

研究ノート

The New Phase of Japanese Realism: Restructuring of Masculinities

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日本的現実主義の新しい段階 —— マスキュリニティの再編との関連で ——

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日本の現実主義は、特にブッシュ政権の下でのアメリカの大きな戦略的転換、9・11事件以降の「対テロ戦争」に呼応する形で、新しい段階に入ろうとしている。現在の日本の現実主義は、1950年代に見られた日本的現実主義と、いくつかの点で共通点を見いだすことができる。双方とも、現実をヘゲモニーによって決定されたものと受け止め、それを自分たちの力で変えようとしなない。それらは、ただアメリカのグローバル戦略に追随するのみである。しかし、最近の現実主義は、過去の現実主義と異なる点を有する。端的に言う、最近の現実主義は、よりミリタリスティックで、日本国憲法9条の制約を外そうという志向を有している。この論考では、そうした日本の現実主義の連続性と非連続性について、マスキュリニティ（ファルス中心主義）の再編という過程から検討を加える。

Now Japanese realism is now re-emerging in the new form through responding to the American strategic shift (represented by NSS 2002 and NSS 2006) and the war against terror after September 11, 2001. The recent Japanese realism has similar characteristics with that during the 1950s in some respects. Both perceive realities as determined by the hegemony and do not try to change them by themselves. They just follow American global strategies. However the recent one is a little different from the former one in some respects. In short, the recent one is more militarized and is freer from constitutional constraint (the article 9 of Japanese constitution). This article examined the continuities and discontinuities of Japanese realism while paying an attention to restructuring of masculinities (phallus-centrism).

Introduction

If we simplify the standardized realist way of thinking in the international relation theories by borrowing Jacques Derrida's terminology, how can we express it? First of all, most of realists perceive the distinction between international politics (the outside) and domestic politics (the inside) as given. In addition, the idea is generally accepted that realism can capture realities of anarchical world politics such "the presence" for them, while the so-called idealism is something like 'a dangerous supplement'¹⁾. In oppositions such as positive / negative, normal / abnormal, life / death,

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health / disease, the superior term belongs to the logos and is a higher presence; the inferior term marks a fall and is something like a supplement. Logo-centrism thus assumes the priority term and conceives the second in relation to it, as a complication, a negation, a manifestation, or a disruption of the first²⁾. According to Derrida, metaphysical thought has been structured by dichotomies or polarities, such as good / evil, presence / absence, truth / error, identity / difference, nature / culture, and speech / writing. These opposites are neither equal in value nor independent of each other. Rather the second term in each pair is considered the negative, corrupt, undesirable version of the first, a fall away from it³⁾. Thus the opposition implies a hierarchical order. As Derrida pointed out, “an opposition of metaphysical concepts is never the confrontation of two terms, but a hierarchy and the order of a subordination”⁴⁾.

In this sense, realism is the superior logos while idealism is the inferior non-presence in the realists’ eyes. However theories grounded on presence undo themselves, as the supposed foundation or ground proves to be the product of a differential system, or rather, of difference, differentiation, and deferral.⁵⁾ In other words, realism grounded on presence (realities!) also must undo, as the supposed foundation proves to be the product of a differential system that excludes and sometimes co-opts the various kinds of others such as idealism, liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism, constructivism, post-structuralism and so on. In short, realism is one of logo-centric ways of thinking that seems foundational but cannot have the theoretical foundations. That is a just contingent process of thinking by excluding the other, the supplement. Thus “deconstruction, through a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, puts into practice a reversal of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system.”⁶⁾

The main aim of this paper is to present an interpretation about the present transition process of Japanese realism from such a deconstructive perspective. Five decades ago, Masao Maruyama had already pointed out three characteristics of Japanese realism during the 1950s⁷⁾. The first is their one-dimensional view of realities. They tend to ignore diversities of realities. Secondly they perceive realities as given rather than constructed. They tend to deny malleability of realities. Thirdly they tend to bandwagon a main stream dominated by hegemonic powers. They perceive realities as determined by the hegemony and do not try to change them by themselves. Behind the emergence of this kind of Japanese realism, there was a strong political pressure from the US due to the beginning of the full-scale Cold War in the East Asia (the Communist Victory in China, NSC 68, The Korean War and the shift of American Strategies from the Containment Policy to the Roll-back policy). After the defeat of the Second World War, Japan was once disarmed and nullified. However the US pressured Japan to rearm and try to use rearmed Japan as a strategic dependent alliance for containing the communist block. Japanese realism had emerged responding to this US strategic shift with regard to Japan during the 1950s.

Now such Japanese realism is re-emerging in the new form through responding to the American strategic shift (represented by NSS 2002 and NSS 2006) and the war against terror after September 11, 2001. The recent Japanese realism has similar characteristics with that during the

1950s in some respects. Both perceive realities as determined by the hegemony and do not try to change them by themselves. They just follow the shift of American global strategies. However the recent one is a little different from the former one in some respects. In short, the recent one is more militarized and is freer from constitutional constraint (the article 9 of Japanese constitution). In this essay, I want to examine this continuities and discontinuities of Japanese realism while paying an attention to the construction process of logo-centrism and phallus-centrism (and its one variation, realism) there.

1. The Formation and Consolidation of Japanese Realism

When the people discuss about the diplomacy of their own nation, they tend to become essentialist through receiving the nation-state as given. Then it is very difficult for them to perceive that the nation is socially constructed by excluding the other. In the eyes of the people around the periphery such as Okinawa or Jeju-do, the naturalized imagined communities behind realist discourses look dubious and seem to have no foundations. In short, realities at the center are very different from realities at the periphery. The issue is what kind of image is dominant amongst various kinds of realities.

What is a dominant image of realities? While realities are perceived through a common frame of reference and are inter-subjectively constructed, perceived realities are different from each other. The differences are partly determined by perceivers' social positions and standpoints. As Kurosawa Akira's film 'Rashomon (1950)' indicates, realities are always plural and are sometimes contradictory to each other. When realities are contradictory to each other, hegemonic powers sometimes determine which reality is authentic. While realism is a frame of reference based upon some widely perceived and authentic realities, it also cuts down other realities that are at odds with them.

Generally speaking, Anglo-American realism is based upon their authentic realities of world politics (the so-called anarchical power politics). Under its strong influence, Japanese realism⁸⁾ has been constructed through denying and deleting Hiroshima realism based upon realities of the nuclear war or Okinawa realism⁹⁾ based upon realities of the conventional total war on the ground. Although Japanese pacifism is based on realities at Hiroshima and Okinawa during the Asia-Pacific War, it was criticized as too naïve and too idealistic and the idea of its alternative foreign policy was thrown away as a utopian dream by realistic scholars and politicians. (See chart)

With regard to the relation between Japanese realism and pacifism, the mainstream Japanese realists wrote as follows in the report of the informal advisory committee of the security and defense for the prime minister in 2004.

“As pacifism based upon regrets for the Second World War had been so strong in Japan, the people tended to avoid discussing how to deal with the problem of national security with might and main. They evaded mentioning even war emergency legislation. However the peo-

ple recently begins to understand the problem of national security. So we now succeed in arranging a legal framework for war contingencies.”¹⁰⁾

This paragraph sounds like a victory declaration of Japanese realism against Japanese pacifism. It took five decades to form and consolidate Japanese realism after the miserable defeat at the Second World War. During this process, Japanese realism needed the others (targets) such as Japanese idealism or pacifism to consolidate itself. There were two types of others to be denied or to be excluded for Japanese realism. The first is a pacifist group that advocated a policy of demilitarization and non-alignment. The second is a hawkish group that oriented toward a heavy rearmament option and a self-reliance defense policy. Both have been treated as a dangerous element by the mainstream realist camp. According to the mainstream interpretation, the diplomatic policy by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida from 1948 to 1954 (the so-called Yoshida diplomacy) was highly successful because it adopted the lightly rearmament option based upon the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance with emphasis upon economic recovery. As some critical scholars pointed out that Yoshida narrowed a range of choices for Japanese diplomacy by depending too much on the US¹¹⁾, the stereotyped positive interpretation of the Yoshida diplomacy might be a myth. However we do not examine the myth itself here because we want to focus on the gap between the recent changing realities and the stereotyped Japanese realist way of thinking rather than unveil the myth of the Yoshida diplomacy.

2. A Gap between the Fixed Form of Japanese Realism and Changing Realities

A golden rule of the stereotyped Japanese realism is that the US-Japan alliance should be maintained and be strengthened at any rate, which must be the optimal solution of Japanese foreign policy. One of the important lessons from the Asia-Pacific War is that Japan absolutely must not wage a war against any countries, in particular neighboring countries, in the future. However the hidden lesson is more important for Japanese realism. That is, Japan should not defy American hegemony in terms of security policy. Behind this lesson, we can observe the typical Japanese realist way of thinking. As Maruyama pointed out five decades ago, they tend to receive reality as given and think that there is no alternative.

Receiving ‘reality’ as given and starting from ‘reality’ means privileging the status quo dominated by the hegemony. In other words, realist way of thinking limits the space for critical thinking and action. If you say that this is ‘reality’, that utterance becomes the political act of placing limits for action. As Maja Zelhuss criticizes Germany’s shift towards participation in international military operations, the utterance that we have no choice plays a crucial role to promote that shift in the German political discourse. Related to the issue, she wrote as follows.

“The claim that there was no choice is significant not as a reflection of an outside reality but

as a political contextualization of actions. If we do not have a choice, we cannot be blamed. We are not responsible. Our conceptualization of reality is thus pertinent to the problem of responsibility.”¹²⁾

In the same way, Japan has also shifted towards participation in international military operation while saying that there was no choice and avoiding for its decisions. In addition, Japan traced the path directed by the US much more faithfully than Germany while saying that there was no choice. However it is a political act to accept some ‘reality’ as a cognitive starting point and not to respond to other dissident voices. . This problem might be closely related to the Japanese ‘system of irresponsibility (無責任の体系)’, which Maruyama named five decades ago¹³⁾. Even in the academic world, we can observe the same phenomena. Academic Japanese realism has also, needless to say, been highly influenced by Anglo-American IR¹⁴⁾ or broad realism, so the ‘reality’ that Anglo-American realism has premised has been accepted as a starting-point for the development of Japanese realism. Although there are various kinds of Anglo-American realism (classical realism, neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism that converges at soft realism, and recent realistic constructivism), Japanese realism has been the most affinitive with classical realism because of its artless naturalism or naïve positivism.

Of course, there is a difference between Anglo-American realism and Japanese realism because Anglo-American realism is based upon the ‘reality’ of the hegemony and Japanese realism is based upon ‘reality’ of its dependent ally. The content of each realism is closely related to its positionality, which determines the content of each reality. For example, realism at the periphery sometimes takes a form of the so-called subaltern realism¹⁵⁾. Even in Japanese realism, there had been an element of this kind of subaltern realism that put emphasis on the need of ‘the intimidations of the weak’¹⁶⁾. But, after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of American Supremacy in terms of military capabilities, such a challenging subaltern realism disappears and their inclination to bandwagoning is so strong that the idea of anti-Americanism is rejected as a dangerous thought.

Related to this tendency, we should pay an attention to a few aspects of the issue. First, there is the hidden presumption that the US is the benign hegemony behind the performative proposition that Japan should not defy the hegemony in terms of security issues. But after the reckless military policy of the Bush government, it become difficult to maintain such presumption so that they say that the American society is very dynamic and has capabilities to correct its own errors. For example, the US must shift its policy from unilateralism to multilateralism in the near future. However this kind of presumption sounds wishful thinking that has no affinities with realism based upon reality. If it is correct that aberrant foreign and military policies are brought by structural causes (peculiar Americanism including Christian fundamentalism and anti-intellectualism at the grass roots level) rather than exceptional neo-conservative leaderships, recent realities might continue even after the Bush government. The US, which continues to have a sense of superiority to other

states (such as manifest destiny and exceptionalism), has the tendency to collide with multilateralism that restrict the state sovereignty. If so, it is more appropriate to understand that the US uses a multilateral framework only when it is useful for enforcing other states to do and the period when the US complying with the principle of multilateralism is exceptional¹⁷⁾.

Second, the proposition that Japan should not defy the hegemony can be paraphrased as follows. If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. Or don't kick against the pricks. Needless to say, this is the logic of bandwagoning. Without counter-balancing, it would lead to the excessive concentration of powers. If you apply the domestic analogy, the logic of bandwagoning would lead to the tyranny. The most effective method of deterring the emergency of tyranny at the domestic level is the separation of powers. In the same way, the counterbalancing is the most effective way for deterring the global tyranny. It may sound exaggerated to call the US the global tyranny. However the US itself has been behaving according to the logic of the preponderance of power rather than the balance of power at the global level since the beginning of the full-scale Cold War¹⁸⁾. And the concentrating global power without counterbalancing and counterchecking might be out of control leading to immeasurable negative consequences such as global civil war or global climate change. In short, Japanese realism seems to forget the commitment to rebuilding the international institutions or revitalizing the global public sphere by soft balancing¹⁹⁾ against reckless hegemony because it is possessed by the logic of bandwagoning utterly.

On the other hand, the hegemony itself, which advocates 'the war on terrorism' or 'war on tyranny', is likely to become tyranny at the global level. This political irony is partly brought by the structural transformation from the Westphalia system to the post-Westphalia system (something like Negri and Hard's postmodern Empire²⁰⁾ with deepening of the neo-liberal globalization. With globalization of risk, the dichotomous distinction, such as the inside / the outside, the friend (us) / the enemy (them), and the safe / the danger, begins to be blurred and the traditional framework of national security based upon that dichotomy is now vacillating. Blurring boundaries between the safe and the danger bring us the sense of insecurity, which promotes the offensive realism and the hyper-surveillance regime. Accelerating offensive realism with the principle of the preponderance of the power leads to the doctrine of preventive and preemptive attack. This kind of offensive realism leads to the diminution of the legitimacy of the hegemony. That is, the coercion becomes much stronger and the consent to accept the domination of the hegemony is lost at the level of the dominated. This situation also might trigger 'the blowback'²¹⁾ from the periphery of the system and 'the global civil war'²²⁾ in which several local civil wars are connected with each other to form a global network. It seems that Japan, one of faithful dependent allied powers, just follows this path of the hegemony.

3. Cutting Down Some Realities as Collateral Damages

As is common knowledge, the logic of preponderance of power has been empowered by the Project for New American Century, the neo-conservative's idea that the US now can remake the

geopolitical landscape all over the world. This kind of idea causes friction with the conventional realism including neo-realism. The conventional realism looks like 'narrow realism' in the eyes of the neo-conservatives²³⁾ while the neo-conservatives are very dangerous idealists for the conventional realists²⁴⁾. This friction derives from differences in terms of perception of malleability of realities. In short, conventional realists emphasize the immalleability of realities of world politics while the neo-conservatives tend to underestimate it. It seems that the latter emphasizes the necessities and possibilities for remaking geopolitical realities by military means. However both have in common attaching the most importance to the military aspect of the world politics. With regard to this point, the neoconservative idea is not so different from the conventional realism and it could be situated as an extreme case of the realism, which is mingled with some sort of idealism (pre-millennialism based upon Christian fundamentalism).

The logic of preponderance of power in terms of military affairs inevitably leads to the so-called RMA (the Revolution in Military Affairs). As Albert Wohlsteter, who involved in the making of the myth of the RMA, played an important role to form a neoconservative network as well as political philosopher Leo Strauss²⁵⁾, the concept of the RMA is closely connected with the neo-conservative idea that the US must maintain its absolute superiority over other states. In other words, the US must have a God's-eye view of the battle as well as God's hands in the battle. Concerning a God's-eye view of the battle, Rey Chow wrote as follows with quoting some paragraphs from Heidegger's essay "The Age of the World Picture".

"Heidegger argues that in the age of modern technology, the world has become a "world picture." —Supplementing Heidegger, we may say that in the age of bombing, the world has also been transformed into - is essentially conceived and grasped as - a target. To conceive of the world as a target is to conceive of it as an object to be destroyed. As W.J. Perry, a former United States Under Secretary of the State for Defense, said: "If I had to sum up current thinking on precision missiles and saturation weaponry in a single sentence, I'd put it like this: once you can see the target, you can expect to destroy it." Increasingly, war would mean the production of maximal visibility and illumination for the purpose of maximal destruction. It follows that the superior method of guaranteeing efficient destruction by visibility during the Second World War was aerial bombing, which the United States continued even after Japan had made a conditional surrender."²⁶⁾

As Chow pointed out, the truth of the continual targeting of the world as the fundamental form of the knowledge including area studies and international studies is xenophobia, the inability to handle the otherness of the other beyond the orbit that is the bomber's own visual path.²⁷⁾ This kind of xenophobia is closely linked with the quest of the US for absolute security²⁸⁾ and the peculiar type of masculinity where they do not admit they own vulnerability at all.²⁹⁾ This kind of masculinity is based upon the exclusionary identity politics that tends to essentialize the dichotomy

between the safe inside and the dangerous outside. With regard to the relation between the (non-) violent formation of the collective identity and the exclusion of the threatening others, a feminist and queer theorist, Judith Butler, pointed out as follows while having in mind the political situation in the US after September 11, 2001.

“In a way, we all live with this particular vulnerability, a vulnerability to the other that is part of bodily life, a vulnerability to a sudden address from elsewhere that we cannot preempt. This vulnerability, however, becomes highly exacerbated under certain social and political conditions, especially those in which violence is a way of life and the means to secure self-defense are limited. Mindfulness of this vulnerability can become the basis of claims for non-military political solutions, just as denial of this vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery (an institutionalized fantasy of mastery) can fuel the instruments of war.”³⁰⁾

The current after September 11 shows us that the denial of the vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery dominates our political unconsciousness. This kind of reaction is supported by absolute supremacy in terms of military capabilities in the case of the US. Technological supremacy makes conditions for reproduction of Orientalism by which the West see the East as inferior or barbarous. In addition, such supremacy also brings about the imperialistic hubris, which promotes more violent reactions. As Chow also pointed out, “when anxiety about the United States’ loss of control over its target fields becomes overwhelming, bombing takes as its target the United States itself.”³¹⁾ We should call this kind of situation ‘the security paradox’ rather than the security dilemma because this problem derives from formation processes of violent subjectivity rather than interactions of each actor.

Through this kind of violent formation of subjectivity, they tend to de-humanize the dangerous enemy. Precision missile, the symbol of the RMA, and its derivative word ‘collateral damage’ play an important role to sanitize the war against the evil. For example, casualties of civilians are justified as collateral damage in the wars at Afghanistan and Iraq. Under the extremely asymmetric power relations, some realities of wars are dismissed from the mind of the winners’ while they are oppressed as unspeakable trauma in the mind of the losers’.

The logic of bandwagoning, which just follows this kind of the logic of preponderance of power, also dismissed some realities not only in the military affairs but also in the economic affairs. The logic of neo-liberalism also justifies unemployment and socio-economic polarizations as necessary costs for the structural adjustment and each person must take the responsibility for its negative consequences. The winners dismiss some hardships as necessary evil or collateral damage while the losers must endure them as heavy burden by themselves in the economic sphere as well as in the political sphere. In this sense, the logic of neo-liberalism is resonant with the logic of the preponderance of power. As Japanese realism just follows this current by saying that there is nothing for it but to swim in the tide, it loses potentialities to change the structures of realities and

narrows the range for options not only in the foreign policy but also in the economic policy. However oppressed memories of realities that Japanese realism might reemerge in another form.

4. Oppressed Memories and a Reactionary Movement to Recover Symbolic Phallus

If one aspect of realities is accepted as ‘authentic reality’ and is once naturalized, it becomes very difficult to slough off its stereotyped framework. Japanese realism also faces similar problems. Next, questions to be asked is how to de-naturalize this stereotyped realism. Related with this point, a feminist IR scholar, Cynthia Enloe, pointed out the problem of lack of curiosity³²⁾. For example, those who are not curious about hidden aspects of the international political economy do not realize even the existence of the so-called sweatshop issue behind fashionable apparel or shoes products. But if they have feminist curiosity, they can notice it through feminist glasses. In the same way, those who are indifferent to some realities including ‘collateral damages’ caused by precision bombing do not recognize hyper-militarization (hyper-masculinities) and its negative consequences. But if they have feminist or critical curiosity, they can notice it through glasses of critical IR.

In the case of recent revival of American hyper-militarism, the neo-conservatives play an important role and they tried to get back their own lost symbolic phallus in order to overcome the impotence situation, the so-called Vietnam syndrome³³⁾. We can situate the Panama invasion, the 1st and 2nd Gulf war in this context. On the other hand, how can we interpret the revival of hyper-masculinities in the case of Japan? After its defeat at the Second World War, Japan started as an emasculated one. However the US began to enforce us to become an American good boy to rearm himself because of the beginning of the full-scale Cold War. On the other hand, the constitutional constraint, the article 9 (and most of the people who supported it) has prevented Japan from becoming a fully armed state that can freely support the US in the military affairs. In other words, Japan wanted to be a good boy but still remained a feminized one during the Cold War (see Chart).

As Japanese American Soldiers played an exemplary (domestic model minority) in the American society, Japan has played a role of ‘the global model minority’ in the world order dominated by the US. This is an interesting aspect that historian T. Fujitani pointed out. According to him, “particularly in the cold war years, images of Japan underwent a miraculous metamorphosis, from a backward nation peopled by an insectlike or herdlike population, to the United States’ most reliable, friendly, and democratic ally (although racism and stereotypes obviously continued to exist in latent and sometimes blatant form). As the democratic, capitalist, and almost but not quite White nation, Japan came to be deployed as the new model for aspiring peoples of color through the world.”³⁴⁾ Even at the time of Iraq War, Bush tried to utilize this model as an exemplary while ignoring historical and cultural contexts and their differences. But this ‘global model minority’ is just minority which is actually something like the second-rate citizen. It cannot become a mature,

fully masculine comrade.

This feminized Japan is clearly represented by the protagonist appearing in the novel “Embracing Family (抱擁家族, 1965)” written by Nobuo Kojima (小島信夫). In this novel, the middle-class university lecturer, whose wife committed adultery with young American GI, cannot blame her and just flusters. This faint-hearted man represented the Japanese post-(lost)war society that lost the symbolic phallus while GI represented the shadow of the US that really dominated his family but this faint-hearted husband does not want to admit it³⁵). In the same way, loathsome historical realities, which some of Japanese does not want to admit, still haunt Japanese society and its oppressed memories upsurge intermittently as chauvinism.

But the end of the Cold War and, in particular, the impact of the 1st Gulf War drastically changed the political scenes around military policies in Japan. After the 1st Gulf War, the US pressured Japan to contribute to the military affairs more strongly. Japan is now becoming ‘a tough good boy’ by responding to this demand from the US (see Chart). On the other hand, some neo-nationalist movements led by the right wing politicians (including the former prime minister Shinzo Abe) and academic scholars emerged during the 1990s. First, they form ‘Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (新しい歴史教科書をつくる会)’ in 1996 and ‘Group of young Diet members for thinking the future of Japan and historical education (日本の前途と歴史教育を考える若手議員の会)’ in 1997. By using these platforms, they try to rewrite their national history along the chauvinistic line while denying their own responsibilities for the past human rights abuses such as the ‘comfort women’ issue under the former Japanese empire. They also attack feminist movements in Japan by claiming that feminism is destroying ‘the good Japanese family value’ and try to rewrite the article of the constitution about gender equality (article 24). In this way, the militarization of Japanese realism resonates with the backlash against feminism. They want to recover their own symbolic phallus to find their way out emasculated or feminized situations, but they must continue to obey to the US hegemony as a good boy. This is an ironical reality that Japanese realists must face. The neo-chauvinistic movement in Japan can be interpreted as some sort of men’s hysteria, the response to this double bind situation³⁶).

5. Japan as the Other in New Asian Regionalism: With reference to the Politics of Denial of Human Rights Abuses under the Former Empire

Neo-chauvinistic move in Japan has triggered anti-Japanese movements particularly in South Korea and China. Reacting to it, the right wing mass media in Japan shifts the responsibility onto the historical education influenced by anti-Japanese sentiment in both countries and furthermore stirs up anti-Chinese sentiment by exaggerating ‘the Chinese threat’ with some hawkish realists (e.g. Terumasa Nakanishi). Furthermore conflicts over the boundaries of collective memories have been whipped up by conflicts over the geographical boundaries around peripheral islands such as Dokdo (독도) / Takeshima (竹島) and Diàoyúdǎo (釣魚島) / Senkakushoto (尖閣諸島). The whole picture of these conflicts clearly shows isolating Japan in the East Asia as well as interact-

ing chauvinistic neo-nationalism derived from social discontent with neo-liberal governance. In short, this might be depicted partly as the dark side of the arrogant 'Empire of Sun' as well as the adjustment costs for the regional hegemonic shift.

While we notice deepening of regional integration at the west fringe (heading) of the Eurasian continent, why does another side, the East Asia, still face the fragmentation? Although many scholars point out the power shift from the west (the Atlantic) to the east (the Pacific), the east of the continent looks like the rear in terms of regional integrations. We cannot notice the deepening of regionalism apart from superficial regional arrangements such as ARF or APEC. With reference to the EU, Derrida underlines the simultaneous necessity to be responsive to the call for Europe and at the same time opening up to its Other, to avoid closing it down as being identical to itself³⁷). In this sense, regional integration might be an experiment for overcoming closed identities that have affinities with the realist way of thinking although even the EU is criticized for its using Islam-phobia (including Muslim migrants) as its other to consolidate the Fortress against the outside as a matter of fact.

Realities in Asia are far away from such an ideal. Even 'regionalism from above' is not mature. However Asian regionalism ironically seems to develop by targeting Japan (the US satellite) as the other because the former Japanese Empire and the memories of bitter experiences under its harsh domination are common denominators for integrating heterogeneous Asia. During the age of imperialism, some Japanese intellectuals tried to use the idea of Asian regionalism (the East Asian Alliance, 東亜連盟論) to overcome the Anglo-American hegemony and the western modernity. However, in point of fact, Japan practically used that idea for dominating Asia as another empire. That was clearly the negative consequences of over-adaptation to the logic of imperialism through the slogan of 'Exit from Asia, Enter Europe (脱亜入欧)'. However Japan has not fully taken those negative consequences yet as the issue of 'comfort women' indicates. Due to the beginning of the Cold War, Japan could avoid it by adapting itself to the logic of Americanism (American globalism) and the 'Japan problem' has remained intact.

This 'Japan problem' is partly derived from the characteristics of the national identity (ambivalent self-image) of Japan in the world politics, its marginality. During the age of imperialism, Japan tried to enter the family of western civilized nations while invading neighboring nations. After losing war, Japan has given the US-Japan alliance priority over other principles (attaching importance to Asian countries and the UN). Borrowing Chow's words, we can say that the former striking target is now a useful tool for the US to target the world and to contain threats including the idea of anti-hegemonic Asian regionalism such as Mahathir's EAEG. In short, while Japan has continued to accommodate itself to the logic of the powerful (from the West to the US), it has continued to play a paternalistic attitude toward neighbors. This kind of ambivalent character of Japanese liminal national identity has led to its isolation in Asia.

With regard to the politics of denial of human rights abuses under the Japanese Empire, we can explain it as an unconscious defense mechanism for coping with guilt, anxiety, and other dis-

turbing emotions aroused by ‘reality’. According to Stanly Cohen, the official and mainstream denial of human rights abuses usually takes the forms of following responses: 1) outright denial (It doesn’t happen); 2) discrediting (the organization was biased, manipulated or gullible) ; 3) renaming (Yes, something did happen but the state did not involve in it or it was not massacres) ; 4) justification (anyway it was morally justifies)³⁸⁾. We can observe this kind of denial reaction to the issue of ‘comfort women’ in the Japanese neo-nationalism. However as this neo-nationalist movement tends toward the historical revisionism much more, Japan will become the other to be excluded for consolidating the Asian community as well as the target to be attacked by other Asian neo-nationalism in China or Korea.

On the other hand, the issue of ‘comfort women’, which Japanese neo-nationalists want to deny or ignore, provided a chance for each civil society to form a transnational network for human rights. From December 8 to 12, 2000, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal was set by women’s NGO at Tokyo, Japan to consider the criminal liability of leading high-ranking Japanese officials including Emperor Hirohito and the separate responsibility of the state of Japan for rape and sexual slavery (the so-called ‘comfort women’ as crimes against humanity arising out of Japanese military activity in the Asia Pacific region in the 1930s and 1940s³⁹⁾. This tribunal’s establishment was organized by NGO of the offending country (VAWW-NET Japan⁴⁰⁾), NGO of victimized countries / areas (South / North Korea, China, Philippines, Indonesia, Netherlands etc.), and advisory groups from North and South America, Australia, Africa, Europe, and Asia. Survivors under the Japanese colonial violence have been uniting with each other by sharing their bitter memories and narratives beyond national boundaries. In some sense, the negative legacy of the former Japanese Empire ironically contributed to the formation of the post-Westphalia transnational network, which is proto-type of ‘Asian regionalism from below’. A transnational network excavates some realities, which Japanese realists tend to disown or ignore. That kind of movement with new imaginations are changing Asian regional politics from below as anarchists’ international network tried to change the Asian regional order from below almost one century ago⁴¹⁾.

Concluding Remarks

“This is the reality.” By saying this, we set limits to the sphere of realities, draw the lines beyond which we seem not to be able to surmount, and accept them as realities. If the lines are fixed, they are not so easy to be shifted. In other words, if the frame of reference (or the theory) , through which we observe the world, is fixed, it becomes difficult to adjust it to new realities it. However the content of realities will change and the lines limiting the sphere of ‘realities’ will shift responding to new situations and structural changes.

Japanese realism also now seems to shift its lines toward the more hawkish or masculinist position by responding to the new situation as described before. However the main characteristics of Japanese realism such as its one-dimensional views of realities, its tendency to perceive realities as given, and the logic of bandwagoning, remain intact. In the beginning of this paper, I cited

Masao Maruyama as the representative critiques of this kind of mainstream realism. His critiques still are useful for deconstructing and reconstructing Japanese IR and political studies. Again I want to quote one paragraph from his essay ‘Changes in the Perspectives at the End of Tokugawa Era—The Case of Shozan Sakuma—’.

“We often easily say, “Watch the realities”. However actual realities consist of complex and contradictory parts. So we construct the image of a world around us by picking up only some parts from innumerable realities through the glasses. To preach, “Watch the realities”, might be to impose their own images consisted of selected ‘realities’ through their glasses. Otherwise, they just watch the world through the ready-made glasses without being aware of them. —Our perceptions are always mediated by value-laden ready-made glasses or prisms, through which we unconsciously watch the world. However we cannot grasp new situations of the world through ready-made glasses. That is the point that Shozan emphasized.”⁴²⁾

This paragraph might be re-interpreted as follows. We cannot grasp new situations through ready-made Japanese realist glasses. In one sense, a part of his works could be the forerunner of deconstructive critical approach in the Japanese IR and political studies. To follow this critical alternative approach, we need imaginations with which we can transcend the limiting boundaries fixed by realist way of thinking. Cynthia Enloe might call them feminist curiosities⁴³⁾. To be more radical, we may rename them queer curiosities. By these curiosities or imaginations, we can notice hidden realities that could not be seen through ready-made glasses and deconstruct naturalized epistemology to reach new realities. These imaginations are not idealism, not the opposite of realism. They are deconstructive moves to go beyond the naturalized dichotomies such as realism / idealism. By such a move, we can discover realities masked by the Japanese realism and can design the alternative chart with which we can go reach the new horizon as the new transnational network for the issue of ‘comfort women’ did.

Chart A : The New Phase of Japanese Realism and other standpoints.





Chart B : Types of Masculinities in the Eyes of the Hegemony



Notes

- 1) *Of Grammatology*, pp.141-64,
- 2) Jonathan Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p.93.
- 3) Barbara Johnson, 'Translator's Introduction', in Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, translated, with introduction and additional notes, by Barbara Johnson (University of Chicago Press, 1981), p.viii.
- 4) Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," in *Limited Inc* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p.21.
- 5) Culler, *On Deconstruction*, p.109.
- 6) Derrida, "Signature Event Context", p.21.
- 7) Masao Maruyama, 'The pitfalls of realism', *Sekai* (『世界』), May 1952. In Japanese. (丸山眞男『『現実』主義の陥穽』『丸山眞男集 第5巻 (1950—1953)』岩波書店, 1995年,) 1995年, pp.193-209
- 8) Masataka Kosaka and his epigones could be cited as representative Japanese realists. See Masataka Kosaka, *Collected Papers of Kosaka Masataka* (高坂正堯著作集) vol.1-8. Tokyo: Toshishuppan (都市出版), 1998-2001. In Japanese.
- 9) Here I borrow the word 'Hiroshima Realism' and 'Okinawa Realism' from Yoshikazu Sakamoto's work. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, *Collected Papers of Sakamoto Yoshikazu* (坂本義和集4) vol.4, Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten (岩波書店), 2004, In Japanese. Sakamoto usually had been placed as an opponent of Kosaka in the Japanese IR during the 1960s and 1970s.
- 10) The Informal Advisory Committee of the Security and Defense, 'The Vision of National Security and Defense for the Future', 2004. In Japanese. (安全保障と防衛力に関する懇談会『『安全保障と防衛力に関する懇談会』報告書——未来への安全保障・防衛力ビジョン』) Among members of the committee, we notice some typical pro-US realists such as Makoto Iokibe and Akihiko Tanaka who take the similar position with Kosaka.
- 11) For example, See Narahiko Toyoshita, *Materialization of the US-Japan Security Treaty: the Yoshida Diplomacy and the Emperor's Diplomacy* Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1996. In Japanese. (豊下楯彦『安保条約の成立——吉田外交と天皇外交』岩波新書)
- 12) Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.256.
- 13) Masao Maruyama, 'The Mental Mode of Militaristic Dominators', *Choryu* (潮流), May 1949. In Japanese. (丸山眞男『軍国支配者の精神形態』『丸山眞男集 第4巻 1949—1950』岩波書店, 1995, pp. 97-142.)
- 14) As Hoffman pointed out, IR itself is American paradigm. In that sense, realism in IR could also be American paradigm made of imports from Europe. Stanley Hoffman, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', *Daedalus* 106, 1977, pp.41-59.
- 15) Mohammed Ayoob, 'Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World', in *International Relations Theory and the Third World*. Edited by Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.31-54; Carlos Escudé, 'An Introduction to Peripheral Realism: Realism and Its Implications for the Interstate System: Argentina and C ndor Project', in *ibid.*, pp.55-76.
- 16) Yonosuke Nagai, 'A Restraint and a Choice in the Japanese Diplomacy', *A Price for Peace*. Chuokoronsha, 1976. In Japanese. (永井陽之助『日本外交における拘束と選択』『平和の代償』中央公論社)
- 17) Pace Ikenberry, a multilateral framework is not always useful for the US to govern the globe. According to Ikenberry, "the open character of the American polity and a web of multilateral institutions allow the US to exercise strategic restraint and establish stable relations among the industrial democracies despite rapid shifts and extreme disparities in power." G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), *passim*.
- 18) Melvyn P. Leffer, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and*

- the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
- 19) Soft balancing involves the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the United Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if the United States goes beyond the international rules and norms. See T.V. Paul, 'Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy', *International Security*, 30 (1), 2005, pp.46-71.
 - 20) Michael Hard and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000)
 - 21) Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (N.Y.: Owl Books, 2004)
 - 22) Michael Hard and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p.37; Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*. Translated by Kevin Attell, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p.2; Hiroyuki Tosa, 'De-territorial terrorism, Post-modern Empire System and Global Civil War', *Gendai Shiso* (*The Modern Thought*, 現代思想), 29 (13), 2001, pp.151-155. In Japanese.
 - 23) Robert Kagan, 'Higher Realism', *The Washington Post*, January 23, 2005.
 - 24) John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, 'An Unnecessary War', *Foreign Policy*. January / February 2003, pp.50-59.
 - 25) Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.103-108.
 - 26) Rey Chow, *The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p.31
 - 27) Chow, *ibid.* p.42
 - 28) James Chace and Clabe Carr, *America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars* (New York: Summit Books, 1988), pp.11-16.
 - 29) With regard to this point, see Cynthia Weber, *Faking it: U.S. Hegemony in a "post-Phallic" Era* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)
 - 30) Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004), p.29.
 - 31) Chow, *The Age of the World Target*, p.43.
 - 32) Cynthia Enloe, *The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p.3.
 - 33) With regard to this point, see Susan Jeffords, *The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp.168-186.
 - 34) T. Fujitani, 'Go For Broke, the Movies: Japanese American Soldiers in U.S. National, Military, and Racial Discourses', in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War (s)* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), p.253.
 - 35) With regard to this interpretation, see Chizuko Ueno 'Jun Etoh's Post War (江藤淳の戦後)', *Chunichi Newspaper* (『中日新聞』), 12 September 1995. In Japanese. (上野千鶴子『上野千鶴子が文学を社会学する』朝日新聞社), 2003, pp.148-153)
 - 36) Lisa Yoneyama 'Re-narrating Wars and Masculinity during the Post-Cold War', in *Asia 'Pacific Wars*. Tokyo: Iwanamishoten. In Japanese. (米山リサ「戦争の語り直しとポスト冷戦のマスキュリニティ」『岩波講座 アジア・太平洋戦争 なぜ、いまアジア・太平洋戦争か』岩波書店, 2005, pp.317-356)
 - 37) Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992)
 - 38) Stanley Cohen, *States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering* (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp.76-116.
 - 39) Christine M.Chinkin, 'Women's International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery', *American Journal of International Law* 95 (2), April 2001, pp.335-341.
 - 40) VAWW is an abbreviation of 'Violence against Women in War-Network Japan'. The website of VAWW-Net Japan is as follows.
<http://www1.jca.apc.org/vaww-net-japan/english/index.html>

Its founder, Yayori Matsui (松井やより) was a journalist and Christian. Korean feminists, Yun Chung-ok (윤정옥, 尹貞玉) and Lee Hyo-chae (이효재) who support this movement are also Christian. In this sense, the movement could be depicted as a Christian network for human rights beyond national boundaries. With regard to the Korean side of the movement for 'comfort women', see Chunghee Sarah Soh, 'The Korean "Comfort Women": Movement for redress', *Asian Survey* 36 (12), 1996, pp.1226-1240.

- 41) With regard to the anarchists' international network in Asia around the end of 19th century, see Benedict Anderson, *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-colonial Imagination* (London: Verso, 2005).
- 42) Masao Maruyama, 'Changes in the Perspectives at the End of Tokugawa Era—The Case of Shozan Sakuma—', *Tenbo* (『展望』), May, 1965. In Japanese. (丸山眞男「幕末における視座の変革——佐久間象山の場合——」『丸山眞男集 第9巻(1961—1968)』) 岩波書店, 1995, pp.203-250)
- 43) Enloe, *The Curious Feminist*, p.3.