetunā grantham upanibadhnīyāt sa uttareṣāṃ manvādivat pramāṇībhavet.* See Yoshimizu 2012a:674–675.

¹³³ TV 202,3–6: “It is ascertained that because the same people who are approved by none other than the Vedas as missionaries [of *dharma*], being eternally named through the succession of Manus and *yugas*, create several collections of *dharma* while these ages turn around, their words form the means of knowledge, but the words of others are not so.” *vedenaivābhyanuñātā yeṣāṃ eva pravakṛtā / nityānām abhidheyānām manvantarayugādiṣu // teṣāṃ viparivarteṣu kurvātām dharmasamhitāḥ / vacanāni pramāṇāni nānyeṣāṃ iti niścayaḥ //*

1. Restrictions on custom as sources of law and the role of the erudite (*śiṣṭa*)

The *Manusmṛti* also recognizes traditional customs that are not written down as a Smṛti under the title “customary practice of good people” (*sadācāra*). The *Manusmṛti* did not foresee centralized power structures like modern and present-day states. Like the Dharmasūtras that preceded it, it requires that the ruler, sitting in judgment on a case, respect the traditional customs of the various social groups that stand between the individual and the state. These include blood relationships like clan (*kula*), regional groups of the various regions in the state, and occupational groups like castes and merchant unions.¹³⁴ However, it is not the case that the *Manusmṛti* admitted the customs of these intermediary social groups as *dharma* without restriction, and there were restrictions placed upon them becoming *dharma*. First, there are geographical restrictions; the region in which the customs of residents are recognized as *dharma* is called the “place where Aryans live gregariously” (*āryāvarta*),¹³⁵ which is delineated in Mn 2.21–22 as below. Outside this is the “land of barbarians” (*mlecchadeśa*) (Mn 2.23). The idea of geographically limiting the region subject to *dharma* does not reconcile with Buddhism, which spread beyond India.

“Between the Himalaya Mountains and the Vindhya Mountains, and east of the land of the vanished [downstream of the Sarasvatī River] and west of Prayāga is called the “central region” (*madhyadeśa*). The region reaching the sea to the east and the west, between these two mountain ranges, is known to the wise as the “place where Aryans live gregariously.”¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Mn 8.41: “[A king] who knows *dharma* should let each person (i.e., each party in disputes) know their *dharma* (i.e., the judgments they should submit to), paying regard to the *dharma* of the caste and region, the *dharma* in the merchants’ union, and the *dharma* in the clan.” *jātijānapadān dharmān śreṇīdharmāṃś ca dharmavit / samīkṣya kuladharmāṃś ca svadharmam pratipādayet*// See ĀpDhS 2.15.1; GDhS 11.20; BDhS 1.2.1–8; VDhS 1.17 (from Bühler 1982:562).

¹³⁵ *Amarakośa* (AK) states that eddying currents surging on big waves (AK 1.12.5–6: *ūrmiṣu mahatsūllolakallolau ... ambhasāṃ bhramah*) and whorled hairs between the eyes of sheep (AK 3.3.50: *meṣādilomni ... antarā bhruvau*), etc. are called *āvarta*. Note that before defining the scope of *āryāvarta*, the *Manusmṛti* calls the westernmost part of the *madhyadeśa* between the Sarasvatī River and the Dṛṣadvatī River (see Witzel and Goto 2007: Bildteil, 2) *brahmāvarta*, and says the customs of the people in this land are *sadācāra* (Mn 2.17–18), and regards this land as the mythological core region in which the Vedic culture originated.

¹³⁶ Mn 2.21–22: *himavadvindhyaḥ madhyaṃ yat prāg vinaśanād* (see PB 25.10.1) *api / pratyag eva prayāgāc ca madhyadeśaḥ prakīrtitaḥ // ā samudrāt tu vai pūrvād ā samudrāc*

Patañjali, dating to the second century before the common era, limited the *āryāvarta* to an area like this “central region” in northern India.¹³⁷ The *Manusmṛti* extended *āryāvarta* to the east and west due to the expansion of the Aryan cultural sphere. In the northern and southern directions, however, it remained in northern India and was confined to the south of the Vindhya Mountains, which extended east-west across the center of the Indian subcontinent. Kumārila also says that recognition of inhabitants’ customs as a source of law was limited to the geographical scope of the *āryāvarta*. He begins considering whether customs can form the foundation for knowing *dharma* by establishing the following question:

Here is performed an examination invoking the various customs of the four-class system in the place where Aryans live gregariously, which is characterized as the area where blackbucks (*kṛṣṇamṛgas*) wander: If it is observed that the Aryans carry out a certain act with the attitude that “this is following *dharma*,” is this itself a means of knowledge, or it is not a means of knowledge?¹³⁸

The *kṛṣṇamṛga* (Eng. blackbuck) is a sacred beast whose pelt and horns are used in Vedic rituals. The *Manusmṛti* characterizes the *āryāvarta* as the area it inhabits naturally (*svabhāvataḥ*) (Mn 2.23), in addition to the above definition of its borders.¹³⁹ However, the *kṛṣṇamṛga* inhabits the Vindhya Ranges and the area south

ca paścimāt / tayor evāntaraṃ giryor āryāvartaṃ vidur budhāḥ //

¹³⁷ VMBh, vol. 1, 475,3; pt. 3, 174,7-8: “What is the ‘place where Aryans live gregariously’? East of the land of the vanished [downstream of the Sarasvatī River] (*ādarśa*, see Brucker 1980:132), west of the forest of Kālaka (*kālakavana*), south of the Himalayas, north of Pāriyātra (northwestern Vindhya Ranges).” *kaḥ punar āryāvartaḥ. prāg ādarśāt pratyak kālakavanād dakṣiṇena himavantam uttarena pāriyātram*. Among the Dharmasūtras, the Baudhāyana (BDhS 1.2.9) and the Vasiṣṭa (VDhS 1.8–10) consider the same range as Patañjali to be the *āryāvarta* (see Brucker 1980:94–95). From a fragment of the *Śaṅkhalikhitadharmasūtra* (see Kane 1968–1977, I, 1:141, n. 138), Brucker (1980:130) identifies *kālakavana* with Kāmpilī (now Farrukhabad).

¹³⁸ TV 214,2–5: *iha yāvanti kṛṣṇamṛgasamcaraṇopalakṣitāryāvartanivāsi-cāturvarṇyā-caraṇāni tāny udāhṛtya cintyate. dharmabuddhyā yad āryānāṃ caritram upalabhyate / kiṃ tathaiva pramāṇaṃ tad atha vā niṣpramāṇakam //* iti.

¹³⁹ Before the *Manusmṛti*, the *Baudhāyana* and the *Vasiṣṭa* inform of verses (*gāthā*) by Bāllavin and others that hold that the Brahman glory (*brahmavarca*) extended broadly eastward and westward in northern India as far as the *kṛṣṇamṛga* wanders (BDhS 1.2.12; VDhS 1.15; Kane 1968–1977, II, 2:14). BDhS 1.2.13 lists the names of *āryāvarta* borderlands where racial mixture with indigenous peoples (*saṃkṛṇayoṇi*) is occurring, including the Deccan region (*dakṣiṇāpatha*).

of the Narmadā River, which flows east to west through valleys in the Satpura Range running parallel to the Vindhya Ranges on their southern side.¹⁴⁰ The southward expansion of the Brahmins began long before the era of the *Manusmṛti*,¹⁴¹ and Sanskrit culture expanded into southern India during the time of the Gupta dynasty. Nevertheless, the extension of the geographic concept of the *āryāvarta* southward beyond the Narmadā River was unusual, if not entirely absent.¹⁴² Accordingly, given that Kumārila brazenly discussed the cultural superiority of the *āryāvarta* region without changing the scope defined by the *Manusmṛti*,¹⁴³ he must not have been living further south than the Narmadā River,

¹⁴⁰ See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackbuck>. According to Blanford (1888–91:522), the *kṛṣṇamṛga* inhabits from the Himalayas in the north to Cape Comorin in the south. However, the present author (Yoshimizu) does not know whether the *kṛṣṇamṛga* living in southern India is a native species or an imported species brought with Brahmin migration to purify the land.

¹⁴¹ For the documents predating the *Manusmṛti* that mention Aryans living in lands further south than the Vindhya Ranges in present-day Madhya Pradesh, see Bhattacharyya 1977:4. The legend that the sage Agastya calmed the swelling Vindhya Mountain (MBh 3.102.10–12) depicts well the southward migration of the Aryans. Purāṇa literature generally uses the *bhāratavarṣa*, which covers all of India, rather than the *āryāvarta* as a geographical concept for the broader area. See Kane 1968-1977, II, 1:17–18.

¹⁴² Rājasekhara, around 900, calls the same scope as Mn 2.22 the *āryāvarta* (KM 93,17) and the region south from Māhiṣmatī (a town on the north bank of the Narmadā River, now Maheshwar; see Bhattacharyya 1977:170–175) to the southernmost point of the subcontinent *dakṣiṇāpatha*, and he lists the names of the regions, rivers and mountains that comprise them (KM 93,25–94,3). Medhātithi, a person from Kashmir in the northernmost part of India, comments that the scope defined in v. 22 would exclude the mountainous regions of the Himalayas and the Vindhya Ranges from the *āryāvarta* in the same way that the eastern and western seas are excluded. To enable Aryans to live in this region, he says, Manu considered the habitat of the *kṛṣṇamṛga* as another standard in the following v. 23 (MnBh, vol. 1, 79,24). This interpretation enlarges the southern area of the *āryāvarta* to the southern foothills of the Vindhya Ranges up to the Narmadā River, as Rājasekhara said. Rājasekhara was a writer who lived during the peak of the Gurjara-Pratihāra dynasty (Warder 1988:413). He may strictly limit the *āryāvarta* to the north of the Narmadā River because this dynasty battled for supremacy with the Pāla dynasty in the east and the Chālukya dynasty in the south while being engaged in terms of “the emperor ruling over the great kings of the land where Aryans live gregariously” (*āryāvarta-mahārāja-adhirāja*). See Wink 1991:284.

¹⁴³ TV 258,18–19: “that belonging to the languages of *barbara* (see footnote 15 herein) and others who differ from those who live in the land where Aryans, who are qualified in *dharma* (that is, Vedic sacrifices), live gregariously, which is characterized by ‘between the Himalayas and the Vindhyas’ and ‘the *kṛṣṇamṛga* wanders,’ among others” *himavad-vindhyāntarālakṛṣṇamṛgasamcaraanādyupalakṣitadharmādhikṛtāryāvartanivāsiviyatirikta-barbarādibhāṣāgatasya*. Incidentally, Medhātithi makes the following alarming comment, beyond the habitat range of the *kṛṣṇamṛga*: MnBh, vol. 1, 80,23–26 (on Mn 2.23) “Further, if a certain rightly acting king of *kṣatriya* or some such origin conquered barbarians, established the four-class system, and permanently insulated the barbarians as untouchables

or at least no further south than the northern Deccan Region. (The author has no definitive proof at present as to whether his residence was north or south of the Narmadā River.)

The conservative Kumārila also makes customary law subordinate to written law wherever possible. In contrasting Smṛti, that is, written law and custom, it may seem that actual customs are superior to the law codes written down long ago. However, he disregards historical change in society and conclusively states that the codes of law were put into writing with the names of reliable authors; therefore, they are superior to the customs of anonymous people.

[Opponent:] Rather, the customs are considered stronger because they stand upon [visible] results.¹⁴⁴

[Proponent: The phrase of MmS 1.3.9] “No, what is based on scriptures” indicates, “No, the recollected scripture (*smṛti*) is stronger than [custom].” The recollected scripture and custom are not equal in being based on revealed scripture because the recollected scriptures are compiled by trustworthy people (*sapratyaya*) and converted to writing (*sopanibandhana*).¹⁴⁵

The proportion of Brahmins in the total population of India was limited;¹⁴⁶ Brahmins also had various occupations and upper and lower classes,¹⁴⁷ as also

as in the land where Aryans live gregariously, that (land) would also become suitable for Vedic sacrifices, because the land itself is not unclean; uncleanliness comes from racial mixture.” *tathā yadi kaścit kṣatriyādijātīyo rājā sādhvācaraṇo mlecchān parājayet cātur-varṇyaṃ vāsayet mlecchāṃś cāryāvarta iva cāṇḍālān vyavasthāpayet so 'pi syād yajñīyaḥ. yato na bhūmiḥ svato duṣṭā. saṃsargād dhi sā duṣyati.* See Kane 1968-1977, II, 1:16.

¹⁴⁴ TV 220,13: *yad vācārabalīyastvaṃ phalasthatvāt pratīyate /*

¹⁴⁵ TV 220,20-22: *smṛtīnāṃ vā balīyastvaṃ śāstrasthā veti varṇyate // ubhayoḥ śrutimūlataṃ na smṛtyācārayoḥ samam / sapratyayapraṇītā hi smṛtiḥ sopanibandhanā //* The *Āpastambadharmasūtra* does not set up the *āryāvarta*, and it places “the agreement of those who know *dharma*” (*dharmajñāsamaya*) before the Vedas as a source of law (ĀpDS 1.1.1–2). On the other hand, the *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra* lists unique customs in the northern and southern regions and rejects them for being contrary to *smṛti* (BDhS 1.2.1–8). On Kumārila’s agreement with the Baudhāyana, which places importance on written law, and criticism of the relativist Āpastamba in this respect (TV 211,16–18), see Shōshin 1997.

¹⁴⁶ As one indicator, in the results of the 1931 Census of India, which was the last one conducting separate surveys for castes, the Brahmin population was 4.32% of the total. From http://www.vepachedu.org/manasanskriti/Brahmins.html#Brahmin_Population.

¹⁴⁷ Datta (1989:148–151) lists master (*guru*) to the king, assistant to the king, minister, soldier, astrologer, and priest as occupations for Brahmin who have received dispensations that are written in inscriptions of a land grant in northern India from 475 to 1030, in addition to priest and teacher. Furthermore, the Brahmin class also underwent caste

outlined in the *Manusmṛti* as the livelihood in times of poverty (*āpaddharma*) (Mn 10.81–94). Brahmins who completed the traditional course of study were very few. The *Manusmṛti* sometimes contrasts the Brahmin erudite (*śiṣṭa*) and the ordinary people.¹⁴⁸ The ordinary people may not be intimately familiar with the Vedas and the fields of study (*vidyāsthānas*) based upon them, but they can be considered “good people (*sat/sādhu*)” from the perspective of the law codes if they do not go against the traditional value system. “Without hate or avarice” (*adveṣarāgin*), good people recognize that the *dharma* explained by the law codes are observed by “intellectuals” (*vidvas*),¹⁴⁹ who observe the everyday standards for behavior (Mn 4.13–260) as their vows (*vratas*) under the title of the “bathed” (*snātaka*) after having been bathed in witness of their completion of Vedic studies.¹⁵⁰

Furthermore, Aryan society, founded upon “the customs of good people,” essentially requires the existence of “good Śūdra” who serve the Aryans. The *Manusmṛti* demands that Śūdra not be jealous of the Aryans and obediently follow their orders, on the promise of a rise in class in their next lives as a reward for being good throughout their lives.¹⁵¹ Śūdra were not permitted to undergo an

division through the middle ages. For example, the Namboothiri Brahmin in present-day Kerala was divided into ten classes of varying ranks with different abilities in terms of social relationships. According to a report by the Namboothiri Website Trust, a local NPO (<http://www.namboothiri.com/articles/classification.htm>), those in the lowest class can use the same bathing place as Brahmins of other classes use, but they cannot even eat together.¹⁴⁸ Mn 8.46ab: “behavior performed by good people or by Brahmins with an understanding of *dharma*” *sadbhir ācaritaṃ yat syād dhārmikāis ca dvijātibhiḥ* /; Mn 9.31ab: “what was said about sons by good people or by the great sages of old times” *putraṃ pratyuditaṃ sadbhiḥ pūrvajais ca maharṣibhiḥ* / Except for these and the following usage of *sat* in Mn 2.1, the *Manusmṛti* includes erudite (*śiṣṭa*) in “good people.” In addition, there are no examples of *sādhu* in the sense of ordinary people who are distinct from erudites.

¹⁴⁹ Mn 2.1: “You shall listen to the *dharma* followed by erudite people and sincerely approved by good people who are constantly without hate and greed.” *vidvadbhiḥ sevitaḥ sadbhir nityam adveṣarāgibhiḥ* / *hrdayenābhyanujñāto yo dharmas taṃ nibodhata* //

¹⁵⁰ Mn 4.13: “Subsisting by one of these means of livelihood, a twice-born who is a bath-graduate should follow these observances, which procure heaven, long life, and fame.” (Transl. by Olivelle 2005) *ato ’nyatamayā vṛtṭyā jīvaṃs tu snātako dvijaḥ* / *svargyāyusya-yaśasyāni vratāṇīmāni dhārayet* //

¹⁵¹ Mn. 1.91: “God defined the sole behavior of Śūdra as being obedient to these classes (the upper three classes) without envying them.” *ekam eva tu śūdrasya prabhuḥ karma samādiśat* / *eteṣāṃ eva varṇānāṃ śuśrūṣāṃ anasūyayā* //; Mn 9.334–335: “For the Śūdra, only being obedient to honorable Brahmin householders who know the Vedas is the supreme *dharma* leading to happiness. [The Śūdras] who are clean, obedient to the upper classes, speak gently, not self-assertive, and always rely on Brahmin and others will acquire a birth in the upper classes [in the next life]. *viprāṇāṃ vedaviduṣāṃ grhasthānāṃ yaśasvināṃ* / *śuśrūṣaiva tu śūdrasya dharmo naisreyasaḥ paraḥ* // *śucir utkrṣṭaśuśrūṣur mṛduvāg anahaṃkṛtaḥ* / *brāhmaṇādyāśrayo nityam utkrṣṭāṃ jātim aśnute* // Kumāṛila

initiation ceremony and become students, so they could not become erudite. Accordingly, the scope of “good people” can be considered to encompass and be broader than the scope of “erudite,” and the “customary practice of good people” (*sadācāra*) can be a source of law insofar as people respect and follow the practice of the erudites acquainted with the Vedas and Smṛtis.

However, it is not clear how much of the population in the regional society held to be the *āryāvarta* is included in the actual scope of “good people” as referred to in the law codes. The great majority of the populace has no connection to the Vedic religions, and the law codes could not be rendered effective unless the king maintains control over people breaching them by mandatory force.¹⁵² Accordingly, one cannot expect that guidance of the lifestyles of the public by the minority Brahmin elite realistically covered the entirety of the *āryāvarta*.

Nevertheless, Kumārila said in the above passage that because the erudites have compiled written law based on the Vedas and followed it for generations, they can be “trustworthy people” (*sapratyaya*) for the general public according to this social view of the *Manusmṛti*. In that case, what kind of person does Kumārila think these “erudites” are, and why does he think the good public will comply with the law codes that the erudites pass down? Moreover, notwithstanding that Brahmins who have completed Vedic studies may become Buddhist monks for some reason—and probably did so—why are such monks in Buddhist orders not included as “erudite”?

First, people feel an affinity to erudites because they are not celibate, unmarried ascetics but married householders who want to find joy in worldly life. According to Kumārila, erudites, like ordinary people, try to obtain benefits and pleasure in worldly life through many kinds of occupational and consumption activities. No one, not even the erudites themselves, thinks that they are doing these activities for the *dharma*.

Even so, [erudites are also] observed to perform a range of acts that they have in common with barbarians and others, such as farming, service, and commerce as means for benefit (*artha*) and pleasure (*sukha*), whether restricted

allows including Śūdra in the “good people” who live in the *āryāvarta* by his use of “the four-class system” (*cāturvarṇya*) in the example in footnote 138 herein.

¹⁵² As an example of the divergence between the law codes and reality, Nobuyuki Watase (2011:7) points out: the 1.25% per month interest on debt stipulated in GDhS 12.29 continued to be respected in Dharmaśāstras (Mn 8.140; YS 2.39), but according to Chatterjee (1971:69–74), the real interest as confirmed in inscriptions was often higher than that.

or unrestricted. They are various acts that are widely known as acts [aiming at] delicious food and drink, soft bedding and seating, an attractive house or gardens or paintings or songs or dancing or perfumes or flowers, and so on. Concerning these acts, no one suspects that they deal with *dharma*.¹⁵³

However, the erudites accumulate disposition (*saṃskāra*) by studying the Vedas and the sciences based on the Vedas for many years. Through these activities, they control themselves in accordance with the Vedas. They do not desire to do things contrary to the Vedas, such as acting in their egoistic interest or being guided by personal feelings.¹⁵⁴

Thus, it was widely known that the self-satisfaction of the people who have completed themselves by contemplating the many *dharma* based on the Vedas is a means of knowledge for clarifying *dharma*. In precisely that way, people who have trained for a long time and raised disposition (*saṃskāra*) by the Vedas and recognition of their meaning cannot have thoughts that stray from the way (*unmārga*), because their thoughts follow the path laid by the Vedas.¹⁵⁵

What arises in salt deposits within salt mines and glittering gold deposits within Mount Meru has only its respective ingredients (salt and gold). In the same way, the self-satisfaction of a person who knows the Vedas has [only ingredients from the Vedas]. Moreover, this is also preached by poets in a widely known form (wording) as something originating in the words of

¹⁵³ TV 206,21-23: *yāni tu mlecchādisamānāni niyatāniyatakriyāntarāṅgy arthasukhasādhanakṛṣisevāvāñijyādīni mṛṣṭānnapāna-mṛduśayanāsana-ramaṇīyagrḥodyānālekhyagītanṛtyagandhapuṣpādikarmāṇi prasiddhāni teṣu naiva kasyacid dharmatvāsaṅkāstīti*. See Harikai 1994:163.

¹⁵⁴ Kumārila gives an anecdote on the hero Bhīṣma from the *Mahābhārata* as an example of erudite (TV 208,26–27). Bhīṣma formerly conducted an ancestor ceremony on the banks of the Gaṅgā River for his late father, King Śantanu, but when he had completed all of the preparations for the ritual, and it came time to offer the dumplings (*piṇḍas*) as an oblation, the ground suddenly split, and an arm stretched out from between the grass mulch. Seeing that the arm was wearing Śantanu’s bracelet, Bhīṣma learned that his father had come from the other world, and he almost went to place a dumpling upon the open palm out of nostalgia. However, he suddenly recalled the stipulation in the scriptures, “the dumplings in ancestor ceremonies shall be placed upon the grass mulch” (see Mn 3.215–216), and placed the dumplings on the grass as stipulated. Then, the arm disappeared back into the earth (MBh 13.83.11–21). See Yoshimizu 2007e; Yoshimizu 2012a:648–649.

¹⁵⁵ TV 207,1-4: *etena vaidikānantadharmadhīsaṃskṛtātmanām / ātmatuṣṭeḥ pramāṇatvaṃ prasiddhaṃ dharmasūddhaye // tathā eva bahukālābhyastavedatadarthajñānāhitasaṃskārāṇāṃ vedaniyatamārgānusāripratibhānām nonmārgaṇa pratibhānaṃ saṃbhavati*.

intellectuals, “Because for good people, the operation of their innermost organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for things at the stage of uncertainty.” (*Śakuntalā* 1.20cd)¹⁵⁶

Thus, Kumārila permits erudites to seek benefit and pleasure while distinguishing these from *dharma* and stating that their *dharma* practice can be achieved in secular life. He agrees with the view about humanity in the *Manusmṛti*, which acknowledges that all acts are based on desire (*kāma*) while requiring that those acts be conducted correctly.¹⁵⁷ Kumārila can be regarded as looking back to the age of the Vedas and viewing the repayment of the three religious debts (*ṛṇa*) that are also explicitly mentioned in the *Manusmṛti* as being at the center of the *dharma* that should be practiced in day-to-day life.¹⁵⁸ People assume themselves to

¹⁵⁶ TV 207,7–10: *yathā rumāyāṃ lavaṇākareṣu* (cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.5.13) *merau yathā vojvvalarukmabhūmau / yaj jāyate tanmayam eva tat syāt tathā bhaved vedavid-ātmatuṣṭiḥ // evaṃ ca vidvadvacanād vinirgataṃ prasiddharūpaṃ kavibhir nirūpitam / satām hi samdehapadeṣu vastuṣu pramāṇam antaḥkaraṇapravṛttayaḥ // iti*. This quotation from the play *Śakuntalā* contains the lines spat out in a scene where King Duṣyanta, passing by the hermitage of the sage Kaṇva, spied upon Śakuntalā from behind a tree and fell in love, but he came to suspect that she might be the daughter of the sage Kaṇva, who is a Brahmin, and in the awareness that the marriage of a *Kṣatriya* man and a Brahmin woman would be a “reverse marriage” (*pratiloma*) and contrary to the status stipulations in the law codes relating to marriage (Mn 3.13). However, he firmly decided to follow his heart’s orders, throwing away his hesitation with the quoted lines. After this scene, Duṣyanta is overjoyed to discover that Śakuntalā is, in fact, the daughter of the sage Viśvāmitra (*Śakuntalā*, pp. 40–42) and therefore his marriage to Śakuntalā is legal. Viśvāmitra was one of the founders of the Brahmin lineages (*gotras*, see footnote 87 herein), but since epics (MBh 1.165.4; *Rāmāyaṇa* [R] 1.50.17), he generally came to be deemed to have been initially a king.

Using authoritative sources, David (2007) proves that reliance on “self-satisfaction” in Hindu law codes is generally limited to the cases where there are several available options, no applicable stipulations in other law sources, and where the person making the determination is beyond reproach. He concludes that “self-satisfaction” is accepted only as a law source of last resort, factually as a very narrow exception. Then, David (2007:288–289) points out that having Kumārila argued that the “self-satisfaction” of such a person can see through to the truth of things hidden on the surface, assuming that Duṣyanta is a person who received a thorough education in the Vedas,.

¹⁵⁷ Mn 2.4–5: “Acts that people perform without having any desire cannot be seen anywhere in the world. In fact, no matter what action a person performs, they are all performed by people with desire. A person who can perform them correctly will go to the world of the immortal [gods]. In addition, in this world, they will acquire all of the objects of desire as planned. *akāmasya kriyā kācid dṛśyate neha karhicit / yad yad dhi kurute kiṃcit tat tat kāmasya ceṣṭitam // teṣu samyag vartamāno gacchaty amaralokatām / yathā-saṃkalpitāṃś ceha sarvān kāmān samaśnute //*

¹⁵⁸ To justify Bhīṣma’s remaining unmarried, Kumārila quoted Mn 9.182 “Manu said that if one of several brothers born to the same father became a person having a son, the son will

have been born with a sort of religious debts, which they should repay in installment to the ancient sages (*ṛṣis*) who transmitted the Vedas by reciting them daily, to the gods by performing sacrifices, and to the ancestors of households by raising children.¹⁵⁹ Among these three activities, the daily recitation of the Vedas is a legacy of the culture that society built in ancient times. The performance of sacrifices is always associated with charity and promotes the circulation of wealth in the present-day regional society (albeit with a bias toward the upper levels of society).¹⁶⁰ Raising children guarantees the stability of society in the future. These are social activities of the laity rooted in the local region and cannot be performed by celibate monks of Buddhism and other religions. Then, the ordinary people observe the erudites as they strive for happiness and contribute to the community (provided that the good people do not envy Brahmins). Finally, these behaviors of the respected erudites are perceived by ordinary people as standard norms that they can imitate to achieve happiness.

cause all of them [the brothers] to become a person having a son.” (*bhrātṛṅnām ekajātānām ekaś cet putravān bhavet / sarve te tena putreṇa putriṇo manur abravīt*) He then defends Bhīṣma, saying, “By the son born [to Satyavatī’s child Vyāsa] from the wife of Vicitravīrya (the prince who was born to Bhīṣma’s father, King Śantanu, and the queen Satyavatī), he has repaid his debt to the ancestral spirits.” (TV 208,24: *vicitravīryakṣetrajaṅgapatralabdha-pitrānṛṇatvaḥ*) (Bhīṣma usurped the princess Varanasi and made her marry Vicitravīrya). In a paternal joint family society with solid bonds between relatives, this probably means that nephews also had future values similar to one’s own sons.

¹⁵⁹ Mn 4.257: “After obeying the rules and reaching a state with no debts to the great sages, the ancestral spirits, and the gods, [the householder] shall entrust everything to his son and live in a neutral stance.” *maharṣipitrdevānām gatvānṛṇyaṃ yathāvidhi / putre sarvaṃ samāsajya vasen mādhyasthyam āśritaḥ* // The repayment of these three religious debts was first reduced to writing as a set in the *Taittirīyasamhitā* (TS 6.3.10.5), and the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* added the “debt to people” that should be repaid by entertaining guests (ŚB 1.7.2.1–6). See Watase 1991: translator’s note to 4.257; Malamoud 1980. On the “repayment of religious debts” discussed by the *Manusmṛti* commentator Medhātithi, whom Kumārila influenced in respect of theory on the sources of law, see Yoshimizu 2013a.

¹⁶⁰ The *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, which is the standard type of the *Soma* sacrifice (*soma* pressing and offering take place on one day), is conducted by a total of sixteen priests, four for each of the four divisions of the Vedas, and the sacrificer pays charities for all of them (although the amount that each priest receives within his division may vary according to his role). The *Manusmṛti* allows the *Soma* festival to be hosted by a householder with at least three years’ food stores for all the people he supports, ensuring the payment of charities (Mn 11.7). Provisions with the same contents include MBh 12.159.5; VDhS 8.10; YS 1.123ab; *Viṣṇusmṛti* (ViS) 59.8–9 (from Bühler 1982:575). Moreover, the *Manusmṛti* allows the confiscating of assets from wealthy people who do not conduct Vedic sacrifices (Mn 11.14) to circulate wealth by charities for sacrifices. On the caution against miserliness and the virtues of giving gifts, see Mn 4.224–235.

For this reason, erudites do not commence [all the acts that they usually seek to carry out], having confirmed that the scriptures characterize them differently [from the means for achieving benefit and pleasure, i.e., by characterizing them as a means for achieving *dharma*]. However, the conduct of erudites and the scriptures do not diverge at any time, so [ordinary people] extract some portion from their conduct and claim that it must be the means for achieving heaven, etc., [while] forgetting that it was performed incidentally. Thus it comes to be widely known as a regular obligation imposed [on people].¹⁶¹

In this way, ordinary people form customary laws by accepting some parts of behaviors that erudites perform according to the motto “this is good.” Still, the foundation for this lies in the erudites regulating themselves under the traditional value system, and suppressing self-interest to contribute to the public benefit (Indian-style *noblesse oblige*¹⁶²) while still seeking a good living in their current lives like the ordinary people in the secular world. In contrast, if “self-satisfaction” were allowed as a source of law without restrictions, it would decline into mere self-serving self-complacency because people’s individual preferences vary widely, and the criteria used to determine whether something is good or evil would lose all objectivity and publicity. In discussing “the customs of good people” as a source of law, Kumārila initially adopted an opponent and temporarily contained the direction of admitting sources of law other than the Vedas and written law:

[Question to the opponent:] However, do not Manu and others recollect that the customs of good people are a means of knowledge? [Answer by the opponent:] They (Manu and others) describe self-satisfaction as another [means of knowledge] concerning *dharma*, but this is not determined. In fact, the heart (*āśaya*) is varied according to the habits, and [people are] satisfied with themselves when they perform pure things, or impure things, or things that are neither, so [self-satisfaction] is varied [according to people].¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ TV 206,3-6: *ato na nāmopalakṣaṇāntareṇa śāstraṃ pravṛttam upalabhya śiṣṭāḥ pravṛttāḥ, sarvakālaṃ tu śiṣṭavyavahāraśāstrayor aviyoḡād vyavahārād evāpoddhṛtya kecīd svargādisādhanatvena niyamamānāḥ kādācitkatvaparitāyāgena nityaprayojyā vijñāyante.*

¹⁶² However, this is not limited to the social liability required of the royalty and nobility in the West. Erudites should preferably be in honest poverty. See “have enough cereal to fill a jar” (*kumbhīdhānyā*) in footnote 38 herein and Mn 4.2–8; YS 1.127.

¹⁶³ TV 204,14-18: *nanu—sadācārapramāṇatvaṃ manvādibhir api smṛtam / ātmatuṣṭiḥ smṛtā ’nyā tair dharme sā cānavasthitā // yathābhyāsaṃ hy āśayavaicitryeṇa śubhāśubhobhayahīnakriyānuṣṭhāyinām ātmatuṣṭir api vicitraiva bhavati.*

What is more, this opponent represents arbitrary judgments by what Buddhists like and hate:

In fact, some people may be satisfied even with impure actions, like how Buddhists are [satisfied] with preaching sophism and criticizing the Vedas and Brahmins. Likewise, Brahmins are satisfied with sacrifices accompanied by the taking of the lives of livestock, etc., but Buddhists are enraged by these sacrifices being distressed [by the suffering of the livestock].¹⁶⁴

This opponent, then, is not a real person who opposed Kumāṛila, but a fictionary opponent whom Kumāṛila set up as an introduction to the discussion of customary law, reflecting Kumāṛila's intentions. Since the Vedas are revealed scriptures not created by humans, their norms are not influenced by a human subjective view. Kumāṛila is concerned that if we move away from Vedic norms and entrust the criteria for good and evil to the intellectual judgment of human beings, as preached in Buddhism, the conflict between different value systems among people would not be resolved, leading to complete relativism or even inviting self-centered, "anything goes" social anarchy.¹⁶⁵

2. "Correct language" (*sādhuśabda*) and "incorrect language"

Kumāṛila's attitude of allowing customs in Aryan society as a source of law while giving written norms precedence over custom aligns with the grammarian school's view. While allowing the usage of words to be fixed by the community customs,¹⁶⁶ the grammarian school also holds that only Sanskrit has its appropriate

¹⁶⁴ TV 204,18-23: *tathā hi—kasyacij jāyate tuṣṭir aśubhe 'pi hi karmaṇi / śākyasyeva kuhetūktivedabrāhmaṇadūṣaṇe // tathā hi—paśuhiṃsādisaṃbandhe yajñe tuṣyanti hi dvijāḥ / tebhyaḥ eva hi yajñebhyaḥ śākyāḥ krudhyanti pīḍitāḥ //* Cf. Francavilla 2006:166–167.

¹⁶⁵ As the error of relativism concerning good and evil, Kumāṛila mentions that it must permit the *saṃsāramocakas*, who preach that they can "release living beings from the transmigration by taking their lives" and carry this out, arguing against karmic retribution. ŚV, Autpattikasūtra, vv. 5cd–6: "The *saṃsāramocaka* and others believe that taking a life is a [behavior of] happiness and prosperity. Some people do not recognize that happiness and prosperity [are obtained through good conduct] afterward because of their repugnance. Similarly, barbarians and Aryans will not reach a common understanding of *dharma*." *saṃsāramocakādeś ca hiṃsā puṇyatvasammatā // na paścāt puṇyam icchanti ke cid evaṃ vigānataḥ / mlecchāryāṇāṃ prasiddhatvaṃ na dharmasyopapadyate //* Halbfass (1991:97–102 & 107–111) traced the buried thought of the *saṃsāramocaka* from Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* and various other texts.

¹⁶⁶ Vārttika 3–4 on the Pasaśāhnikā (VMBh, vol. 1, 6–8: "The relationship between words

usage made explicit by works on grammar, and Sanskrit is the sole “correct language” (*sādhuśabda*) among the various languages in Indian society.¹⁶⁷ Kumārila appreciates the Pāṇinian grammar and other treatises on grammar in volume 1, chapter 3 of the *Tantravārttika*. Concerning the vernacular, he states that it is a language derived (*prākṛta*) from Sanskrit because its vocabulary cannot represent meaning but can convey meaning only through the corresponding words in Sanskrit, the language it derives from (*prakṛti*), which can represent meaning by itself.

Corrupted words (*apabhraṃśa*) are used in understanding meaning while manifesting the ability [to represent meaning] of the original words [in Sanskrit] through similarity with them.¹⁶⁸

Kumārila points out that many Buddhist and other heretic scriptures are written in the vernacular of distant regions, specifically “the Magadha region and the south.”

Literature handed down in Buddhism and Jainism mostly consists of incorrect language (*asādhuśabda*). Because they are written in incorrect (language), they cannot be understood as scripture. In fact, they are based on incorrect language from the Magadha region and the south that has been corrupted (*apabhraṃśa*) from that (Sanskrit).¹⁶⁹

and meaning is established based on the community, and words are applied to convey meaning, but restrictions for *dharma* [are made] by grammars.” *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato ’rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ*. On the interpretation of “lokatas,” see Joshi-Roodbergen 1986:115, n. 462 and 117, n. 473. For the religious merit held in the Veda and Pāṇinian grammar to be obtained by uttering correct words, see Ozono 2021.

¹⁶⁷ Patañjali calls Pāṇini’s grammar “the scripture that defines correct [language].” VMBh, vol.1, 39,14: *sādhvanuśāsane ’smiñ śāstre*. See Cardona 1997:544.

¹⁶⁸ TV 278,13-14: *prakṛtisārūpyadvāreṇāpabhraṃśāḥ prakṛtīm eva śaktim āvirbhāvayanto ’rthapratipattāv upayogaṃ gacchanti*. Cf. MmS 1. 3. 28: *tadaśaktiś cānurūpatvāt; Vākyapadīya* 1.177-178 (ed. W. Rau, 1977) = 1.141-142 (ed. K.A. Subrahmanya Iyer, 1966); Harikai 1975:1039, n. 21.

¹⁶⁹ TV 237,3-5: *asādhuśabdabhūyiṣṭhāḥ śākyajaināgamādayaḥ / asannibandhanatvāc ca śāstratvaṃ na pratīyate // māgadhadaḥkṣiṇātyatadapabhraṃśaprāyāsādhuśabdānibandhanā hi te*. Cf. Ollett 2017:123, 244. Deshpande (1994:103–104) points out that in addition to the Maurya Empire collapsing and the other countries than Magadha increasing their strength, the Magadha language suffered a fall in status and was considered the language of the lower classes in Sanskrit drama. At the same time, Sanskrit began to be used in Buddhist literature and inscriptions.

Kumārila quotes the following writing, which is not regular Sanskrit, as a practical example:

tathā ukakhitte loḍammi uvve atthi kāraṇam. paḍaṇe ṇatthi kāraṇam. aṇubhave kāraṇam ime sakkadā dharmmā saṃbhavanti sakāraṇā akāraṇā viṇasanti. aṇupattikāraṇam. (TV 237, 6–8)

When the readings in multiple manuscripts¹⁷⁰ that were collected a hundred years ago by La Vallée Poussin and more recently by Kunio Harikai were sorted, this writing became the following two *anuṣṭubh* verses:

*[ya]thā¹⁷¹ ukkhitte¹⁷² loḍ[h]ammi ukkheve¹⁷³ atthi kāraṇam /
paḍaṇe ṇatthi kāraṇam aṇ[ṇam¹⁷⁴] ubbhave¹⁷⁵-kāraṇ[āt¹⁷⁶] //
[ev'] ime¹⁷⁷ sakkadā dhammā¹⁷⁸ saṃbhavanti sakāraṇā /
akāraṇā viṇas[s]anti aṇ[ṇam] uppattikāraṇāt¹⁷⁹ //*

“When a lump of earth (**loṣṭa*) is thrown up (**utkṣipte*), there is a cause for the throwing up (**utkṣepe*), but falling (**patane*) has no cause other than (**anyam*) the cause when rising (**udbhava*). In the same way, these various existences (**dharmāḥ*) of constant change (**saṃskṛtāḥ*) occur due to cause, but they disappear without any cause (**vinaśyanti*) other than the cause of their occurrence (**utpatti*).”

This verse preaches in the vernacular the same content as the theory of “perishing without cause” held in the Sautrāntika, which holds that “things perish by themselves without an external cause,” and Candrakīrti of the Madhyamaka

¹⁷⁰ The manuscripts referred to in Harikai 2010:235: M1: Asiatic Society of Calcutta, S.C. 2388; M2: Bodleian Library, Chandra Shum Shere d.516; M3: Bodleian Library, Wilson No. 325; M4: British Library, Eggeling No. 2151; M5: Bodleian Library, Chandra Shum Shere d.536; M6: Oriental Institute, Baroda, No. 11566. See Harikai 2010:224.

¹⁷¹ Mss of the PrsP in La Vallée Poussin 1903-13: 223,11: *yathā*

¹⁷² M3: *ukhittai*; M1, M6: *ukkhite*

¹⁷³ M1, M3, M5, M6: *ukkheve*

¹⁷⁴ La Vallée Poussin’s reading (PrsP 222,16) based on the Tibetan translation “*gshan pa*” (Derge, no. 3860, 76b6).”

¹⁷⁵ M1, M4: *acchi ubbhhave*

¹⁷⁶ Mss of the PrsP in La Vallée Poussin 1903-13: 223,12: *kāraṇād iti*

¹⁷⁷ Mss of the PrsP in La Vallée Poussin 1903-13: 223,25: *eva me*

¹⁷⁸ M4, M5: *dhammā*

¹⁷⁹ M3: *anupattikāraṇād*; M1, M6: *anupattikāraṇam*

quotes an almost identical vernacular verse in the *Prasannapadā*.¹⁸⁰ However, Kumārila is not treating the language of this verse with disdain and refusing to reflect upon it because it is in an inferior language; on the contrary, he analyzes how this language differs from regular Sanskrit and typical vernacular out of linguistic interest as an academic scholar.

In addition, [Buddhist scriptures] have (word forms) like *bhikkhave*, which are further corrupted, compared to the regional languages, which are well known as corrupted forms, because Prākṛit (derived language) forms ending in *e* are observed in places with the accusative plural cases, but not in places with the nominative plural and vocative plural cases. Moreover, concerning the word *saṃskṛta*, the various languages derived [from Sanskrit] and corrupted have doubled the *k* sound and lost the *anusvāra*, changing the *ṛ* sound into the *a* sound (in other words, to make *sakkata*) and nothing else, and the change [of the *t* sound] into a *ḍ* sound [as in *sakkaḍā[h]* in the quoted Buddhist scripture] is not [observed].¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ *Prasannapadā* (PrsP) 222,14-16: *yatha ukkhite lodhammi ukkheve atthi kāraṇaṃ / paḍane kāraṇaṃ ṇatthi aṇṇaṃ ukkhevakāraṇāt // iti*; 223,4-5: *evime saṃkhatā dhammāḥ saṃbhavanti sakāraṇāḥ / sa bhāva eva dhammāṇāṃ yaṃ vibhonti samudgatāḥ // iti*. Candrakīrti gives the following commentary on this verse, but the author is not criticizing its contents here. PrsP 223,1–2: “In the case of this (the lump of earth), the cause for falling is it being thrown up and nothing else. In the same way, in this case as well, we explain that only the occurrence is the cause of the disappearance and nothing else.” *yathāpy atra kṣepaḥ patanakāraṇaṃ nānyat. evam ihāpi jātim eva kāraṇatvena vināśasya varṇayāmo nānyat*. PrsP 173,8-175,6 contains Candrakīrti’s criticism of the theory of perishing without cause.

¹⁸¹ TV 239,1-4: *kim uta yāni prasiddhāpabhraṣṭadeśabhāṣābhyo ’py apabhraṣṭatarāṇi bhikkhave ityevamādīni. dvitīyābahuvacanasthāne hy ekārāntaṃ prākṛtaṃ padaṃ dr̥ṣṭaṃ na prathamābahuvacane saṃbodhane ’pi. saṃskṛtaśabdasthāne ca kakāradvayasamyogo anusvāralopaḥ. ṛvarṇākārāpattimātram eva prākṛtāpabhraṃśeṣu dr̥ṣṭam. na* [Harikai 2010:237, M3: *tu*] *ḍakārāpattir api*. Moreover, Kumārila points out with actual examples that Buddhists’ works frequently contain irregular word forms, even in those works written with the intention to use Sanskrit. TV 238,27–28: “In the literature of Buddhism, etc., even the certain pieces spelled with an unhindered intellect generally use *prajñapti*, *vijñapti*, *paśyanā*, *tiṣṭhana*, and other [irregular word forms] from the intention to use language properly, so only a small number of proper items can be obtained.” *sākyādigrantheṣu punar yad api kimcid sādhuśabdābhiprāyeṇāvinaṣṭabuddhyā prayuktaṃ tatrāpi prajñapti-vijñapti-paśyanātiṣṭhanādiprāyaprayogāt kimcid evāviplutaṃ labhyate*. Edgerton’s (1993) dictionary gives *prajñapti* and *vijñapti*, as well as *paśyana*, *vipaśyanā*, and *tiṣṭhantika*. See NSu 237,17–21.

IV. Awareness of *dharma* from others' discourse

In the second half of its final chapter, the *Manusmṛti* defines the council of experts (*pariṣad*) who will be the judiciary in regional communities. It also emphasizes the authority of the Vedas and the virtue of reciting them. Then, addressing the readers involved in judgment, the *Manusmṛti* explains to them the three modes of *Dharma* cognition, namely, direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), i.e., gathering evidence, inference (*anumāna*), i.e., deducing what happened from evidence, and the teachings of the various scriptures (*śāstra*), i.e., the standard for making rulings.¹⁸² Following on from that, it states:

Those who interpret the texts transmitted by the sages (i.e., the Vedas, that is, *śruti*) and law codes (*smṛti*) through reasoning (*tarka*) without contradiction with the Vedic scriptures know *dharma*. The others do not.¹⁸³

With regard to the scriptures to be consulted in a lawsuit, it is said that one should investigate how the Vedas and codes of law handed down from ancient times should be applied in an actual lawsuit, provided that they are correct scriptures, and one should not investigate whether the scriptures are true or false.¹⁸⁴ The final passage, “The others do not [know],” brings to mind the following provision in the theory of legal source in chapter 2 of the *Manusmṛti*:

“Brahmins who belittle both these sources of law (*śruti* and *smṛti*), relying on the study of logic, should be excluded by good people as nihilists (*nāstika*) and vilifiers of the Vedas.”¹⁸⁵

Moreover, if we have to assume unconditionally that “the scriptures handed down to us are correct,” we cannot doubt the master who transmitted the scriptures to us.

¹⁸² Mn 12.105: “Direct perception and inference and scriptures consisting of various inheritances. Those who wish to purify the *dharma* must thoroughly know these three.” *pratyakṣaṃ cānumānaṃ ca śāstraṃ ca vividhāgamam / trayaṃ suviditaṃ kāryaṃ dharmasuddhim abhīpsatā //*

¹⁸³ Mn 12.106: *ārṣaṃ dharmopadeśaṃ ca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā / yas tarkeṇānusamdhatte sa dharmam veda netarah //*

¹⁸⁴ The commentator Medhātithi interprets this *tarka* as *mīmāṃsā*. MnBh, vol. 2, 485,16: “By this (*tarka* as in Mn 12.106), therefore, a decree has been given to know Mīmāṃsā for purifying *dharma*.” *ato dharmasuddhyarthaṃ mīmāṃsāvedanam etena coditam.*

¹⁸⁵ Mn 2.11: *yo 'vamanayeta te mūle hetuśāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ / sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ //*

The Brahmin law codes emphasize the need for disciples to obey their masters in all respects.

“[A student] should sit facing the master as if facing a god.”¹⁸⁶

“When abuse or criticism of the master occurs, [the student] should block both ears, or go elsewhere from that place.”¹⁸⁷

Kumārila also requires students to believe what their masters say, no matter what is done elsewhere, concerning the reading of the Vedas:

Trusting the reliable person (i.e., the master), disciples understand it in the way [the master] says, “We read this part like this,” no matter whether it is read [in that way somewhere else] or not.¹⁸⁸

On the Buddhist side, Dharmakīrti argued immediately after Kumārila that one should accept teachings received from others after carefully examining them with one’s intellectual powers, i.e., after confirming them by perception or by inference. He also explains that even the words of the Buddha fall within the realm of examination.

“The reliability [of a statement] consists in that it is not invalidated by perception or by two kinds of inference¹⁸⁹ concerning its object that can be perceived or that cannot be perceived.”¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ ĀpDhS 1.6.13: *devam ivācāryam upāsīta...*

¹⁸⁷ Mn 2.200: *guror yatra parivādo nindā vāpi pravartate / karṇau tatra pidhātavyau gantavyam vā tato ’nyataḥ* // See footnote 7 herein.

¹⁸⁸ TV187,18-19: *tatra yathāivāptapratyayād idam iha paṭhyata iti kathitam uccāritam anuccāritam vā śiṣyāḥ pratipadyante*. However, although Kumārila is writing sub-commentaries to Śabara’s *sūtra* commentary, he himself gives frank, harsh criticism in many places on Śabara, unlike Prabhākara, who also wrote sub-commentaries to Śabara’s commentary. The reader is referred to the appendix in Yoshimizu 2012c.

¹⁸⁹ Inference not based on scripture (*anāgamāpekṣānumāna*), and inference based on confirmed scripture (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*) applied to reject contradictory statements. See PVSV (ad PV 1.215) 108,24–109,3; Yaita 1987:7–8; Tillemans 1999:28–30; Eltschinger 2010: n. 20; Yoshimizu 2011c:253–255.

¹⁹⁰ *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) 1.215: *pratyakṣeṇa anumānena dvividhena apy abādhanam* / dṛṣṭādrṣṭārthayor asya avisamvādas tadarthayoh* // Of Buddha’s teachings, the five aggregates that form a human being can be confirmed by perception, and the four noble truths by an inference not based on scripture (PVSV on PV 1.215).

This critical attitude of examining even the Buddha’s teachings is certainly not limited to the so-called Buddhist school of logic and epistemology and dates back to the origin of Buddhism. For example, in one of the oldest Buddhist scripture, the *Suttanipāta*, the Buddha himself repeatedly emphasizes, “The *dharma* that I preach is what has been directly perceived (*sakkhi/diṭṭha*) and not what comes from mere traditional sayings (*netiha*).”¹⁹¹ Moreover, according to the dialogue between the Buddha and his disciples described in the *Mahātaṇhāsankhayasutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* 38),¹⁹² a Buddhist monk should not disbelieve the teachings because a heretic preached them, nor should he or she believe them because the Buddha preached them. Instead, a Buddhist monk should observe and consider the contents of the teachings and accept only those teachings that he or she has confirmed to be correct.

“Would you, knowing and seeing all this, say: — We revere our teacher, and it is because of our reverence for him that we affirm this?

No, sir,

Would you, knowing and seeing all this, say: — Oh, we were told this by a recluse or recluses ; we do not affirm it ourselves?

No, sir,

(Omitted)

Do you affirm only what you have of yourselves known, seen and discerned?

Yes, sir.” (Transl. by Chalmers 1928:188–189)¹⁹³

*Here, *abādhana* means that the object exists exactly as recognized by a means of knowledge (PVSV 108,20&24: *tathābhāva*), and it does not mean “the validity because of a lack of counterproof” derived from Kumāriḷa’s “theory of intrinsic validity” (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*).

¹⁹¹ *Suttanipāta* (Sn) 934ab & 1053.

¹⁹² The Buddha heard that his disciple Sāti preached to a layperson that “the Buddha says that consciousness (*viññāṇa*) survives after a person’s death” and harshly scolded Sāti in front of other monks. After the monks recited the dependent origination in twelve-fold chain of causation, the following question-and-answer dialogue between the Buddha and his disciples began.

¹⁹³ MN vol. I, 265,17–29: *api nu tumhe bhikkhave evaṃ jānatā evaṃ passantā evaṃ vadeyyatha: satthā no garu, satthugaravena ca mayaṃ vademāti. no h’etaṃ bhante. api nu tumhe bhikkhave evaṃ jānatā evaṃ passantā evaṃ vadeyyatha: samaṇo no evaṃ āha samaṇā ca, na ca mayaṃ evaṃ vademāti. no h’etaṃ bhante.... nanu bhikkhave yad eva tumhākaṃ sāmaṃ nātaṃ sāmaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sāmaṃ viditaṃ tad eva tumhe vadethāti. evaṃ bhante.*

As shown above, there is a conflict of principle between Kumārila and the compilers of the Brahmin law codes on the one hand and Buddhist thinkers on the other, as to whether recipients should accept without doubt the teachings traditionally handed down in their groups regarding *dharma* or whether they should accept those teachings after scrutinizing them for themselves and confirming their validity. Kumārila formalized this as a conflict between the “theory of intrinsic validity” (*svataḥprāmānya*) and the “theory of extrinsic validity” (*parataḥprāmānya*). The former considers cognition valid until proven otherwise, whereas the latter considers cognition valid only once confirmed. Attacks and responses have been made under this framework from both positions down to posterity.

V. Historical background

Based on a critical examination of their traditions, the Buddhist monks successively developed new doctrines and missionary activities not found in other Indian religions. Finally, at the time of the Gupta dynasty, they enjoyed the support of a broad section of the population, including the general populace, not to mention the kings and other upper classes of society. However, with the decline of the Gupta dynasty in the sixth century, the nobility in each area claimed their independence and became new kings. They generously offered land and villages to the orthodox Brahmins to establish their authority. An example of such an emerging kingdom is the Maitraka dynasty, which flourished in present-day Gujarat from the sixth to the eighth centuries. According to Njammasch, who studied the inscriptions issued by this dynasty,¹⁹⁴ the surviving inscriptions show that land and villages were offered more to Buddhist temples in Gujarat until about the fifth century. In contrast, from the sixth to the ninth centuries, including the Maitraka dynasty, offerings to Brahmins were more common than Buddhist temples.¹⁹⁵ Amid the historical

¹⁹⁴ Njammasch 2001:318–319.

¹⁹⁵ Valabhī, the capital of the Maitraka dynasty, had a Buddhist monastery complex of a scale similar to the Nālandā. Whereas the royal household generously made contributions to religious institutions, of the 104 Maitraka dynasty contribution inscriptions with value as historical materials, twenty-five are to Buddhist monasteries, only four are to Hindu temples, and the remaining seventy-five are to Brahmins (Njammasch 2001:279 and 342–346). In addition, Toshio Yamazaki (1967:2) also referred to a total of seventy-five inscriptions on village and land offerings issued by the Maitraka dynasty and counted fifty-five for Brahmins, seventeen for Buddhist monasteries, and three for Hindu temples. On the inscriptions in the Kaṭaccuri dynasty, which was adjacent to the Maitraka dynasty to the south and dated to almost the same period, Schmiedchen (2013:361) wrote, “at the

background of the post-Gupta era, some Brahmin intellectuals sought to make their interests and rights firmly fixed in actual society, developing their armor of discourse more powerful than before. We can safely regard Kumārila as the foremost of these people at the end of the sixth and beginning of the seventh centuries.

Kumārila broadly rearranged the Mīmāṃsā theory of ritual according to the traditional Vedānta theory of “the combination of knowledge and action” (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāya*), which also values sacrifices to become liberated from rebirth. Still, he does not take the side of the Vedāntic monism, which claims that “the spirit of the individual ultimately becomes merged into the universal spirit and the distinction between self and other disappears.” Regarding individuals’ self (*ātman*) in the *Tantravārttika*, Kumārila rejects the theory of monism because it contradicts the social and religious norms imposed on people by the Vedas differently according to their class in society. Instead, he approves of the differences between classes in society as the unchangeable nature of individuals. In this way, Kumārila suggests that the essential thing he is interested in is the actual societies of the various classes, not the spiritual state of liberation.

Moreover, [if the *ātman* were only one,] decrees on acts [in the Vedas] would not be distinguished by established separate classes. This is because the same singular *ātman* would be linked to bodies here and there, and all classes would be formed. There is no fault if individual *ātman* is separate [from each other].¹⁹⁶

Then, Kumārila confirms that festivals currently celebrated by the populace around him are, in general, correct customs as long as erudites are involved, on the basis that the Vedas and law codes contain passages (albeit a few) that refer to the

Kaṭaccuri court, ... in the 6th to 8th century ... The majority of the royal grants were in favour of Vedic Brahmins without any specific Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, or other sectarian learnings.” According to Njammasch, in Gujarat from the ninth century, contributions to Hindu temples approached the contributions to Brahmins, and from the twelfth century, the contributions to Hindu temples were overwhelming.

¹⁹⁶ TV 403,25–27: *varṇaviśeṣavyavasthayā ca karmacodanābhedo na syāt. ekasyaivātmanas tena tena śarīreṇa sambadhyamānasya sarvavarṇopapatteḥ. ātmanānātve tv adoṣaḥ.* This statement is at the end of the section on *apūrva* (TV 2.1.5). In the history of the Mīmāṃsā school, Kumārila’s era saw the beginning of the idea to regard *apūrva* as this kind of “newly acquired power.” Before Kumārila (including Śabara), *apūrva* was not described as the potential power (*śakti*) or disposition (*saṃskāra*) accumulated within the sacrificer. See Yoshimizu 2012c, section 4 (p. 19 ff.).

populace's festivals with words like *utsava* and *mahas*.

Moreover, under the topic of the suspension of the Vedic study, [the law code has a provision], “at the time of a festival (*utsava*), [cease chanting] after the meal.” [This provision is] the foundation for festivals in the countryside and towns being based on a means of knowledge. Moreover, the *Mahāvratā* section of the Vedas also has, in the supplement to the sentence, “The Hotṛ priest recites the *śastra*¹⁹⁷ riding on a swing,” the passage, “When *mahas* has actually attached to offsprings,¹⁹⁸ the offsprings ride on the swing.” It is repeatedly said that the word *mahas* is well known to refer to a festival (*utsava*).^{199,200}

Kumārila's general confirmation of the populace's festivals like this resulted from a positive evaluation of the enterprising Brahmins who carried on the Vedic traditions by compiling the Purāṇas and other Hindu literature and organizing folk religion. Kumārila lists the names of many rites, customs, and festivals celebrated by the populace at his time as follows:

Even if the foundation for confirming them [in the Veda] is lacking, it is recognized in this world that the various acts performed by good people (*sādhu*) are *dharma*. The acts carried out for maintaining the body, pleasure, or profit should not be determined to be *dharma* by erudites. [However,] in any case, the acts that outstanding people (*viśiṣṭa* or erudite (*śiṣṭa*)) concentrate on as *dharma* are recognized as *dharma* because they have the agent of action in common with the acts stipulated in the Vedas.²⁰¹

Besides the scriptures (*śāstra*), there is no foundation for performing matters of obligation such as dedication (*pradāna*), murmuring [formulas] (*japa*), fueling a fire (*homa*), the ceremony for maternal ancestors (*māṭṛyajña*), etc.,²⁰² the march (*yātrā*) of the festival (*mahas*) of “Indra's flag”

¹⁹⁷ *Śastra* is the Ṛgveda chanting performed in each session of the *soma* offering after reciting from the Sāmaveda and before offering *soma* to the sacrificial fire.

¹⁹⁸ The verb in the original PB text has the singular *āviśati*, and *mahas* is the subject.

¹⁹⁹ According to *Amarakośa*, *mahas* means both *utsava* and *tejas* (AK 3.3.231).

²⁰⁰ TV 205,22-24: *tathā 'nadhyaādihikāra "ūrdhvaṃ bhojanād utsave"* (GDhS 16.43) *iti deśanagarotsavaprāmāṇyāśrayaṇam. vede 'pi ca mahāvrate "preṅkham āruhya hotā śaṃsati"* (PB 5.5.9) *ity etadvākyaśeṣe śrūyate, "yadā vai prajā maha āviśanti (sic) preṅkham tarhy ārohanti"* (PB 5.5.10) *iti mahaṣṭabdavācyotsavaprasiddhir anūdītā.*

²⁰¹ This is the same reason used to justify Smṛti in MmS 1.3.2. See footnote 44 herein.

²⁰² On the memorial services for mothers' and wives' spirits in paternal ancestral spirits, and maternal ancestral spirits in Śrāddha (ancestral ceremony), see Mushiga 2015.

(*indradvaja*),²⁰³ and [festival marches²⁰⁴] at various temples, the purification including the rites by the maidens of all [classes²⁰⁵] on the fourth day [after a wedding ceremony],²⁰⁶ the sending [and eating²⁰⁷] sweets, cakes, and milk porridge on the first day (*pratipad*)²⁰⁸ of [the white part of the month of Kārttika (October–December) when the festival²⁰⁹ of] torches is performed, the festivals on the seventh day and the day of the full moon in the month of *Māgha* (January–February), when offerings not cooked over fire are offered,²¹⁰ the spring festival on the first day [directly after the full moon²¹¹] in the month of *Phālguna* (February–March), etc.²¹²

²⁰³ On the eighth day of the white part of the month of Bhādrapada (August–September), a large log that has been cut down in advance is used as a pole, carried to the city gate, and decorated and stood up. See *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* (BṛhatS) 43.1–68. For descriptions in various Purāṇas, see the *indradvaja* entry in EINOOCARD.

²⁰⁴ NSu 187,18–19: *devatāyataneṣv ityatra mahā[maho?]yātrety anuṣaṅgaḥ*.

²⁰⁵ NSu 187,19–20: *sarvavarṇasādhāraṇyārthe sarvāsām ity uktam*

²⁰⁶ After avoiding sleeping with the bridegroom for at least three days after a wedding ceremony (*trirātra-vrata*), they set up an Āvasathya fire as *caturthīkarma*. See Pandey 1969:222 ff.

²⁰⁷ NSu 187,21–22: *dānabhakṣaṇādīni*

²⁰⁸ NSu 187,20–21: *kārttikaśuklapratipadi*

²⁰⁹ For the texts on Diwali, see the *dīpaavalī* entry in EINOOCARD.

²¹⁰ NSu 187,22–23: *māghasaptamīpaurṇamāsībhyāṃ tatkālānuṣṭheyāṃ karma lakṣyate*.

²¹¹ NSu 187,23: *phālgunīpaurṇamāsyanantarāyāṃ pratipadi vasantanimitta utsavaḥ*

²¹² TV 205,9–20: *dr̥ṣṭakāraṇahīnāni yāni karmāṇi sādhubhiḥ / prayuktāni pratīyeran dharmatveneḥ tāny api // śarīrasthitaye yāni sukhārthaṃ vā prayuñjate / arthārthaṃ vā na teṣv asti śiṣṭānām eva dharmadhīḥ // dharmatvena prapannāni viśiṣṭair (IO; Ān: śiṣṭair) yāni (IO; Ān: yāni tu) kānicit / vaidikāiḥ kartr̥sāmānyāt teṣāṃ dharmatvam iṣyate // pradānāni japā homā (IO; Ān: japo homo) mātryajñādayas tathā / śakradhvajamahoyātrā devatāyataneṣu ca // kanyakānām ca sarvāsām caturthyādyupavāsakāḥ / pradīpapatipad-dānamodakāpūpapāyasāḥ // anagnipakvamāghasaptamīpaurṇamāsī-phālgunīpratipad-vasantotsavādīnām niyamakriyāpramāṇam na śāstrād ṛte kiṃcid asti*.

Śabara conspicuously looks down on the priests of Hindu temples (see Yoshimizu 2008b; Willis 2009:208–212), but Kumārila does not show such contempt. Because Mīmāṃsā denies that the Vedas are the work of any human being or deities, it is sometimes regarded as a certain type of atheism to later generations. For example, in the *Śaṅkaradīgviḥaya*, Kumārila as a character relates that he decided to commit suicide by self-immolation to atone his two faults, that is, rebutting the argument of his former Buddhist master and denying the supreme god (*parameśvara*) in his treatise (ŚDV 7.101–102). Kumārila indeed criticized Pāñcarātra and Pāsupata as groups of recluses (see footnote 97 herein), and he rebuts the theory of “the creation of the world by god” in detail (ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, vv. 42–116).

However, the denial of metaphysical proofs does not necessarily lead to atheism, as seen in the religious agnosticism of Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein. Kumārila does not deny the existence of the Hindu gods, nor declares that belief in them is meaningless; instead, he asserts that the Vedas are the body of “the supreme self” (*paramātman*) (see footnote 63 herein) and has even written a verse praising the god Śiva at the beginning of

Conclusion

The scholastic debate between Buddhist and Brahmin philosophers intensified significantly from the sixth century.²¹³ To understand what happened in this new phase of Indian thought, one should not only trace the processes of arguments and responses in philosophical theory one by one, but also understand the social conditions that formed the background of the debate; in particular, the relations between religious people and their economic supporters, as well as the circumstances within Brahmin society from the Gupta period onward. Consequently, the present monograph examined how Kumārila criticized Buddhism as a religion in society from the perspective of the four sources of law listed in the *Manusmṛti* in volume 1, chapter 3 of his *Tantravārttika*. The consideration above can be summarized in the following points:

1. From the viewpoint of conservative Brahmin scholars, the law sources that are more distant from the individual's perspective have greater authority. However, whether they be the Vedas or the law codes, the judgment of the “erudite” (*śiṣṭa*) with specialized training is necessary for an ordinary person to comprehend the scriptures.²¹⁴

the *Ślokavārttika* in which he likens the three Vedas to the three eyes of Śiva. ŚV, Pratiññā-sūtra 1: “I devote myself to the one who is wearing the crescent moon, who has a body of purified knowledge, who has divine sight through the three Vedas, and who is the cause of reaching supreme bliss.” *viśuddhajñānadehāya trivedīdivyacaṣuṣe / śreyahprāptinimittāya namaḥ somārdhadhāriṇe* // Because the first commentator, Umbeka (8th c.), explains this verse, it can be regarded as an original not added by later generations. Moreover, in a *Bṛhaṭṭikā* fragment quoted by Śāntarākṣita (TSg vv. 3198–3210), Kumārila accepts the omniscience of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, describing Śiva (TSg vv. 3205–3206) as possessing ten imperishable qualities (*daśāvyaya*). See footnote 78 of Yoshimizu 2008a.

The name “Kumārila” may derive from Kumāra, which refers to the war god Skanda, who is closely related to Śiva, with the addition of the *taddhita* affix *ilāC*, which indicates possession in the same way as *matUP* (see A 5.2.99 [1.1.72], 100, 117), and maybe a nickname likening the sharpness of his tongue to Skanda's excessive violence (see MBh 3.214.27–37), suggesting that it is “as though he is possessed by Skanda” (see Kane 1978:172). The region where Kumārila lived appears to believe in Śiva, including the lay Brahmin households.

²¹³ For an outline of the debate from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti about many problems in the theories of language and scripture exchanged between Buddhism and Brahmin scholastics, see Yoshimizu 2011c; Eltschinger 2014.

²¹⁴ Saying that the scriptures cannot be understood without erudite and that only those thoroughly familiar with the scriptures can be erudite is either interdependence or an infinite regress. Admitting this, Davis (2004) regards this as a productive tautology and

2. Kumāṛila strongly argues that the various Vedic schools (*śākhā*, branch) are equal and that each school should treat the others tolerantly. In contrast, he had an extreme intolerance for heretical religions that go against the Vedic value system.

3. Kumāṛila abides by Hindu legal thought to maintain social groups ahead of the individual. Accordingly, he deems the position of Buddhism, which regards observation and verification through reasoning as necessary and evenly generalizes *dharma*, as the abuse of “self-satisfaction” (*ātmatuṣṭi*), which has the lowest priority among the sources of law in Hindu law.

4. Kumāṛila’s criticism of Buddhism may have many slanderous aspects, but it provides evidence for Buddhist orders’ missionary activities toward the non-Aryans oppressed by the class-based society. Kumāṛila does not regard Mahāyāna Buddhism as the Buddhism of an independent religious group. Instead, he views it as a strategy skilfully devised by Hīnayāna Buddhist orders to grab the populace’s attention.

5. In the early middle ages, Brahmins gave structure to the myths of folk religions and developed religious rites to reinforce their influence on the public seriously. Kumāṛila did not oppose this; instead, he agreed with it, and to him, the Buddhist orders that had succeeded in encroaching upon the populace in advance were a highly offensive sight.

6. (Hypothesis) Kumāṛila’s denunciation of Buddhism in terms of the four sources of *dharma* with the hostility that is so aggressive as not previously seen in Indian thought may have resulted from the historical circumstance that in the era following the Gupta dynasty, the emergent kings engaged Brahmins in their court and made generous offerings to them. This social change spurred the competitive relationship between various Vedic schools concerning patronage. Thus, to reduce disharmony and promote cooperation between Brahmins,²¹⁵ Kumāṛila felt a strong need to

points out that there may be cases where a regional erudite is thoroughly familiar with pan-Indian law codes and, being aware of the deviation from them, defines a unique custom that should be permitted in that region as an exceptional custom (*an-ācāra*). As an actual example of this, he quotes 12.4.1–2 from the *Laghubharmaparakāśikā* (Tamburān 1906, unknown to the present author), written in pre-modern times in Kerala, which says in effect, “Sixty-four customs that a descendant of Bhṛgu (*bhārggava*) defined as not being allowed elsewhere but being allowed in Kerala are commented as *anācāra*.” (Davis 2004:820)

²¹⁵ In the debate concerning the authority of grammar, Kumāṛila compares and contrasts the Vājasaneyin school and the “Caraka school” as an example that corroborates the principle, “we cannot say that scriptures with smaller volumes of additions (*upasaṃkhyāna*) have no authority compared to the scriptures with large volumes of additions,” in TV 286,28–29: “People do not hold that [the scripture of the Vājasaneyin school], which cover very few objects, have no authority simply because Adhvaryu-related stipulations (*ādhvaryava*) are very few in the *śākhā* of the Vājasaneyin school, but many in the various *śākhā* of the

create a “common enemy” for Brahmins outside Brahmin society. In particular, many former Brahmins were actively involved in developing Buddhist doctrine in Buddhist orders.²¹⁶ From Kumārila’s perspective, they were traitors to Brahmin society, so Buddhism must have been ideal as a common enemy. When a future crisis is predicted due to inner conflict, many social groups, from small communities to nations, have repeatedly attempted to bring the group together by shifting the hostility’s target to a common enemy outside from historical times to the present.

Caraka school.” *vājasaneyiśākhāyām alpam* (IO; Ān: *alpam* omitted) *ādhvaryavam. carakaśākhāsu ca bahv ity etāvatā nālpaviṣayaṃ apramāṇīkurvanti*. Adhvaryu is the name of the chief priest in the Yajurveda division. “Carakāḥ” usually refers to the Black Yajurveda schools other than the Taittirīya (Tsuji 1970: n. 320). However, the disciple Vaiśampāyana who received the Yajurveda from Vyāsa (see footnote 27 herein) is known by the alternative name Caraka, and there are examples of Vaiśampāyana’s disciples as a whole (according to legend, Yājñavalkya broke with his master Vaiśampāyana and founded the Vājasaneyin school. See ViPu 3.5; Tsuji 1970:5–6) being called *carakāḥ* (end of *Kāśikā* to *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.3.104). From these facts (Simon 1889:14, n. 2; Witzel 1982/1983:188), Witzel argues that the “different volumes of *ādhvaryava*” that Kumārila refers to here may mean that the Black Yajurveda had more schools and a more abundant volume of scripture compared to the White Yajurveda, or it may mean that, for example, the White Yajurveda lacks the chapter on the elective sacrifice (*kāmyakarman*) and has only a small number of its provisions in the *Kātyāyanaśrautasūtra* as well (Witzel 1981:124–125).

In any case, Kumārila exhorts people to respect each other between the Vedic schools (see II.1 herein), but he also regards the White Yajurveda and the Kaṭha and Maitrāyaṇīya schools in the Black Yajurveda as outside schools (see footnote 78 herein). He may have been involved in the Taittirīya school among the Yajurveda (see footnote 16 herein). Therefore, here, Kumārila is probably admonishing certain colleagues in the Taittirīya school who are antagonistic to the Vājasaneyin school that they should not slander the White Yajurveda despite the circumstances that the White Yajurveda was beginning to encroach upon the sphere of influence of the Black Yajurveda schools (see footnote 68 herein). Although the example dates to much later, for a dispute between Vedic schools recorded in Maharashtra in the eighteenth and later, see Deshpande 2012:347–348.

²¹⁶ Bronkhorst (2018) enumerates some prominent Buddhist scholars who came from Brahmin families, Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghōṣa, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Śīlabhadra, and Saraha Rāhulabhadra, and he also points out that in some cases, Brahmin Buddhist scholars retained their Brahmin status in secular society, such as Śāṅkaranandana, Haribhadra, and Candragomin, giving attention to the fact that “there must have been Brahmins who strongly disliked Buddhists, and Buddhists who hated Brahmins. But there were others who could not be categorized as only one or the other” (Bronkhorst 2018: 319).

Appendix: Kumāriila, the omniscient Buddha, and the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*²¹⁷

Kataoka (2011a:366–369) translates ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137: *rāgādirahite cāsmīn nirvyāpāre vyavasthite / deśanānyapraṇītaiva syād ṛte pratyavekṣaṇāt //* as “And when he is established as having no action because he lacks desire and so on, [his] teaching could only have been composed by others without having [directly] observed [anything]” (Kataoka [2003:56] also has the same interpretation of the syntax). He then contrasts this with the corresponding BṬ fragment (*Tattva-saṃgraha* [TSg] vv. 3237–3239), and says that there is a difference in the strategy for criticizing the omniscient person (*sarvajña*) between these two works. He also insists that this difference was caused by the influence of Dharmakīrti who defended the Buddha’s omniscience in the first chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) (Kataoka 2011a:48–51; Kataoka 2003:58–63). Kataoka claims that in the ŚV, Kumāriila regards one’s selfish desires, such as greed (*rāga*), as the cause of any worldly activities (*vyāpāra*) that have contacts with others. According to Kataoka, in the first half of v. 137 of the Codanāsūtra, Kumāriila expresses this causal relationship in the form of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) “without cause, there is no result,” inferring that “If the Buddha had no greed, he would not have engaged in any worldly activities involving others.” In the second half, he holds teaching as an example of desire-oriented activities toward others, saying, “Nevertheless, if a teaching came from the Buddha, it was made by someone other than the Buddha.”

Kataoka also says that in PV 1.12, Dharmakīrti held the inference “because of his utterance, [the Buddha who teaches others] is greedy” (*vacanād rāgītā*) as impossible because it is based merely on its logical reason, “teaching,” being not seen (*adr̥ṣṭimātreṇa*) in some dissimilar examples (*vipakṣa*) that do not have the property to be proved, “greed.” In his self-commentary, he disproved this inference by presenting a counterexample: the Buddha who has no greed teaches others out of compassion (*karuṇā*) (see PVSV 9,3–12; Dunne 1996:537–538). With this argument, Kataoka maintained that in PV 1 and PVSV, Dharmakīrti countered Kumāriila’s criticism of the Buddha’s omniscience made in ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137.

Furthermore, in the BṬ fragment quoted in TSg vv. 3237–3239, Kumāriila argues that when the Buddha was aware of the whole world in meditation, he could not give teaching pertinent only to a part of the world. Kataoka translates TSg v. 3239: *yadā copadiśed ekaṃ kiṃcit sāmānyavakṛtvat / ekadeśajñagītaṃ tan na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam //* as “And if he, like an ordinary speaker, taught one particular

²¹⁷ This appendix is an English translation of footnote 33 in Yoshimizu 2015a.

thing, what [he taught] would be that which is uttered by a cognizer of [only] one thing, not uttered by a cognizer of everything.” According to Kataoka’s scenario, after the completion of ŚV, Kumārila becomes aware of the refutation made by Dharmakīrti in PVSV 9,3–12 and, in writing BṬ, takes a new perspective on the incompatibility between meditation and teaching, rather than on the causal relationship between greed and action.

Refutation of Kataoka’s scenario: However, Kumārila does not change his perspective in denying the Buddha’s omniscience from the ŚV to the BṬ.

The Buddha’s mental state and sitting posture: The content of the first half of ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137, “Since the Buddha has no greed (*rāga*), he is established (*vyavasthita*) without worldly activities (*nirvyāpāra*),” is retained at the beginning of the BṬ fragment, “Having destroyed all greed (*rāga*), etc., he has gone to the tenth stage” (TSg v. 3237ab: *daśabhūmigataś cāsau sarvarāgādisamkṣaye*). In both works, completely separating the sacred and secular realms, Kumārila says that perfecting the practice of conquering desires, the Buddha must have left the secular world and entered the enlightened world alone since he no longer had any motivation to associate with others. There are further similarities in describing the Buddha in the ŚV and the BṬ. While implying that greed is the condition for remaining in the secular world, Kumārila asserts that the Buddha does not meet this condition, using a locative that expresses his lack of greed (*rāga*) both in the ŚV (*rahite*) and the BṬ (*samkṣaye*). Moreover, with *vyavasthita* in the ŚV and *āsthita* in the BṬ (TS, v. 3240b), he describes the awakened Buddha as keeping his immovable sitting posture by his will. Unlike the opponent whom Dharmakīrti countered in PV 1.12 and his self-commentary, Kumārila does not say in ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137 that the Buddha suddenly becomes paralyzed and unable to speak when conquering greed and all other desires.

Pratyavekṣaṇa, one of the four kinds of Buddha’s wisdom in meditation: In both ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137 and the BṬ fragment that expands on it, it is taught that the Buddha exercises unique wisdom that observes all things in the world. In the BṬ fragment, the Buddha goes into meditation (v. 3238a: *dhyānāpannas*) and exercises “cognition equal to a clean crystal to observe everything” (v. 3237cd: *śuddhasphaṭikatulyena sarvaṃ jñānena buddhyate*). In ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137, the unique cognition that only Buddhas can exert is called “observation-wisdom” (*pratyavekṣaṇa*). *Pratyavekṣaṇa* was listed in the *Bhāṣya* (MSABh) to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* 9.67, as also quoted by Kataoka (2011a:369, n. 428; see Sakuma 2012:60), as one of the “four kinds of wisdom” that work in Buddha’s stage: great-mirror-wisdom (*ādarśajñāna*), equality-wisdom (*samatā-*

jñāna), observation-wisdom (*pratyavekṣaṇajñāna*), and action-wisdom (*kr̥tyānuṣṭhānajñāna*). With “without *pratyavekṣaṇa*” (*rte pratyavekṣaṇāt*) at the end of v. 137, Kumārila says that the person who is teaching (*deśanā*) in this scene is not the Buddha, but someone else (*anya*) who is not cognizant of all things around the world individually by *pratyavekṣaṇa*. In this saying, it is implied that the Buddha cannot teach a particular topic in this scene because he concentrates on equally observing all events in the world by *pratyavekṣaṇa*. In the same manner as in the BṬ fragment that refers to “the tenth stage of Bodhisattva’s path,” Kumārila says in ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137, that the founder of Buddhism is already in Buddha’s stage and exerts his four-wisdom including *pratyavekṣaṇa*. Because v. 137 of the Codanāsūtra contrasts the Buddha with another person who has no *pratyavekṣaṇa*, Kumārila can be said to hold “teaching” of a particular topic as incompatible with the *pratyavekṣaṇa* to observe everything individually. In the BṬ fragment, “sustainable concentration on all things” (TSg v. 3238ab: *sarvārthaviṣayāṃ dhāraṇām*) and “teaching something one” (TSg v. 3239ab: *upadiśed ekaṃ kiṃcit*) are incompatible. The same incompatibility is expressed in ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137 that contrasts the Buddha seeing everything in the world by *pratyavekṣaṇa* with someone else who fabricates the Buddha’s teaching.

A wish-granting gem (*cintāmaṇi/cintāratna*) as a simile of the meditating Buddha: Since ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137 states that the meditating Buddha views everything in the world with *pratyavekṣaṇa*, his everyday preaching (Kataoka 2011a:370, n. 429: “Buddha’s teaching in a normal form”) does not matter here. Kumārila says that even if an audience surrounds the body of an enlightened person (*buddha*), his spirit is not there but resides in the world of enlightenment, so if the audience hears any teaching, it is someone other than the Buddha speaking secretly. Then his opponent, a Buddhist, would say, “Just because this person (i.e., the Buddha) is nearby, various teachings come out of the walls [of the hall] according to [the audience’s] desires, just as when a wish-granting gem [is nearby]. (v. 138: *sānnidhyamātratas tasya puṃsaś cintāmaṇer iva / niḥsaranti yathākāmaṃ kuḍyādibhyo ’pi deśanāḥ*). In response to this defense, Kumārila says, “But such explanations may be wonderful to the pious, but we have no faith in such teachings because they originate from the wall. Were they preached by the Buddha, or were they uttered to seduce [the hearers] by some evil and invisible spirits? (vv. 139–140: *evamādy ucyamānaṃ tu śraddadhānasya śobhate / kuḍyādinīḥṣṛtatvāc ca nāśvāso deśanāsu naḥ // kin nu buddhapraṇūṭāḥ syuḥ kim u kaiś cid durātmabhiḥ / adṛśyair vipralambhārthaṃ piśācādibhir īritāḥ //*). We also find the simile of a wish-granting gem used in the BṬ fragment in TSg v. 3240: “When he concentrates

on meditation and stays like a wish-granting gem, according to the desire [of each one of the listeners], various teachings emanate even from the walls and so forth.” (*tasmīn dhyānasamāpanne cintāratnavad āsthite / niścaranti yathākāmaṃ kuḍyādibhyo ’pi deśanāḥ*).

The miraculous scene of the meditating Buddha in the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*: In the introduction to his commentary (*Pañjikā*, PST) to TSg v. 3240, Kamalaśīla cites a Buddhist *sūtra* that Kumārila took as a Buddhist testimony for his criticism of the omniscient Buddha. Hamano (1987: 45) points out that Kamalaśīla refers to a hagiographic scene of the Mahāyāna Buddhism called Tathāgata’s non-speech of a single word (一字不説). This scene of the meditating Buddha is cited in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (LS 142,16–143,3) and the *Prasannapadā* (PrsP 539,3–6; 366,1–4). Initially, this scene was depicted in a section of the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, which is quoted in the old Chinese translation, *Mahāratnakūṭasūtra* (『大宝積經』, vol. 10 「密迹金剛力士会」, no. 3; Taishō, vol. 11, 55–56), the new Chinese translation (『仏説如来不思議秘密大乘經』, vol. 7, Taishō, vol. 11, 719–720), and the Tibetan translation (Peking ed., vol. 22, 151b–154a) (see Ikuma 2016). Hamano (1987: 44) describes the scene of the “non-speech of a single word” in the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* as follows: “From the time of his awakening to his *nirvāṇa*, the Buddha is always in meditation, and since he has no discrimination, he does not utter even a single word of Dharma. Nevertheless, people hear the Buddha’s teachings according to their own beliefs and pleasure.” The first half is equivalent to 55c7–10 in the old Chinese translation, 719b22–25 in the new Chinese translation, and 151b4–6 in the Tibetan translation. The last half (“Nevertheless, people hear ...”) is equivalent to 56a16–17 in the old Chinese translation, 720b14–15 in the new Chinese translation, and 154a5 in the Tibetan translation.

The simile of a wish-granting gem in the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*: Kumārila compares the Buddha meditating silently and surrounded by people to a wish-granting gem both in the Codanāsūtra of ŚV, v. 138 and the BṬ fragment quoted as TSg, v. 3240. In all three translations, the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* also compares the Buddha in this miraculous scene to “a wish-granting gem in the vast ocean”: 「大海之中如意明珠」 (56b27–28 in the old Chinese translation), 「大海之中有如意珠宝」 (720b26 in the new Chinese translation), and “*rgya tsho chen po i nan na yid bshin gyi nor bu rin po che*” (154b5 in the Tibetan translation). Therefore, the contents of both verses in the ŚV and the BṬ are the same. Moreover, the Buddhist opponent in v. 138 defends the miraculous “teaching” mentioned in v. 137 due to the Buddha’s superhuman ability. Given that the continuity from v. 137 to v. 138 cannot be denied, it is unreasonable for Kataoka to insist that v. 137

speaks about the Buddha's keeping silent in everyday life out of meditation. We can safely say that in the Codanāsūtra of the ŚV, Kumāriḷa had already known the Buddha's "non-speech of a single word" in meditation depicted in a certain version of the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* that was accessible to him, and he exacted it as a promise for criticizing the omniscient Buddha before writing the BṬ. I want to express my gratitude to Hiromitsu Ikuma, who has been studying the Sanskrit manuscript of the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* and will publish its critical edition, for informing me about this *sūtra* and Hamano's 1987 paper.

Sucaritamiśra's commentary on ŚV, Codanāsūtra, v. 137: The ŚV commentator Sucaritamiśra takes "without *pratyavekṣaṇa*" (*ṛte pratyavekṣaṇāt*) as a description of the Buddha himself, not of someone else. He holds *pratyavekṣaṇa* as a mental operation of differentiation "this has happened, this will happen" (ŚVK 132,27–133,8: *idaṃ vṛttam, idaṃ vartīṣyata iti*). He also remarks, "It (i.e., *pratyavekṣaṇa*) [as well as the teaching] is impossible for one who has not come out [from meditation]" (ŚVK 133,9: *na caitad apy anutthitasya sambhavati*). With this remark, it is to be noticed that Sucaritamiśra accepts that the Buddha remains in meditation (*anutthita*). According to Sucaritamiśra, because the Buddha remains in meditation, he does not discriminate one thing from another and therefore cannot teach a particular subject. However, Umbeka, a commentator who is chronologically closer than Sucaritamiśra to Kumāriḷa, describes "without *pratyavekṣaṇa*" as "without which the teachings were issued" (ŚVT 78,27: *vipraṇītā eva... deśanāḥ*). Thus Umbeka takes the lack of *pratyavekṣaṇa* as a description of someone else, not the Buddha himself. Sucaritamiśra probably does not know that in Mahāyāna Buddhism, *pratyavekṣaṇa* means a sort of unique wisdom of the Buddha different from ordinary people's discriminating discretion (*vikalpa*).

Sucaritamiśra, however, in his comment on v. 137, describes the Buddha as "dwelling firmly, looking all over the entire world with a gazing eye in meditation" (ŚVK 132, 24–25: *dhyānastimitalocano jagad akhilam avikalena vilokayamānaḥ avatiṣṭhate*). With this, he eventually mentions *pratyavekṣaṇa* in the sense of the Buddha's observation-wisdom. Thereby, he makes v. 137 naturally connect with v. 138 by stating that the Buddha remains in meditation while surrounded by an audience gathered in anticipation of his preaching. Kataoka (2011a:370, n. 428) criticizes Sucaritamiśra's description of the Buddha in v. 137 as "forced interpretations that Sucarita wants to incorporate the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* arguments into the *Ślokavārttika*." However, Kataoka's interpretation is a much more forced attempt than Sucaritamiśra's because Kataoka separates the scene of v. 137 from v. 138 despite the evident continuity mentioned above.

Conclusion: Kumārila, by the end of his life after the completion of the ŚV, read more Buddhist scriptures and expanded his Buddhist vocabulary, including Bodhisattva’s ten stages (*daśabhūmi*; for another example, see footnote 84). Comparing Kumārila’s criticism of the Buddha’s omniscience in the ŚV and the BṬ, we conclude that there is no change of perspective because the salient perspective in the ŚV (lack of greed) is inherited in the BṬ, and the salient perspective in the BṬ (meditation) already exists in the ŚV. Moreover, the BṬ fragment that is quoted as vv. 3237–3239 of the TSg makes no remarks on Dharmakīrti’s statement, “even without greed, the Buddha teaches people by compassion (*karuṇā*).” Unless we can find a BṬ fragment that discusses the Buddha’s compassion in some way, negatively or otherwise, we cannot use the fragment quoted here to say that Kumārila was aware of Dharmakīrti when he wrote the BṬ. Therefore, it is unreasonable for Kataoka (2011a:20, 21, 28) to place the dates of Kumārila’s lifetime around 600–650, insisting that Kumārila was influenced by Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660) discussing the Buddha’s omniscience in the BṬ.

Abbreviations

- A *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.
- AK *Amarakośa*. A. A. Ramanathan (ed.), Adyar Library Series 101. Madras: the Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1971–1983.
- ĀM *Āptamīmāṃsā*. Nagin J. Shaḥ, *Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā. Critique of an Authority*. Ahmedabad: Dr. Jagruti Dilip Sheth.
- Ān The first edition of the *Mīmāṃsādarśanam* in Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97.
- ĀpDhS *Āpastambadharmasūtra*. In: Olivelle 2000.
- AŚV *Śaṅkaravijaya* by Anantānandagiri. N. Veezhinathan (ed.). Madras: University of Madras, 1971.
- AV *Atharvavedasamhitā*. R. Roth and W. D. Whitney (ed.), 2nd ed. Berlin: Ferd. Dümmlers, 1924.
- BDhS *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra*. In: Olivelle 2000.
- BhGS *Bhāradvājagṛhyasūtra*. Henriette J. W. Salomons (ed.), reprint, New Delhi: Meharchand Lachhmandas, 1992, [1st ed., Leiden: Brill, 1913].
- BṇḍPu *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇ*. J. L. Shastri (ed.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973.
- Bṛh *Bṛhatī* (on MmS 1.2–2.4). S. S. Sastri (ed.), Madras University Sanskrit Series 24. Madras: University of Madras, 1962.
- BṛhatS *Bṛhatsamhitā*. H. Kern (ed.), Bibliotheca Indica 48. Calcutta: the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1865.
- BŚS *Baudhāyanaśrautasūtra*. W. Caland (ed.), vol. III, reprint. New

- Delhi: Munshram Manoharlal 1982, [1st ed., Calcutta, 1913].
- BT *Bṛhaṭṭīkā.*
- CV *Caranavyūha.* A. D. Śāstrī (ed.), Kashi Sanskrit Series 132. Varanasi: Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, 1994.
- CVBh Mahidāsa's *Bhāṣya* on the *Caranavyūha*. See CV.
- DN *Dīghanikāya.* T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter (eds.), vol. I, Pali Text Society, London: Oxford University Press, 1890.
- IO Manuscript of the *Tantravārttika*. India Office Library, Eggeling no. 2151 (TV 1.3); no. 2156 (TV 2.4). London: the British Library.
- GDhS *Gautamadharmasūtra.* In: Olivelle 2000.
- KM *Kāvyamīmāṃsā.* C. D. Dalal and R.A. Sastry (eds.), revised and enlarged by K. A. Ramaswami Sastri Siromani, 3rd ed., Gaekwad's Oriental Series 1. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1934.
- LS *Lankāvatārasūtra.* B. Nanjio (ed.). Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923.
- MBh *Mahābhārata.* V. S. Sukthankar, et al. (eds.). Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1933–1966.
- MGS *Mānavagṛhyasūtra.* R. H. Sastri (ed.), Pāṇini Vaidika Granthamālā 6, reprint. New Delhi: Meharchand Lachhmandas, 1982, [1st ed., 1926].
- MmS *Mīmāṃsāsūtra.* See TV.
- MN *Majjhimanikāya.* Pali Text Society, vol. I, V. Trenckner (ed.), 1888; vol. II, R. Chalmers (ed.), 1898. London: Oxford University Press.
- Mn *Mānavadharmasāstra,* alias *Manusmṛti.* In: Olivelle 2005.
- MnBh *Manubhāṣya.* In: Jha 1999, vols. 1–2.
- MS *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā.* L. von Schroeder (ed.), reprint. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1970, [1st ed., Leipzig, 1881–1886].
- MSABh *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra-bhāṣya.* S. Lévi (ed.), reprint. Kyoto: Rinsen Books Co., 1983, [1st ed., Paris, 1907].
- MtPu *Matsyapurāna.* Ānandāśramastha-Paṇḍitāḥ (eds.), Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 54. Reprint. Poona: Ānandāśrama Press, 1981, [1st ed., 1907].
- NSu *Nyāyasudhā.* M. Sastri (ed.), Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 14. Reprint. Varanasi 2000: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, [1st ed., 1901–1902].
- PB *Pañcaviṃśabrāhmaṇa,* alias *Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa.* A. Ch. Vedantavagisha, (ed.), 2 vols., reprint. Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan, 1989, [1st ed., Bibliotheca Indica 62, Calcutta, 1870–1874].
- PrkP *Prakaraṇapañcikā.* A. Subrahmanya Sastri (ed.), Banaras Hindu University Darśana Series, no. 4. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1961.
- PrsP *Prasannapadā[Madhyamakavṛtti].* In: De La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913.
- PV 1 *Pramāṇavārttika,* the first chapter. R. Gnoli (ed.). Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome: Is. M. E. O., 1960.
- PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti.* See PV 1.
- R *Rāmāyaṇa.* G. H. Bhatt, et al. (eds.). Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1960–1975.
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